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Bio safety
In stitutional Biosafety Commitee (IBC)
IBC Overview
Institutional Bi osafety Committee (IBC) registration is required pr ior to use of 'biohazards' in
Policy
Training

research. Under UMaine policy, 'biohazard' includes recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules (in cluding plants), biological materials/ biospecim ens (human and animal blood,
bodily fluids, and/or tissues), infectious agents* or select agents/toxins. (*The University of

Fonns & Resources
IBCFAQs

Maine has defined "infectious agents" as all bacterial, parasitic, fungal, viral, and prion,
inclu ded within Class 2 or higher classes; See Append ix B of NIH Guidelines.)
For guidance on whether yo ur biohazards work requ ires IBC or other approvals, view
the IBC Protocol Sub-nission Decision Tree .
Questions regarding the IBC may be directed to umric@maine.edu.

May 15, 2020 Update from the NIH Office of Science Policy: The NIH
Office of Science Policy has issued Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
regarding inter im biosafety guidance for research w ith SARS-CoV-2 and
relevant Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) requirem ents under
the NIH Guidelines. Appendi x B of the NIH Guidelines provides the basis
for the classification of biohazardous agents by Risk Group (RG). At the

present time, SARS-CoV-2 best meets the definition of a RG3 agent and
IBCs should consider the agent to be RG3 as a starting point in their
r isk assessments when reviewing research subject to the NIH

Guidelines. The RG classification may change over t ime as additional
infor mation about the virus, such as potential treatments or the
developm ent of an effective vaccine, becomes availabl e.
Additional interim biosafety_guidance for research with SARS-CoV-2 and
IBC reauirements under the NIH Guidelines

Up next: Pol i!:)'

Contact for IBC Question s
umric@ma ine.edu
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IBC Protocol Submission Flow Chart
University of Maine Office of Research Compliance

Link to Plain Text Version of IBC Protocol Submission Decision Tree

“I am planning on conducting research involving biological materials,
which may include molecules, bacteria, viruses, arthropods,
recombinant DNA-technology or creating transgenic lines of
organisms as research models.”
If you agree with this statement, review all three questions below
to determine protocol submissions needed for your research.

Are you working with animals?

Are you working with biological/
synthetic molecules?

Are you working with human
cells/cell lines?

No

Yes

No

IBC and IACUC protocol approval may
be required. Submit a registration to
the IBC and contact the IACUC for
more information.
Adapted from Villanova IBC Flow Chart

Yes

No action is
required with
the IBC.

IBC protocol approval may be required.
Submit a registration to the IBC.

No

Yes

IBC and IRB approval may be required.
Submit a registration to the IBC and
contact the IRB for more information.
Contact umric@maine.edu with further questions.
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I.

Preamble
The University of Maine acknowledges and accepts responsibility for ensuring
that research using recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules (including
plants), biological materials/biospecimens (human and animal blood, bodily
fluids, and/or tissues), infectious agents* or select agents/toxins is carried out in a
safe and responsible manner. For the purpose of this Policy, the term “biohazard”
refers to all of the preceding.
The University of Maine accepts and incorporates into the policy the Department
of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, Guidelines for
Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules (NIH
Guidelines), April 2019 and amendments thereafter, and applicable government
regulations.
*The University of Maine has defined "infectious agents" as all bacterial,
parasitic, fungal, viral, and prion, included within Class 2 or higher classes. (See
Appendix B of NIH Guidelines.)

II.

Responsibilities of the University of Maine
A.

Establish, implement, and maintain policies that provide for the
safe conduct of research involving biohazards, and that ensure
compliance with all applicable guidelines, in particular state and
federal guidelines. The University may also establish whatever
additional precautionary steps it deems appropriate.

B.

Maintain an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) that meets
the requirements set forth in Section III of this Policy.

C.

Appoint a Biosafety Officer (BSO) who shall be a member of the
IBC and carry out the duties specified in Section VI of this Policy.

D.

Appoint an Authorized Institutional Official (AIO) who shall carry
out the duties specified in Section VII of this Policy.

E.

Ensure that investigators responsible for research covered by this
Policy comply with the provisions of Section IV of this Policy and
assist them in doing so.

F.

Ensure appropriate training for the IBC Chair and members, the
BSO, Principal Investigators (PI), and laboratory staff regarding
this Policy, its implementation, and laboratory safety.
Responsibility for training IBC members is carried out through the
IBC Chair. Responsibility for training laboratory staff is carried
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out through the PI. The University of Maine is responsible for
seeing that the PI has sufficient training.
G.

III.

Review and approve all BSL-3 research proposals and work with
the BSO to ensure users have proper proficiency and training,
including a minimum of 10-15 hours of observation time by the
BSO. (Note: Work with agents or materials at BSL-3 requires
registration, institutional approvals, and training beyond that
required for other research at UMaine as set forth by state and
federal regulations, CDC/NIH Guidelines and UMaine policy.)

The Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)
A.

Responsibilities and Authority of the IBC:
1.

Provide review and approval, require modifications in or
withhold approval of new protocols or significant changes
in previously approved protocols of research utilizing
biohazards under NIH Guidelines.
This review shall include:
a.

Assessing independently, the containment levels
required for the proposed research.

b.

Judging whether the Principal Investigator has
sufficient training to provide for the safe conduct of
the proposed research.

c.

Assessing the adequacy of facilities, procedures,
and practices.

d.

Notifying the Principal Investigator of the results of
their review.

Protocols receiving IBC approval may be subject to further
administrative review by the AIO or by another officer of
the University appointed to that purpose by the President.
This review may result in limitations and restrictions on the
use of biohazards beyond that required by the IBC. In
extreme cases, approval for the use of biohazards may be
denied or revoked. Under no circumstances can the
administration approve a project not approved by the IBC
or ease any restrictions imposed by the IBC.
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2.

Review annually research approved by or reported to the
Committee involving the use of biohazards, and report to
the AIO any instances in which the requirements of this
Policy are not being fulfilled.

3.

Determine, in connection with each project, the necessity
for a health surveillance program for research personnel,
and notify the AIO if such a health surveillance program is
needed.

4.

Ensure Principal Investigators establish written emergency
plans, in concert with existing institutional emergency
planning, covering accidental spills and/or personnel
contamination resulting from research with biohazards.

5.

Report at once to the AIO suspensions of research activity,
significant problems with or violations of this Policy, and
any significant research-related accidents or illnesses.

6.

Review suspensions of research activity ordered by the
BSO and determine whether the activity shall:
a.
b.
c.

7.
B.

proceed without changes; or
proceed only with changes; or
terminate.

Perform additional functions as may be assigned to the
IBC.

Membership of the IBC:
1.

The IBC shall recommend to the AIO, and the President of
the University (or designee) shall appoint, members of the
IBC to three-year terms. Members may be reappointed to
further terms. The President (or designee) may also
appoint alternates when desirable. Such alternates shall
have the same voting privileges as the member for whom
they substitute.

2.

The President (or designee) shall appoint one member of
the IBC to serve as Chair for a term of two years; the
member may be reappointed to additional terms. The Chair
shall normally be a member of the University’s tenured
faculty who engages in research with biohazards and who
has substantial experience in the review of research with
biohazards.
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3.

The IBC shall comprise no fewer than five members, so
selected that they collectively have sufficient experience,
expertise, and technical capability to assess the safety of
research experiments involving the biohazards and to
identify any potential risk to public health or the
environment. The IBC shall include:
a.

At least two members who are not affiliated with
the University (apart from their membership on the
IBC) and shall represent the interest of the
surrounding community with respect to health and
protection of the environment. Members meet this
requirement if, for example, they are officials of
State or local public health or environmental
protection agencies, members of other local
governmental bodies, or persons active in medical,
occupational health, or environmental concerns in
the community.

b.

The BSO of the University. The BSO will be an exofficio member with voting rights.

c.

Persons with expertise in the technology, biological
safety, and physical containment of biohazards, in
order to ensure the competence necessary to review
research activities involving biohazards.

d.

The IBC may require the inclusion of experts (e.g.,
plant, plant pathogen, or plant pest containment
expert, animal containment expert) when University
has research using biohazards involving plants or
animals requiring IBC approval.

An individual who meets the requirements of more than
one of these categories may fulfill more than one
requirement. However, the IBC may not consist of fewer
than five members.
In addition, the AIO, to whom this committee reports, shall
be available as a consultant in matters concerning
institutional commitments, policies, applicable law,
standards of professional conduct and practice, community
attitudes, and the environment.
4.

No member of an IBC may be involved (except to provide
information requested by the IBC) in the review or
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approval of a project in which he or she has been or expects
to be engaged or has a direct financial interest.
IV.

Responsibilities of the Principal Investigator
On behalf of the University of Maine, the Principal Investigator (PI) is
responsible for complying fully with this Policy and the NIH Guidelines in the
conduct of research involving biohazards.
A.

General Responsibilities of the PI:
1.

a) Abstain from initiation or modification of research
involving biohazards until that research or the proposed
modification has been approved by the IBC and all other
requirements of this Policy have been met;
b) Ensure that reporting requirements are fulfilled and is
accountable for any reporting lapses.

2.

Determine whether experiments involving biohazards are
covered by Section III-E of the NIH Guidelines,
Experiments that Require IBC Notice Simultaneous with
Initiation and follow the appropriate procedures.

3.

Report immediately any significant problems, violations of
the NIH Guidelines, or any significant research-related
accidents and illnesses to the Biosafety Officer and the IBC
Chair. Faculty, staff and students are encouraged to report
‘near misses’ in support of continuous improvement of the
program.
a) Report laboratory acquired infections (LAIs) to UMS
Risk Management (RM) through JIRA or the
appropriate incident reporting software.

4.

Report to the IBC new information bearing on this Policy.

5.

Be adequately trained in good microbiological techniques
and laboratory safety.

6.

Adhere to approved emergency plans for dealing with
accidental spills and personnel contamination (this includes
having appropriate spill kit materials on hand); and

7.

Comply with shipping and permitting requirements for
biohazards. (See Appendix H of the NIH Guidelines.
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B.

Responsibilities of the PI to the IBC:
1.

Make the initial determination of the required levels of
physical and biological containment in accordance with this
Policy.

2.

Select appropriate microbiological practices and laboratory
techniques to be used in the research.

3.

Submit the initial research protocol and also subsequent
changes (e.g., changes in the source of or synthetic nucleic
acid or host-vector system) to the IBC for review and
approval or disapproval.

4.

Remain in communication with the IBC throughout the
conduct of the project.

5.

Annually submit to the IBC whether:
a) Research is occurring as-is with no modification
b) Research has been amended or modified (to include
personnel transition or location change)
c) Research has been suspended or terminated
d) Research has ended

C.

D.

Responsibilities of the PI Prior to Initiating Research:
1.

Be adequately trained in good microbiological techniques
and laboratory safety to provide for the safe conduct of the
proposed research.

2.

Make available to the laboratory staff the protocols that
describe the potential biohazards and the precautions to be
taken.

3.

Instruct and train staff in the practices and techniques
required to ensure safety and in the procedures for dealing
with accidents, and maintain copies of training records (it is
recommended that training records be signed by both
parties).

4.

Inform the staff of the reasons and provisions for any
precautionary medical practices advised or requested, such
as vaccinations or serum collection.

Responsibilities of the PI during the Conduct of the Research:
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V.

1.

Supervise the safety performance of the staff to ensure that
the required safety practices and techniques are employed.

2.

Investigate and report in writing to the IBC and BSO any
significant problems pertaining to the operation and
implementation of containment practices and procedures.

3.

Correct work errors and conditions that may result in the
release of biohazards.

4.

Ensure the integrity of the physical containment (e.g.,
biological safety cabinets) and the biological containment
(e.g., purity and genotypic and phenotypic characteristics).

Responsibilities of the Department Chair or Unit Director
The chair of any department or director of any unit in which research using
biohazards is conducted shall be familiar with this policy and shall exercise the
following responsibilities:

VI.

A.

Assure compliance with this policy.

B.

Provide appropriate resources to adequately support infrastructure,
equipment and staffing needs.

C.

Assure proper management of the laboratory facilities and allow
only those research projects to be conducted for which the facilities
are adequate and safe.

D.

Assure proper supervision of research personnel.

E.

Nominate, at the request of the AIO (from among members of the
department or unit), representatives to serve on the IBC.

Responsibilities of the Biosafety Officer (BSO)
A.

Ensure through periodic inspections that laboratory standards are
rigorously followed.

B.

Suspend any research activity if he/she determines that the activity
is not being conducted in a safe and responsible manner.

C.

Report to the IBC Chair significant problems with and violations
of this Policy and any significant research-related accidents and
illnesses of which the BSO becomes aware unless the BSO
determines that report has already been filed by the PI.
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VII.

D.

Develop emergency plans for dealing with accidental spills and
personnel contamination and investigating research laboratory
accidents involving biohazards.

E.

Provide technical advice on laboratory security and safety.

F.

Provide technical advice to PI and IBC on research safety
procedures.

G.

Liaise with University System or UMaine occupational safety
representation on non-biosafety related concerns.

H.

Encourage PIs to report LAIs to RM through JIRA or the
appropriate incident reporting software. Follow up with RM as
necessary and as requested by the IBC Chair.

I.

Liaise with local emergency responders to include technical
hazardous material responders (i.e. Orono Fire Department) and
UMS Safety Management staff, as needed.

Responsibilities of the Authorized Institutional Official (AIO)
A.

Provide administrative oversight and serve as the institutional
representative responsible for reporting to the National Institutes of Health
and other cognizant federal agencies.

B.

Report within 30 days to the National Institutes of Health Office of
Biotechnology Activities any significant problems with and
violations of the NIH Guidelines and significant research-related
accidents and illnesses.

C.

Take appropriate, corrective action to remedy reported safety
problems or Policy violations and report that action to the IBC.

D.

Forward the names of individuals to be appointed to the IBC by the
President (or designee). In addition, the AIO forwards the name of
one member to be appointed by the President (or designee) to serve
as Chair for a term of two years.

E.

Maintain official files of the IBC.

F.

Make available to the public, upon request, all minutes of IBC
meetings and any documents submitted to or received from
funding agencies which the latter are required to make available to
the public. If comments are made by members of the public on
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IBC actions, the University shall forward to NIH both the
comments and the IBC's response.
VIII. Required Training
All personnel who work with biohazards are required to complete
biosafety/biosecurity training through the university’s Collaborative
Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) subscription. Note: Significant inperson training, including a minimum of 10-15 hours of observation by the
BSO, is required for personnel who will be involved in BSL-3 research. A
BSL-3 Biosafety Manual describing all procedures that must be followed
by researchers in the BSL-3 facility is made available during training.
IX. Export Control Regulations
Some materials that are registered with IBC are also controlled by U.S.
Export Control regulations (ECR). These laws and regulations may
require federal agency approval or a license before any controlled
materials may be exported out of the U.S. or transferred to foreign persons
within the U.S. (See the Office of Research Compliance Export Control
Regulations Overview.)
X.

Dual Use Research of Concern
Dual use research of concern (DURC) is life sciences research that, based
on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide
knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly
misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences
to public health and safety, agricultural crops, and other plants, animals,
the environment, material, or national security.
Investigators at the University of Maine wishing to conduct or sponsor life
sciences research that involves one or more of the agents or toxins listed,
and produces, aims to produce, or is reasonably anticipated to produce one
or more of the effects listed in the “categories of experiments” are required
to contact the IBC. The research will be evaluated by the IBC for DURC
potential. (Note: Planned work with Select Agents or Toxins, even if not
potentially DURC, should be discussed with the IBC as it requires
registration with the CDC under the Federal Select Agent Program. A list
of Select Agents and Toxins can be found on the Federal Select Agent
Program website.)
Life sciences research that raises dual use concerns will be reviewed by
the IBC, acting as the Institutional Review Entity, in accordance with the
United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life
Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (USG Policy). The IBC will
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maintain records of DURC reviews and risk mitigation plans in
accordance with USG Policy.
Agents and toxins (The 15 agents and toxins listed in the USG Policy are subject
to the select agent regulations (42 CFR Part 73, 7 CFR Part 331, and 9 CFR Part
121), which set forth the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of select
agents and toxins, and have the potential to pose a severe threat to human, animal,
or plant health, or to animal or plant products. It is important to note, however,
that the Federal Select Agent Program does not oversee the implementation of the
USG Policy or the March 2012 DURC Policy.)
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic)
Bacillus anthracis
Botulinum neurotoxin (For the purposes of the USG Policy, there are no
exempt quantities of botulinum neurotoxin. Research involving any
quantity of botulinum neurotoxin should be evaluated for DURC
potential.)
Burkholderia mallei
Burkholderia pseudomallei
Ebola virus
Foot-and-mouth disease virus
Francisella tularensis
Marburg virus
Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus
Rinderpest virus
Toxin-producing strains of Clostridium botulinum
Variola major virus
Variola minor virus
Yersinia pestis

Categories of experiments
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Enhances the harmful consequences of the agent or toxin
Disrupts immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization against the
agent or toxin without clinical and/or agricultural justification
Confers to the agent or toxin resistance to clinically and/or agriculturally
useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin
or facilitates their ability to evade detection methodologies
Increases the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate the
agent or toxin
Alters the host range or tropism of the agent or toxin
Enhances the susceptibility of a host population to the agent or toxin
Generates or reconstitutes an eradicated or extinct agent or toxin listed
above
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XI. Resources
A.

Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health,
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid
Molecules, April 2019

B.

University of Maine, Office of Research Compliance, Export Control
Regulations Overview

C.

The United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life
Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (PDF), Sept. 2015

D.

Federal Select Agent Program

Bio safety
Biosafety Training Instructions
IBC Overview
The University's Policies and Procedures for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic

Policy

Nucleic Acid Molecules or Infectious Agents include a training requirem ent. Research ers
must complete biosafety/biosecu rity training through the university's current CITI

Training

subscription. All students, postdocs, techn icians working in your research lab should also

Fonns & Resources

complete the t raining. Please be sure to inform them of this requirement and keep
documentation of training.

IBCFAQs

Instructions for CITI Training_(PDF)
NOTE: While the training requirement is directed prim arily to researchers, if a course
involves the use of BL-2 materials, th e instructor is required to complete the training.
The four specific modules you are required to complete are:
• Introduction to Biosafety
• Basic Biosafety Training (NOTE: this will show up as "Training for Investigators, Staff
and Students Handling Biohazards" in your list of courses once added)
• Select Agents, Bi osecurity and Bioter rorism
• NIH Recombinant DNA (rDNA Guidelines)
Up next: For ms & Resources
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Instructions to Access CITI Training
Office of Research Compliance (ORC), University of Maine

The Office of Research Compliance (ORC) delivers a variety of research training through the
University of Maine System (UMS) subscription service to the Collaborative Institutional
Training Initiative (CITI). These instructions guide you through the institution-specific CITI
registration and enrollment processes. Further information about Research Compliance at the
University of Maine and training requirements can be found on the ORC website.
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are only required to complete the training(s) for your specific area(s)
of research compliance.
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I.

Establish a CITI Account
a. Please note: if you have previously set up a CITI account, please do NOT
create another one. See Section II (Log into CITI as an Existing User) of this
document for guidance.
b. Go to CITI Program (https://about.citiprogram.org/) and click on the white
“Register” button located in the upper right hand corner of the homepage.

c. Search for ‘University of Maine System’ in the section titled ‘Select your
Organizational Affiliation’ and click on it.
i. Click the check boxes to agree to the CITI Terms of Service and Privacy
Policy, and to agree that you are an affiliate of the University of
Maine System.
ii. Click the “Continue to SSO Login/Instructions”
iii. Note: No action is needed in the bottom section titled “Independent
Learner Registration.”
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d. Under “Associate your SSO account with a CITI Program account” click “I
don’t have a CITI Program account and I need to create one.”
i. Click the button that appears below labeled “Create A New CITI
Program Account.”

ii. This will automatically create an account for you using your UMaine
SSO (Single Sign-On), the same login information used to log into the
UMaine Portal, etc. You should also receive a confirmation email via
your maine.edu email address with this information.

II.

Log into CITI as an Existing User
a. To log into CITI once you have established your CITI account, go to CITI
Program (https://about.citiprogram.org/) and click the blue “Log In” button
located in the upper right hand corner of the homepage.

b. On the login page, click the center option labeled “Log In Through My
Organization.”
c. On the list of organizations that appears, click on “University of Maine
System” and you will be logged in using your UMaine SSO.
d. NOTE: if you already had an account set up with CITI from another
institution, you can affiliate that existing account with UMaine. See
instructions from CITI on how to add/change your affiliated institution.
3

III.

Enroll in CITI Courses
a. New Users
i. After you enroll, you will be brought to your “My Courses” page.
Under “Institutional Courses,” click the button next to University of
Maine System labeled “View Courses.”

ii. You will be brought to the “Select Curriculum” page. Select any
desired course(s) from the list. See section IV (Required Trainings) of
this document for details on which specific trainings are required for
each area of research.
iii. Once you have made your selection(s), hit the “Submit” button at the
bottom of the page (Note: you are able to sign up for additional
courses later, after you have made this initial selection – see section
III.b [Returning Users] of this documentfor instructions).
b. Returning Users
i. After logging into CITI as a returning user, you will be brought to the
“My Courses” page. Click on the “View Courses” button next to the
University of Maine System (as shown above under New Users).
ii. On this page, you will see a list of all courses you are currently
enrolled in and have previously completed.
iii. To enroll in another course, scroll to the very bottom of the page to
the section labeled “Learner Tools for University of Maine System.”
Click the link for “Add a Course.”
iv. You will be brought to the “Select Curriculum” page. Select any
desired course(s) from the list. See section IV (Required Trainings) of
this document for details on which specific trainings are required for
each area of research compliance.

4

IV. Required Trainings
PLEASE NOTE: You are only required to take the trainings for your specific area(s) of
research compliance.
If you are unsure of which trainings may be required for your research, please explore
the resources available on the ORC website and reach out to the ORC for additional
guidance as needed.
Once you know which trainings are required for your research, find the relevant
compliance area below and follow the instructions to sign up. See section III (Enroll in CITI
Courses) of this document for instructions on how to enroll as a new or existing CITI users.

a. Animal Care
i. Visit Animal Care on the ORC website for guidance on when and for
whom this training is required.
ii. To enroll, on Question 6, select the required course “Working with
the IACUC” (as shown below). In addition to the required “Working
with the IACUC” course, we strongly recommend you take modules
from these sections that apply to your research.

List continues – see the CITI enrollment page for the full list of available modules. In
addition to the required “Working with the IACUC” course, we strongly recommend
you take modules from these sections that apply to your research.
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b. Biosafety
i. Visit Biosafety on the ORC website for guidance on when and for
whom this training is required.
ii. To enroll, on Question 7, select the following 4 courses:
1. Introduction to Biosafety
2. Basic Biosafety Training (Note: after enrollment, on My
Courses page, the title will appear as “Training for
Investigators, Staff and Students Handling Biohazards.”)
3. Select Agents, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism
4. NIH Recombinant DNA (rDNA Guidelines)
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c. Conflict of Interest
i. Visit Conflict of Interest on the ORC website for guidance on when
and for whom this training is required.
ii. To enroll, on Question 5, select “Conflicts of Interest (All OTHER
University of Maine System Campuses).”

d. Export Control
i. Visit Export Control on the ORC website for guidance on when and for
whom this training is required.
ii. To enroll, on Question 8, select “CITI Export Controls.” (Note: after
enrollment, on My Courses page, the title will appear as “CITI Export
Controls Course.”)
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e. Human Subjects
i. Visit Human Subjects on the ORC website for guidance on when and
for whom this training is required.
ii. On Question 1, select one learner group based on your role and the
research you will be conducting. You will be able to go back and add
another learner group later on, if needed.
1. The most common selection is “Social & Behavioral Research
Investigators,” shown below. (Note: after enrollment, on My
Courses page, the title will appear as “Social & Behavioral
Research - Basic/Refresher.”)
2. The Biomedical Research Investigators course can be selected
for researchers that are conducting mostly biomedical research.

f. Responsible Conduct of Research
i. Visit Responsible Conduct of Research on the ORC website for
guidance on when and for whom this training is required.
ii. On Question 4, select “General Responsible Conduct of Research
Course.” (Note: after enrollment, on My Courses page, the title will
appear as “General RCR.”)
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As a reminder, please note that you are only required to take the trainings for
your specific area(s) of research compliance. If you are unsure of which trainings
may be required for your research, please explore the resources available on the
ORC website and reach out to the ORC for additional guidance as needed.

V. Access CITI User Records and Reports
a. Users can access training records and Completion Reports through the “My
Records” link in the menu bar at the top of the CITI page.
b. CITI will automatically alert ORC when you complete training, however there
is a slight delay. ORC is also able to view in CITI when your training is
complete. Please do not need to send copies of completion reports to ORC.
i. If you require immediate assistance (i.e. you've just completed
Financial Conflicts of Interest training and need access to PARS),
please contact sponsored@maine.edu.
ii. For all other CITI training inquiries, please contact umric@maine.edu.
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Bio safety
Forms & Resources
IBC Overview

Forms

Policy

• Biosa fetY. Checklist (Word) (recommended that BLS2 labs conduct a self-audit on a

Training

yearly basis)
Fonns & Resources

• IBC Registration form (Word) (please complete the form and email
to umric@maine.edu with IBC Registration in the subject line of the email)

IBCFAQs

Resources
• CDC Biosafefy. in Microbiologica l and Biomedical Laborator ies
• Federal Select Agent Program
• IBC MembershiP- List
• IBC Protocol Subm ission Decision Tree: Flow Chart (PDE); IBC Protocol Subm ission
Decision Tree: Text Ver sion (PDF)
• NIH Biosafefy. Guidelines

o NIH Guidelines for Research Invo lving Recombinant or SY.nthetic Nucleic Acid
Molecules [8Wil 2019)
• United States Government PolicY. for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use
Rc-:;corch of Concern

f
Apply

Student Resources

D

Nond,scnm,naoon notice

Clery Safety and Security Report

Un1ve1,;1ty of Marne
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- -

~

_

@)

C0\1ID-19 health and safety guidance

Emergency

BIOSAFETY CHECKLIST (BSL-2)
Re: CDC BMBL/5th Edition

Building
Room:
PI:
Inspection
Date:

Department:
Phone Number:

Biosafety Level 2
A. Standard Microbiological Practices
1. The Principal Investigator (PI) establishes and enforces policies that
limit access to the lab.
2. Persons must wash hands after working with potentially hazardous
materials and before leaving the lab.
3. Eating, drinking, storing food, applying cosmetics, etc., is not permitted
in the lab.
4. Mouth pipetting prohibited; mechanical pipetting devices must be used.
5. Policies for the safe handling of sharps, such as needles, scalpels,
pipettes, and broken glassware must be developed and implemented.
6. Perform procedures to minimize the creation of splashes and aerosols.
7. Decontaminate work surfaces after completion of work and after any
spill or splash of potentially infectious material with disinfectant.
8. Decontaminate all infectious material before disposal using an effective
method. Durable leak proof containers must be used if decon takes place
outside of lab.
9. A sign incorporating the universal biohazard symbol must be posted at
the entrance to the lab. Should show agent, BSL level, PPE, name, phone
nos.
10. PI must ensure that lab personnel receive appropriate training
regarding their duties, precautions to prevent exposures and exposure
evaluation procedures.
B. Special Practices (When required):
1. All persons entering the lab must be advised of the hazards and meet
specific entry/exit requirements.
2. Lab personnel must be provided medical surveillance and offered
appropriate immunizations for agents handled in the lab.
3. Laboratory specific biosafety manual/Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) must be prepared and adopted as policy. This manual must be
available, accessible and read and understood by all.
4. The PI must ensure that lab personnel demonstrate proficiency with
BSL-2 microbiological practices before working with these agents.
5. Potentially infectious materials must be placed in a durable, leak proof
container during collection, handling, processing, storage, or transport.
6. Lab equipment should be routinely decontaminated, as well as after
spills, splashes, or other potential contamination.
7. Incidents that may result in exposure to infectious materials must be
immediately evaluated and treated according to procedures in the
biosafety manual/SOPs.
a. All such incidents must be reported to the PI. PI must also report
incident to Risk Management & Safety and the Manager, Biosafety &
Biosecurity.
b. Medical evaluation, surveillance, and treatment should be provided
when required and appropriate records maintained.
8. Animals and plants not associated with the work being performed are
not to be permitted in the lab.
9. All aerosol generating procedures are conducted in a BSC or other
appropriate physical containment devices (not laminar flow workbenches)
such as sealed centrifuge rotor cups/heads.
C. Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers)
1. Biosafety cabinet (Class II), certified annually, and other containment
devices or PPE used when:
a. Potential for aerosols or splashes exists. These may include
centrifuging, grinding, blending, inoculating animals intranasally,
harvesting infected tissues, etc.

Yes

No

N/A

Comments (additional space on p.2)

Biosafety Level 2

Yes

No

N/A

Comments (additional space on p.2)

b. High concentrations/titers or large volumes of agents are used. These
may be centrifuged outside the BSC using sealed rotor cups/heads.
2. Face protection used for work outside BSC that may generate splashes.
3. Lab coats worn and removed prior to leaving lab. Lab coats must not be
taken home.
4. Gloves must be worn to protect hands from exposure to agents. Glove
selection should be based on risk assessment. Gloves must not be reused
and must be removed prior to leaving lab.
D. Laboratory Facilities (Secondary Barriers)
1. Lab doors must have locks in accordance with university policy.
2. Labs must have a hand washing sink. It should be located near the exit
door.
3. Lab should be designed so that it can be easily cleaned and
decontaminated. Carpets and rugs not permitted.
4. Benchtops impervious to water and resistant to chemicals
5. Lab furniture (chairs, tables, etc.) is appropriate for loading and use.
Spaces accessible for cleaning
6. BSCs must be installed properly to avoid room air fluctuations that
might impede proper functioning of the cabinet.
7. Eyewash readily available and tested periodically.
8. Lab windows that open to exterior are not recommended. If a lab does
have such windows, they must be fitted with screens
9. Negative room airflow relative to the hallway recommended.
10. Vacuum lines should be protected with HEPA (High Efficiency
Particulate Air) filters. Liquid disinfectant traps may be required.
11. HEPA filtered exhaust air from a Class II BSC can be safely
recirculated if cabinet is tested and certified annually.
12. Are autoclaving procedures verified? If yes, explain how:

Training of Personnel

BSC Certification Date:

Yes

No

N/A

Comments

Documented lab safety training?
Documented bloodborne pathogens training (if required)?
Documented chemical safety training (if required)?

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
The Principal Investigator is responsible for full compliance with the policies, practices and procedures set forth in the
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories – 5th Edition, the University of Maine’s Biosafety Policy and
the laboratory’s specific Biosafety manual. The PI is responsible for assuring the appropriate training of employees and
for correcting unsafe working conditions.

PI Signature (Mandatory) ______________________________
Form prepared by _____________________________________

Date_________________

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
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University of Maine Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)
Protocol Registration Form
Registration Type:
☐ New IBC Registration
☐ Exempt Protocol (See II-B)
☐ Amendment to IBC Protocol No.
☐ Renewal to IBC Protocol No.
Registration is required prior to use of recombinant, synthetic nucleic acid activities, biological materials (human and
animal blood, body fluids, tissues), animal, human and plant pathogens, and imported live biological materials. Required
by National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid
Molecules, University of Maine Institutional Biosafety Program, and related Federal, State and University policies.
Technical information relating to this registration is considered confidential.
All Sections of this registration must be completed, with supporting documentation included. This registration
document is meant to provide sufficient detailed information regarding each Biohazardous/Recombinant DNA research
project so that it may be adequately reviewed by the University of Maine Institutional Biosafety Committee. Do not
provide excess information. Discuss with the Institutional Biosafety Program as needed. Please refer to the IBC website
for more information.
Use Microsoft Word to fill in the form. Email the completed request to the Office of Research Compliance,
mailto:umric@maine.edu

I.

Administrative Data
A.

Principal Investigator:

Name:

Email Address:

Department:

Phone #:

B.

Project Information:

Project Title for IBC Registration:
Granting Agency Proposal Title:
Does the project have external funding? ☐ Yes ☐ No If ‘Yes’ then indicate Granting Agency/Project # below.
Granting Agency:
C.

ORS Project #:

Amendment Type:
1.

Major Amendments

All major changes require a complete registration form and full committee review.
☐ Change in scope of research
Reason for Major Change(s):

☐ Additional research projects/procedures ☐ Change of Principal Investigator

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
2.
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Minor Changes:

Dependent upon the type of changes, full IBC Review may not be required. Sections III and VI may need to be
updated. Contact the Institutional Biosafety Program.
☐ Additional Title
☐ Add/Change Lab Location. Update Section VI.A.
☐ Add or Delete Personnel: Update Section VI.B. Use
additional sheets if necessary.

Update Section III for the following:
☐ Animal Strains
☐ Animal Material
☐ Human Material
☐ Plant Material
☐ Cell Lines
☐ Genetic Constructs
☐ Others (explain):

Description of Minor Change(s):

D.

Summary of Biomaterials

This project uses: (Check all that apply)
☐ Biologically Derived Toxins
☐ Prions and Related Biomolecules
☐ Recombinant Activity/Synthetic Nucleic Acid
☐ Microorganisms
☐ Infectious Materials
☐ Cell Lines/Tissues
☐ Invertebrate Animals
☐ Vertebrate Animals

☐ Plants/Plant Parts/Algae
☐ Large-scale (>10 L) production
☐ Environmental Samples (soil, water)
☐ Diagnostic/Clinical Samples (blood, urine, etc.)
☐ Human Origin Material (contact IRB)
☐ Engineered Nanomaterials
☐ Select Agents (www.selectagents.gov)
☐ DURC Concerns or Other

Description of Minor Change(s):

II.

Project Classification
A.

Brief Project Description

Briefly describe the purpose of the project using non-scientific language (in terms for the average citizen). This project
description, title, and PI name will be in the publicly available IBC minutes.
Please restrict to 3-5 sentences.

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
B.
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Determine if Exempt per NIH Guidelines, Section III-F

Item #
8.1

Does this project…
Yes No
ONLY includes rDNA manipulation involving E. coli K12, S. cerevisiae, and B. subtilis host
☐
☐
vector systems (except for DNA from Risk Group 3, 4, or restricted agents)? IF YES,
THEN this registration is exempt, and you may Proceed to Section III. Exempt
registrations are reviewed by an expedited process. An Import and Use permit is required if
importing into the state.
8.2
NOT USE organisms or viruses (PCR or sequencing only, no inoculation into cells, cloning
☐
☐
into competent cell, viral vectors, etc.)?
8.3
ONLY consist entirely of DNA segments from a single non-chromosomal or viral DNA
☐
☐
source, though one or more of the segments may be a synthetic equivalent?
8.4
ONLY consist entirely of DNA from a prokaryotic host including its indigenous plasmids or
☐
☐
viruses when propagated only in that host (or a closely related strain of the same species), or
when transferred to another host by well-established physiological means?
8.5
ONLY consist entirely of DNA from a eukaryotic host including its chloroplasts,
☐
☐
mitochondria, or plasmids (but excluding viruses) when propagated only in that host (or a
closely related strain of the same species)?
8.6
ONLY consist entirely of DNA segments from different species that exchange DNA by
☐
☐
known physiological processes, though one or more of the segments may be a synthetic
equivalent? A list of such exchangers can be found in the NIH Guidelines Section IV-C-1-b(1)-(c), Major Actions. For a list of natural exchangers that are exempt from the NIH
Guidelines, see NIH Guidelines Appendices A-I through A-VI, Exemptions under Section
III-F-5--Sub lists of Natural Exchangers.
8.7
Present NO significant risk to health or the environment as determined by the NIH Director,
☐
☐
with the advice of the RAC, and following appropriate notice and opportunity for public
comment? (see NIH Guidelines Section IV-C-1-b-(1)-(c), Major Actions). Please refer to
NIH Guidelines Appendix C, Exemptions under Section III-F-6 for other classes of
experiments which are exempt from the NIH Guidelines.
8.8
ONLY involve the purchase or transfer of transgenic rodents for experiments that require
☐
☐
Biosafety Level 1 containment (The Purchase or Transfer of Transgenic Rodents, Appendix
C-VII)?
8.9
ONLY involve the breeding of two different transgenic rodents or the breeding of a
☐
☐
transgenic rodent and a non-transgenic rodent with the intent of creating a new strain of
transgenic rodent that can be housed at Biosafety Level 1 containment?
IF ALL YES boxes are checked above, then this registration is Exempt, and you may Proceed to Section
III. Exempt registrations are reviewed by an expedited process.
8.10
ONLY involve the breeding of two different transgenic rodents or the breeding of a
☐
☐
transgenic rodent and a non-transgenic rodent with the intent of creating a new strain of
transgenic rodent that can be housed at Biosafety Level 1 containment
AND
Both parental rodents can be housed under BL1 containment;
☐
☐
AND
neither parental transgenic rodent contains the following genetic modifications:
☐
☐
(i) incorporation of more than one-half of the genome of an exogenous eukaryotic
virus from a single family of viruses; OR
(ii) incorporation of a transgene that is under the control of a gamma-retroviral long
terminal repeat(LTR);
AND
the transgenic rodent that results from this breeding is not expected to contain
☐
☐
more than one-half of an exogenous viral genome from a single family of viruses.
(Generation of BL1 Transgenic Rodents via Breeding - Appendix C- VIII).
IF ALL YES boxes are checked, then this registration is Exempt, and you may Proceed to Section III.
Exempt registrations are reviewed by an expedited process.

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
C.
Item
#
C.1
C.1a
C.2
C.3
C.4
C.5
C.6
C.7
C.8
C.8a
C.8b
C.9
C.10
C.11
C.12
C.13
C.14
C.15
C.16
C.17
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Description of Non-Exempt Projects:

Does this project … (Please check all boxes that apply)
☐ Include deliberate transfer of a drug resistance trait to microorganisms that are not known to acquire
the trait naturally (Section III-A*)?
If answered “YES” for C.1 (above), could such a transfer compromise the use of the drug to
☐
control disease agents in humans, veterinary medicine, or agriculture?
☐ Include cloning toxin molecules with an LD50 of less than 100 nanograms per kilogram body weight
(Section III-B*)?
☐ Include experiments involving the deliberate transfer of recombinant DNA, synthetic nucleic acids, or
DNA or RNA derived from recombinant DNA, into one or more human research participants (Section
III-C*)?
☐ Include experiments using Risk Group 2, Risk Group 3, Risk Group 4, or Select Agents as host-vector
systems (Section III-D-1*)?
☐ Include experiments in which DNA from Risk Group 2, Risk Group 3, Risk Group 4, or Select Agents
is cloned into nonpathogenic prokaryotic or lower eukaryotic host-vector systems (Section III-D-2*)?
☐ Include experiments involving the use of replication-competent recombinant DNA or RNA viruses or
defective DNA or RNA viruses in the presence of helper virus in tissue culture systems (Section III-D3*)?
☐ Include experiments with recombinant influenza virus?
☐ Include experiments involving whole animals in which the animal’s genome has been altered by
introduction of DNA into the germ line (i.e. transgenic animals) (Section III-D-4, III-E-3*)?
If answered “YES” for C.8 (above), does the animal contain a transgene encoding more than
☐
50% of the genome of an exogenous eukaryotic virus?
If answered “YES” for C.8 (above), is the transgene under the control of a gamma-retroviral
☐
promoter?
☐ Include experiments involving viable rDNA-modified microorganisms tested on animals (Section IIID-4, III-E-3*)?
☐ Include experiments involving genetically engineered whole plants (Section III-D-5, III-E-2*)?
☐ Include experiments involving more than 10 liters of culture (Section III-D-6*)?
☐ Include experiments involving the formation of recombinant DNA molecules containing no more than
two-thirds of the genome of any eukaryotic virus and propagated in tissue culture (Section III-E-1*)?
☐ Uses Select Agents (defined by HHS/CDC/USDA Select Agent Program)
☐ Require biosafety level 3 containment (BSL3)?
☐ Dual Use Research of Concern Agents or Toxins?
☐ Requires Federal or State import permit?
☐ Uses unmodified Genomic Material only (e.g., DNA or RNA for sequence or expression analysis)?
D.

Suggested NIH Classification

Derived from NIH Guidelines.
Applicant-determined designation may change upon IBC review.
Item
#
D.1
D.2
D.3
D.4
D..5
D.6
D.7
D.8

Please check all boxes that apply:
☐ Use of animal cells/cell lines or tissues (e.g. tissue culture research)
☐ Use of human cells/cell lines or tissues (e.g. Human blood, 293 cell
lines, CSF)
☐ Transfer of Drug Resistance trait to microorganisms
☐ Use or cloning of toxin molecule genes
☐ Use of or the cloning of genes from, or into a Risk Group 2, 3, 4 or
restricted agent
☐ Use of virus or viral particles
☐ Propagating culture volumes exceeding 10 liters
☐ Creation or Use of c-DNA/genomic libraries

NIH Guidelines reference
II-A-3, Appendix C-1
II-A-3 Revision Date:
01/01/2018
III-A-1-a
III-B-1
III-D-1, 2
III-D-3, III-E-1
III-D-6
III-E, III-F

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
D.9
D.10
D.11
D.12

☐
☐
☐
☐

D.13

☐

D.14
D.15
D.16
D.17

☐
☐
☐
☐

III.

Cloning and vector construction in bacteria and yeasts
Use of rDNA molecules for detection purposes (e.g. probes)
Expression of rDNA products in cultured cells
Administration of rDNA product into humans (e.g. Gene Transfer
Protocol)
Administration of rDNA material into animals (e.g. transformed cells,
vectors)
Experiments involving transgenic rodents
Experiments involving whole transgenic plants
This is an EXEMPT project, per Section II.B.
Select Agent or Toxins
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III-E, III-F
III-F
III-E, III-F
III-C-1
III-D-4
III-E-3
III-D-5
III-F

Description of Biological Materials
A.

Nanomaterials

The CDC defines a technology as engineered nanotechnology only if it involves all the following:
● Research and technology development involving structures with at least one dimension in the range of 1 to100
nanometers (nm), frequently with atomic/molecular precision
● Creating and using structures, devices, and systems that have unique properties and functions because of their
nanometer-scale dimensions
● The ability to control or manipulate on the atomic scale
● NIEHS Nanomaterials
● OSHA Nanotechnology
● CDC Nanotechnology Guidance & Publications
This project uses engineered nanomaterials? ☐ Yes ☐ No
IF YES, THEN please describe the nanomaterials and how they will be used:
B.

Biotoxins

Does the project require possession, use, or transfer of acute biological toxins (mammalian LD50 <100 μg/kg body
weight) or toxins that fall under the Federal Select Agent Guidelines, as well as the organisms, both natural and
recombinant, which produce these toxins? ☐ Yes ☐ No
IF Yes THEN Complete this section, describe the work and relevant Standard Operating Procedures in an attachment.
Name of Toxin:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Current Inventory:

Attach a biotoxin-specific plan for storage, handling, waste disposal/neutralization.
☐ Biological toxin will be commercially acquired or ☐ produced in the laboratory
☐ Experiments involve cloning a biological toxin gene
☐ Will be used in animals (dosing)
C.

Recombinant and Synthetic Nucleic Acids

Refer to the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules
Does this work involve Recombinant/Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecule Activity?
☐ Yes - Complete this section. ☐ No - Do not complete this section. Go to Section III.D.

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
1.

Source of Nucleic Acid Sequence

Name (Gene/siRNA Name, e.g.
GFP green fluorescent protein)

2.
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Source (species, strain, cell line,
cultivar, Vendor/Supplier)

Function of the genetic element

Nature of the Modified DNA

Describe the functional and structural elements of the recombinant DNA, including the regulatory and/or coding
regions, percentage of the entire genome, promoter, synthetic antisense sequence, etc. Will this element be expressed?
What is your risk assessment of the sequence (tumor suppressor, oncogene, etc.)?

3.

Vectors

List the cloning and delivery vector(s) used, including selectable marker(s), reporter genes(s), oncogenes, promoters,
packaging cell line, assay system for detection, quantification, and/or host range of packaged viral vector. Vector
packaged in competent cells (E.coli), other host microbes must have an import permit. Detail the Risk Attenuation
Phenotype (e.g. replication defective, helper virus, disarmed, K-12 derived, potential for reversion, etc.).

**Reference any literature from commercially available vectors**
Name
(include the genus species
if derived from
plasmid/virus)

4.

Type
(plasmid,
phage, virus,
etc.)

Source
(Vendor/Supplier)

Generation
(1st , 2nd,
3rd, 4th,
etc..)

Recipient Organism

Specify the type of organism, species, strain, cell line, or cultivar receiving the nucleic acid.

Risk Attenuation
Phenotype

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
5.
☐ Yes ☐ No

Will you express a toxin or oncogene?

If Yes, please specify:

6.
☐ Yes ☐ No
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Will the vector host range be altered?

If Yes, describe:

7.
Will the project use infectious DNA/RNA viruses, defective DNA/RNA viruses, or
phagesin the presence of helper virus in a tissue culture system?
☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, provide details on the pathogenicity, host range or generation system:

D.
Microorganisms
Identify and describe microorganisms to be employed by this protocol. If none, please indicate N/A or leave blank.
Plant
Pathogen

Produce
Toxin

In Vivo Use

Receive
rDNA
material

Source

Animal
Pathogen

Human
Pathogen

Microorganism Name (genus,
species, strain name)

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐
☐
☐
E.

☐
☐
☐

☐
☐
☐

☐
☐
☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

Cell Lines and Tissues

Identify and describe cells and tissues to be employed by this protocol. If none, please indicate N/A or leave blank.
Receive rDNA
construct

Receive
microorganism

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

Does this Cell line contains latent, adventious, or inherent microorganisms or virus (e.g., HEK and adenovirus)?
☐ Yes ☐ No

Chemically
altered

In Vivo Use

Source

Passage (Primary/
Established/
Immortalized)

Technical Name
(e.g. NIH3T3)

Cell Lines/Tissue Name

☐
☐

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
F.
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Animals
1.

Will you use animals?

☐ Yes (Complete this section.)
☐ Vertebrate
☐ Invertebrate
☐ No (Proceed to Part III.G)
If Yes is checked, you may also need IACUC approval. See the IACUC website.
2.

List all animal species and research locations

Animal Species/Strains

3.

Location of Animal Research

ABSL
designation

Hazards from Animals

Do any of the strains or manipulated animals present a hazard that would require more than ABSL-1 (BSL1-N) housing?
☐ Yes (complete entire animal part of IBC registration)
☐ No
4.

List all transgenic animals

Include animals to be acquired and/or breeding/cross-breeding. (Attach an additional sheet if needed. If none, indicate
N/A or leave blank.)
Background Strain:

5.

Line Designation to be Crossed

Source of Line

Description of transgenic animals

Please check all boxes that apply:
III.F.5.a ☐ The animals contain more than one-half of the genome of an exogenous eukaryotic virus.
III.F.5.b ☐ If cross-breeding, the offspring have transgenes under the control of LTR and contain more than
one-half of the exogenous viral genome
III.F.5.c ☐ Transgenes are under control of gamma-retroviral long terminal repeat (LRT).
6.

Acquisition and Breeding of Transgenic Animals

Please check all boxes that apply:
III.F.6.a ☐ Transgenic animals will be purchased
Vendor:
III.F.6.b ☐ Transgenic animals will be generated in-house
III.F.6.c ☐ A colony of transgenic animals will be maintained
III.F.6.d ☐ Transgenic animals will be cross-bread to generate new strains

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
7.
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Will biological materials* be inserted/inoculated/introduced?

☐ Yes (Describe below)
☐ No

*If biological material is infectious, use of BSC, negative pressure and restricted entry during manipulation is REQUIRED

8.

Will there be a potential of biological material being shed from the animal?

☐ Yes (Describe below)
☐ No

9.

Does animal waste/bedding require decontamination?

☐ Yes (Attach reference and recommended protocol)
☐ No
10.

PPE Use

Describe PPE and biosafety containment use by Laboratory Animal Services. Respond in the Risk Management
Section, VI.D.
11.

Will you use venomous, dangerous, endangered or threatened wild animals?

☐ Yes (List below, describe PPE and Biosafety Containment in attachment, and attach a copy of the permits from
DLNR, CITES/NFWS.)
☐ No

G.

Plants and Derived Biological Materials
1.

Will you use plants, including plant parts, plant cell lines, but excluding fungi?

☐ Yes (Complete this section. Attach relevant plant use SOP.)
☐ Whole Plant
☐ Plant Part
☐ Plant cell lines
☐ No (Proceed to Part IV.)

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
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2.

Will you use commercially available de-regulated transgenic plants only?

3.

Will biological materials be inserted/inoculated/introduced?

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Yes (Describe below)
☐ No

4.

List all plant species and research locations.

IF field testing provide location (field allocation no., GPS location of all four corner points).
Plant Species
(include genus
species or variety)

Has this plant been
altered?
How?

Location of Research

Greenhouse
/Screen house
(Yes/No)

BSL of
Greenhouse

Growth
Chamber/
Room
(Location)

Field Location:
5.

Will you be using poisonous, dangerous or endangered/threatened plants?

☐ Yes (List below, describe PPE and Biosafety Containment in attachment, and attach a copy of the permits from
DLNR, CITES/NFWS.)
☐ No

IV.

Experimental Design

Provide a concise description or summary of your project procedures, placed in sequential order of performance. Attach
an additional sheet if needed. **Please do not attach entire protocols.**

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
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Risk Assessment
A.

Risk Group Classification:

The PI should review Appendix B of the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic
Acid Molecules and propose a risk group.
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

Does not apply. No microorganisms, pathogens, or biomaterial are being used that will cause human, plant, or
animal disease.
RG1: Agents that are not associated with disease in healthy adult humans. This group includes a list of animal
viral etiologic agents in common use. These agents represent no or little risk to an individual and no or little
risk to the community.
RG2: Agents that are associated with human disease which is rarely serious and for which preventive or
therapeutic interventions are often available. These agents represent a moderate risk to an individual but a low
risk to the community.
RG3: Agents that are associated with serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic
interventions may be available. These agents represent a high risk to an individual but a low risk to the
community.
RG4: Agents that are likely to cause serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic
interventions are not usually available. These agents represent a high risk to the individual and a high risk to the
community. NO RG4 RESEARCH IS AUTHORIZED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MAINE
SYSTEM.
B.

Host Range of the Biological Material(s).

Required only if RG2 or RG3 was selected above:

C.

Support for Risk Classification

Identify biosafety risks. What would be the impact of a release to the environment? Extract, condense and describe
the pertinent biosafety content from your protocol. Cite supporting references and/or URLs as needed (assist the
reviewers):

D.

Hazardous Process?

☐ Centrifuge
☐ Sonication

☐ Sharps
☐ Tissue Harvesting

☐ Animal
☐ Pipetting

☐ Injection
☐ None

☐ Other (please state):

E.

Possible Exposure Routes?

☐ Ingestion
☐ Mucous Membrane
☐ Other (please state):

☐ Percutaneous (i.e. needle puncture)
☐ Inhalation
☐ None

☐ Direct Contact

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
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Risk Management
A.

Designated Work Areas

Building

B.

Room Number

Biosafety
Designation
(BSL-, ABSL-,
BL-P, BL-N…)

Date of Most
Recent
Biosafety
Inspection

Movement and Storage

Concisely describe protocol-specific movement and secure storage plans. Attach an additional sheet if needed.

C.

Personnel Training.

Detail all personnel performing manipulations. The PI must be fully trained. (Separate sheet may be attached if
necessary.)
Name

Type of Training

D.

Date of Training

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

☐ Safety Glasses/Goggles ☐ Gloves
☐ Hair Bonnet ☐ Disposable Booties

☐ Lab Coat
☐ Disposable Lab Gown
☐ Surgical Mask
☐ N-95 Respirator*

☐Other (Describe)
*Requires respirator use clearance, fit testing, and training.
E.

Engineering Controls

☐ Biosafety Cabinet
☐Other (Describe)

☐ Fume Hood Centrifuge

☐ Rotor Covers

☐ PAPR*

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
F.
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Equipment Certifications

Type of Equipment
Biosafety Cabinet

Manufacturer/Model

Location

Last Certification Date

Any HEPA equipment
Aerosol generating
equipment
Autoclave
How often is an autoclave quality control test (biological indicator test)
performed?
TYPE of Biological Indicator: ☐ spore ☐ Class 5 integrator
Laminar Flow Clean
Bench

☐Annually ☐ Quarterly
☐ Monthly ☐Not routine

DO NOT USE a Laminar Flow Clean Bench for Infectious Agents. Laminar Flow Clean Benches are not for worker
or environmental protection. They are for product protection only
G.

Decontamination and Waste Disposal

In addition to any attached protocol-specific information, describe how biohazardous materials, waste, carcasses, and
bedding will be disinfected and disposed. Include type of chemical disinfectant, concentration, and time.

VII.

Incident Response Plan

A.
Does a written protocol-specific incident response plan exist?
Incidents would include spill, exposure, injury, fire reporting, security breech, etc.
☐ Yes (you need NOT attach)
☐ No
B.
Item #
B.1
B.2

Occupational Health Program

Question
Are personnel enrolled in an occupational health or medical surveillance program?
Respiratory protection occupational health program (required for any person using a
respirator)
B.3
Tuberculosis testing / surveillance (required for persons who enter the tuberculosis lab)
B.4
Blood-borne pathogen training and HepB vaccine
B.5
Other (vaccine, medical surveillance, etc.)
Describe. Attach an additional sheet if needed.

Yes
☐
☐

No
☐
☐

☐
☐
☐

☐
☐
☐

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
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Select Agents and Toxin/Tier 1

This research uses Tier 1 select agents and toxins (see Select Agents and Toxins List).
☐ Yes
☐ No

IX.

Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC)

Biological research is considered ‘dual-use research of concern’ if the methodologies, material or results could be used in
a manner to cause public harm. To ensure all research is given due consideration as to whether the planned experiments
include DURC, the following questions must be answered. (See NIH Dual Use Research of Concern).
Dual Use Questionnaire
Yes No
Will an intermediate or final product of your research make a vaccine less effective or ineffective?
☐
☐
Will the intermediate or final product of your research confer a drug resistance trait to
☐
☐
microorganism(s) in the study that could compromise the use of appropriate or conventional drugs to
control these microorganism(s) as disease agents in humans, veterinary medicine, or agriculture?
Will your work enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a non-pathogen virulent?
☐
☐
Will the results of your work increase the transmissibility of any pathogen?
☐
☐
Will your research result in the alteration of the host range of the pathogen?
☐
☐
Will your research result in an intermediate or final product that may prevent or interfere with the
☐
☐
diagnosis of infection or disease?
Does your research enable weaponization* of an agent or toxin?
☐
☐
Will synthetic biology** techniques be used to construct a pathogenic organism, toxin or potentially
☐
☐
harmful intermediate product?
Even if your planned research does not involve any of the above eight criteria, and recognizing that
☐
☐
your work product or results of your research could conceivably be misused, is there the potential for
your data/product to be readily used to cause public harm?
*In this context, weaponization refers to the enhanced dispersion, deliverability, survivability or pathogenesis of a
potentially harmful agent or toxin.
**Synthetic biology includes, but is not limited to, techniques of molecular biology, chemistry, and genetics that would
allow for the de novo synthesis or reverse engineering of genes, gene products or entire functional organisms.

X.

Federal/State Permits and Other Approvals
A.

Federal and State Permits

Do the activities/materials for this project require a federal/state permit? ☐ Yes ☐ No
If yes, please provide the permit information below and include a copy of the current permits with this registration
application.
●
●
●

There will be No Authorization without a copy of the permit or authorization.
For NEW protocols, if a permit is pending, you must submit a copy of the final approved permit to the
Biosafety Office before you may begin work.
For RENEWAL protocols, please provide most current approved permit with the registration form.

Type (CDC,
USDA)

Permit #

Biological Materials listed on permit

Importation /
Inoculation

Exp. Date

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Protocol Registration Form
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Other UMaine Review Committee Approvals:

Is this work subject to ☐ UMaine IACUC, ☐ IRB, ☐Radiation Safety (EHSO), ☐ Chemical and Physical Hazards
Committee, or ☐ Office of Export Control? Please provide basic information in the table below. The PI should submit
applications to these other review entities as appropriate.
Protocol #

Exempted
☐

Protocol Title

Exp. Date

☐
☐

XI.

Miscellaneous

Item #
A.
B.

Question
Will your experiments involve large scale culture? (bioreactors or >10 Liters in one container)
Will your experiments involve transfer of an antibiotic resistance gene into the host in
addition to those contained in vectors?
C.
Will you be using human pluripotent stem cells derived from human embryos (human
embryonic stem cells) or human fetal tissue (human embryonic germ cells)?
D.
Will your research/experiment involve the need to share confidential or proprietary
information?
E.
Will your research/experiment involve the need to transfer materials and/or data to other
institutions, organizations, or foreign countries?
If any Yes box was selected for items A - C, ensure information is provided that addresses those items.

Yes
☐
☐

No
☐
☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

The information provided may be shared with other institutional programs and offices for their review and
assessment. It is intended that the disclosure of information to other UMaine compliance entities will not
interfere with the independent IBC review and approval process.

XII.

Certification

As Principal Investigator, I understand the risks associated with recombinant and synthetic nucleic acid molecules, use of
biologically hazardous materials (human pathogens, human blood, body fluids, or tissues, animal pathogens, blood, body
fluids or tissues, plant pathogens), and imported biological materials.
I will notify the UMaine Office of Research Compliance and Institutional Biosafety Officer immediately should related
activity produce an unanticipated product that increases virulence or toxicity, or otherwise confers a phenotypic change
that could be biologically hazardous. Furthermore, I certify I have read the relevant sections of the NIH Guidelines and
CDC/USDA requirements (see links above), have or will have appropriately trained and advised my staff of the
requirements outlined in the NIH Guidelines or CDC/USDA requirements prior to initiation of the project,
acknowledge I have reviewed this form, and I am responsible for this project.
I am familiar with and agree to abide by all provisions of UMaine IBC, US CDC, Maine BLS, NIH, USDA and other
applicable State and Federal guidelines/regulations pertaining to the proposed project. I understand that I bear the
responsibility for ensuring that all personnel are adequately trained and informed of any risks with the research activity.
I agree to comply with all applicable requirements pertaining to:
● Reporting of all personnel exposures of regulated biological material
● Reporting any transgenic/knockout/knock-in/ biological material release/escape.
● Transport/transfer of for import/export of biological commodities
The information in this application is accurate and correct.
Principal Investigator (Print)
Principal Investigator (Signature)

Date

IBC Protocol Submission Decision Tree
University of Maine Office of Research Compliance
Link to Flow Chart Version of IBC Protocol Submission Decision Tree

“I am planning on conducting research involving biological materials, which may include molecules,
bacteria, viruses, arthropods, recombinant DNA-technology or creating transgenic lines of organisms as
research models.”
If you agree with this statement, review all three questions below to determine protocol submissions
needed for your research.
1. Are you working with animals?
a. If yes, you are working with animals: IBC and IACUC protocol approval may be required.
Submit a registration to the IBC and contact the IACUC for more information.
b. If no, you are not working with animals: IBC protocol approval may be required. Submit
a registration to the IBC.
2. Are you working with biological/synthetic molecules?
a. If yes, you are working with biological/synthetic molecules: IBC protocol approval may
be required. Submit a registration to the IBC.
b. If no, you are not working with biological/synthetic molecules: no action is required with
the IBC.
3. Are you working with human cells/cell lines?
a. If yes, you are working with human cells/cell lines: IBC and IRB approval may be
required. Submit a registration to the IBC and contact the IRB for more information.

Contact umric@maine.edu with further questions.

Adapted from Villanova IBC Flow Chart
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SECTION I.

SCOPE OF THE NIH GUIDELINES

Section I-A.

Purpose

(April 2019)

The purpose of the NIH Guidelines is to specify the biosafety practices and containment principles for
constructing and handling: (i) recombinant nucleic acid molecules, (ii) synthetic nucleic acid molecules,
including those that are chemically or otherwise modified but can base pair with naturally occurring
nucleic acid molecules, and (iii) cells, organisms, and viruses containing such molecules.
Section I-A-1. Any nucleic acid molecule experiment, which according to the NIH Guidelines requires
approval by NIH, must be submitted to NIH or to another Federal agency that has jurisdiction for review
and approval. Once approvals, or other applicable clearances, have been obtained from a Federal
agency other than NIH (whether the experiment is referred to that agency by NIH or sent directly there by
the submitter), the experiment may proceed without the necessity for NIH review or approval.
Section I-A-1-a. For experiments involving the deliberate transfer of recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules, or DNA or RNA derived from recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules, into human
research participants (human gene transfer), no human gene transfer experiment shall be initiated (see
definition of initiation in Section I-E-4) until Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) approval (from the
clinical trial site) has been obtained and all applicable regulatory authorization(s) and approvals have
been obtained.
Section I-B.

Definition of Recombinant and Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules

In the context of the NIH Guidelines, recombinant and synthetic nucleic acids are defined as:
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

molecules that a) are constructed by joining nucleic acid molecules and b) that can replicate
in a living cell, i.e., recombinant nucleic acids;
nucleic acid molecules that are chemically or by other means synthesized or amplified,
including those that are chemically or otherwise modified but can base pair with naturally
occurring nucleic acid molecules, i.e., synthetic nucleic acids, or
molecules that result from the replication of those described in (i) or (ii) above.

Section I-C.

General Applicability

Section I-C-1. The NIH Guidelines are applicable to:
Section I-C-1-a. All recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid research within the United States (U.S.) or its
territories that is within the category of research described in either Section I-C-1-a-(1) or Section I-C-1-a(2).
Section I-C-1-a-(1). Research that is conducted at or sponsored by an institution that receives any
support for recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid research from NIH, including research performed
directly by NIH. An individual who receives support for research involving recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acids must be associated with or sponsored by an institution that assumes the responsibilities
assigned in the NIH Guidelines.
Section I-C-1-a-(2). Research that involves testing in humans of materials containing recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acids developed with NIH funds, if the institution that developed those materials
sponsors or participates in those projects. Participation includes research collaboration or contractual
agreements, not mere provision of research materials.
Section I-C-1-b. All recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid research performed abroad that is within the
category of research described in either Section I-C-1-b-(1) or Section I-C-1-b-(2).
Section I-C-1-b-(1). Research supported by NIH funds.
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Section I-C-1-b-(2). Research that involves testing in humans of materials containing recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acids developed with NIH funds, if the institution that developed those materials
sponsors or participates in those projects. Participation includes research collaboration or contractual
agreements, not mere provision of research materials.
Section I-C-1-b-(3). If the host country has established rules for the conduct of recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecule research, then the research must be in compliance with those rules. If the host
country does not have such rules, the proposed research must be reviewed and approved by an NIHapproved Institutional Biosafety Committee or equivalent review body and accepted in writing by an
appropriate national governmental authority of the host country. The safety practices that are employed
abroad must be reasonably consistent with the NIH Guidelines.
Section I-D.

Compliance with the NIH Guidelines

As a condition for NIH funding of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research, institutions
shall ensure that such research conducted at or sponsored by the institution, irrespective of the source of
funding, shall comply with the NIH Guidelines.
Information concerning noncompliance with the NIH Guidelines may be brought forward by any person. It
should be delivered to both NIH OSP and the relevant institution. The institution, generally through the
Institutional Biosafety Committee, shall take appropriate action. The institution shall forward a complete
report of the incident recommending any further action to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes
of Health, preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also
available here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov).
In cases where NIH proposes to suspend, limit, or terminate financial assistance because of
noncompliance with the NIH Guidelines, applicable DHHS and Public Health Service procedures shall
govern.
The policies on compliance are as follows:
Section I-D-1. All NIH-funded projects involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules must
comply with the NIH Guidelines. Non-compliance may result in: (i) suspension, limitation, or termination
of financial assistance for the noncompliant NIH-funded research project and of NIH funds for other
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research at the institution, or (ii) a requirement for prior
NIH approval of any or all recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule projects at the institution.
Section I-D-2. All non-NIH funded projects involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule
conducted at or sponsored by an institution that receives NIH funds for projects involving such techniques
must comply with the NIH Guidelines. Noncompliance may result in: (i) suspension, limitation, or
termination of NIH funds for recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research at the institution, or
(ii) a requirement for prior NIH approval of any or all recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule
projects at the institution.
Section I-E.
General Definitions
The following terms, which are used throughout the NIH Guidelines, are defined as follows:
Section I-E-1. An "institution" is any public or private entity (including Federal, state, and local
government agencies).
Section I-E-2. An "Institutional Biosafety Committee" is a committee that: (i) meets the requirements for
membership specified in Section IV-B-2, Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), and (ii) reviews,
approves, and oversees projects in accordance with the responsibilities defined in Section IV-B-2,
Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC).
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Section I-E-3. The "Office of Science Policy (OSP)" is the office within the NIH that is responsible for: (i)
reviewing and coordinating all activities relating to the NIH Guidelines, and (ii) performing other duties as
defined in Section IV-C-2, Office of Science Policy (OSP).
Section I-E-4. “Initiation” of research is the introduction of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules into organisms, cells, or viruses.
Section I-E-5. The "NIH Director" is the Director of the National Institutes of Health, or any other officer or
employee of NIH to whom authority has been delegated.
Section I-E-6. "Deliberate release" is defined as a planned introduction of recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecule-containing microorganisms, plants, or animals into the environment.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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SECTION II.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS

Section II-A.

Risk Assessment

(April 2019)

Section II-A-1. Risk Groups
Risk assessment is ultimately a subjective process. The investigator must make an initial risk
assessment based on the Risk Group (RG) of an agent (see Appendix B, Classification of Human
Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard). Agents are classified into four Risk Groups (RGs) according to
their relative pathogenicity for healthy adult humans by the following criteria: (1) Risk Group 1 (RG1)
agents are not associated with disease in healthy adult humans. (2) Risk Group 2 (RG2) agents are
associated with human disease which is rarely serious and for which preventive or therapeutic
interventions are often available. (3) Risk Group 3 (RG3) agents are associated with serious or lethal
human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions may be available. (4) Risk Group 4
(RG4) agents are likely to cause serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic
interventions are not usually available.
Section II-A-2. Criteria for Risk Groups
Classification of agents in Appendix B, Classification of Human Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard,
is based on the potential effect of a biological agent on a healthy human adult and does not account for
instances in which an individual may have increased susceptibility to such agents, e.g., preexisting
diseases, medications, compromised immunity, pregnancy or breast feeding (which may increase
exposure of infants to some agents).
Personnel may need periodic medical surveillance to ascertain fitness to perform certain activities; they
may also need to be offered prophylactic vaccines and boosters (see Section IV-B-1-f, Responsibilities of
the Institution, General Information).
Section II-A-3. Comprehensive Risk Assessment
In deciding on the appropriate containment for an experiment, the first step is to assess the risk of the
agent itself. Appendix B, Classification of Human Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, classifies
agents into Risk Groups based on an assessment of their ability to cause disease in humans and the
available treatments for such disease. Once the Risk Group of the agent is identified, this should be
followed by a thorough consideration of how the agent is to be manipulated. Factors to be considered in
determining the level of containment include agent factors such as: virulence, pathogenicity, infectious
dose, environmental stability, route of spread, communicability, operations, quantity, availability of
vaccine or treatment, and gene product effects such as toxicity, physiological activity, and allergenicity.
Any strain that is known to be more hazardous than the parent (wild-type) strain should be considered for
handling at a higher containment level. Certain attenuated strains or strains that have been
demonstrated to have irreversibly lost known virulence factors may qualify for a reduction of the
containment level compared to the Risk Group assigned to the parent strain (see Section V-B, Footnotes
and References of Sections I-IV).
While the starting point for the risk assessment is based on the identification of the Risk Group of the
parent agent, as technology moves forward, it may be possible to develop an organism containing genetic
sequences from multiple sources such that the parent agent may not be obvious. In such cases, the risk
assessment should include at least two levels of analysis. The first involves a consideration of the Risk
Groups of the source(s) of the sequences and the second involves an assessment of the functions that
may be encoded by these sequences (e.g., virulence or transmissibility). It may be prudent to first
consider the highest Risk Group classification of all agents that are the source of sequences included in
the construct. Other factors to be considered include the percentage of the genome contributed by each
parent agent and the predicted function or intended purpose of each contributing sequence. The initial
assumption should be that all sequences will function as they did in the original host context.
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The Principal Investigator and Institutional Biosafety Committee must also be cognizant that the
combination of certain sequences in a new biological context may result in an organism whose risk profile
could be higher than that of the contributing organisms or sequences. The synergistic function of these
sequences may be one of the key attributes to consider in deciding whether a higher containment level is
warranted, at least until further assessments can be carried out. A new biosafety risk may occur with an
organism formed through combination of sequences from a number of organisms or due to the synergistic
effect of combining transgenes that results in a new phenotype.
A final assessment of risk based on these considerations is then used to set the appropriate containment
conditions for the experiment (see Section II-B, Containment). The appropriate containment level may be
equivalent to the Risk Group classification of the agent or it may be raised or lowered as a result of the
above considerations. The Institutional Biosafety Committee must approve the risk assessment and the
biosafety containment level for recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid experiments described in Sections
III-A, Experiments that Require NIH Director Approval and Institutional Biosafety Committee Approval,
Before Initiation; III-B, Experiments that Require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety Committee Approval
Before Initiation; III-C, Experiments Involving Human Gene Transfer that Require Institutional Biosafety
Committee Approval Prior to Initiation; III-D, Experiments that Require Institutional Biosafety Committee
Approval Before Initiation.
Careful consideration should be given to the types of manipulation planned for some higher Risk Group
agents. For example, the RG2 dengue viruses may be cultured under the Biosafety Level (BL) 2
containment (see Section II-B); however, when such agents are used for animal inoculation or
transmission studies, a higher containment level is recommended. Similarly, RG3 agents such as
Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis and yellow fever viruses should be handled at a higher
containment level for animal inoculation and transmission experiments.
Individuals working with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV) or other bloodborne
pathogens should consult the applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
regulation, 29 CFR 1910.1030, and OSHA publication 3127 (1996 revised). BL2 containment is
recommended for activities involving all blood-contaminated clinical specimens, body fluids, and tissues
from all humans, or from HIV- or HBV-infected or inoculated laboratory animals. Activities such as the
production of research-laboratory scale quantities of HIV or other bloodborne pathogens, manipulating
concentrated virus preparations, or conducting procedures that may produce droplets or aerosols, are
performed in a BL2 facility using the additional practices and containment equipment recommended for
BL3. Activities involving industrial scale volumes or preparations of concentrated HIV are conducted in a
BL3 facility, or BL3 Large Scale if appropriate, using BL3 practices and containment equipment.
Exotic plant pathogens and animal pathogens of domestic livestock and poultry are restricted and may
require special laboratory design, operation and containment features not addressed in Biosafety in
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (see Section V-C, Footnotes and References of Sections I
through IV). For information regarding the importation, possession, or use of these agents see Sections
V-G and V-H, Footnotes and References of Sections I through IV.
Section II-B.

Containment

Effective biological safety programs have been operative in a variety of laboratories for many years.
Considerable information already exists about the design of physical containment facilities and selection
of laboratory procedures applicable to organisms carrying additional recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules (see Section V-B, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV). The existing programs rely
upon mechanisms that can be divided into two categories: (i) a set of standard practices that are
generally used in microbiological laboratories; and (ii) special procedures, equipment, and laboratory
installations that provide physical barriers that are applied in varying degrees according to the estimated
biohazard. Four biosafety levels are described in Appendix G, Physical Containment. These biosafety
levels consist of combinations of laboratory practices and techniques, safety equipment, and laboratory
facilities appropriate for the operations performed and are based on the potential hazards imposed by the
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agents used and for the laboratory function and activity. Biosafety Level 4 provides the most stringent
containment conditions, Biosafety Level 1 the least stringent.
Experiments involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules lend themselves to a third
containment mechanism, namely, the application of highly specific biological barriers. Natural barriers
exist that limit either: (i) the infectivity of a vector or vehicle (plasmid or virus) for specific hosts, or (ii) its
dissemination and survival in the environment. Vectors, which provide the means for recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecule and/or host cell replication, can be genetically designed to decrease, by
many orders of magnitude, the probability of dissemination of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecule outside the laboratory (see Appendix I, Biological Containment).
Since these three means of containment are complementary, different levels of containment can be
established that apply various combinations of the physical and biological barriers along with a constant
use of standard practices. Categories of containment are considered separately in order that such
combinations can be conveniently expressed in the NIH Guidelines.
Physical containment conditions within laboratories, described in Appendix G, Physical Containment, may
not always be appropriate for all organisms because of their physical size, the number of organisms
needed for an experiment, or the particular growth requirements of the organism. Likewise, biological
containment for microorganisms described in Appendix I, Biological Containment, may not be appropriate
for all organisms, particularly higher eukaryotic organisms. However, significant information exists about
the design of research facilities and experimental procedures that are applicable to organisms containing
additional recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules that are either integrated into the genome or
into microorganisms associated with the higher organism as a symbiont, pathogen, or other relationship.
This information describes facilities for physical containment of organisms used in non-traditional
laboratory settings and special practices for limiting or excluding the unwanted establishment, transfer of
genetic information, and dissemination of organisms beyond the intended location, based on both
physical and biological containment principles. Research conducted in accordance with these conditions
effectively confines the organism.
For research involving plants, four biosafety levels (BL1-P through BL4-P) are described in Appendix L,
Physical and Biological Containment for Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecule Research
Involving Plants. BL1-P is designed to provide a moderate level of containment for experiments for which
there is convincing biological evidence that precludes the possibility of survival, transfer, or dissemination
of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules into the environment, or in which there is no
recognizable and predictable risk to the environment in the event of accidental release. BL2-P is
designed to provide a greater level of containment for experiments involving plants and certain associated
organisms in which there is a recognized possibility of survival, transmission, or dissemination of
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule containing organisms, but the consequence of such an
inadvertent release has a predictably minimal biological impact. BL3-P and BL4-P describe additional
containment conditions for research with plants and certain pathogens and other organisms that require
special containment because of their recognized potential for significant detrimental impact on managed
or natural ecosystems. BL1-P relies upon accepted scientific practices for conducting research in most
ordinary greenhouse or growth chamber facilities and incorporates accepted procedures for good pest
control and cultural practices. BL1-P facilities and procedures provide a modified and protected
environment for the propagation of plants and microorganisms associated with the plants and a degree of
containment that adequately controls the potential for release of biologically viable plants, plant parts, and
microorganisms associated with them. BL2-P and BL3-P rely upon accepted scientific practices for
conducting research in greenhouses with organisms infecting or infesting plants in a manner that
minimizes or prevents inadvertent contamination of plants within or surrounding the greenhouse. BL4-P
describes facilities and practices known to provide containment of certain exotic plant pathogens.
For research involving animals, which are of a size or have growth requirements that preclude the use of
conventional primary containment systems used for small laboratory animals, four biosafety levels (BL1-N
through BL4-N) are described in Appendix M, Physical and Biological Containment for Recombinant or
Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecule Research Involving Animals. BL1-N describes containment for animals
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that have been modified by stable introduction of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules, or
DNA derived therefrom, into the germ-line (transgenic animals) and experiments involving viable
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified microorganisms and is designed to eliminate the
possibility of sexual transmission of the modified genome or transmission of recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecule-derived viruses known to be transmitted from animal parent to offspring only by
sexual reproduction. Procedures, practices, and facilities follow classical methods of avoiding genetic
exchange between animals. BL2-N describes containment which is used for transgenic animals
associated with recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-derived organisms and is designed to
eliminate the possibility of vertical or horizontal transmission. Procedures, practices, and facilities follow
classical methods of avoiding genetic exchange between animals or controlling arthropod transmission.
BL3-N and BL4-N describe higher levels of containment for research with certain transgenic animals
involving agents which pose recognized hazard.
In constructing the NIH Guidelines, it was necessary to define boundary conditions for the different levels
of physical and biological containment and for the classes of experiments to which they apply. These
definitions do not take into account all existing and anticipated information on special procedures that will
allow particular experiments to be conducted under different conditions than indicated here without
affecting risk. Individual investigators and Institutional Biosafety Committees are urged to devise simple
and more effective containment procedures and to submit recommended changes in the NIH Guidelines
to permit the use of these procedures.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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EXPERIMENTS COVERED BY THE NIH GUIDELINES

This section describes six categories of experiments involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules: (i) those that require NIH Director approval and Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)
approval before initiation (see Section III-A), (ii) those that require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety
Committee approval before initiation (see Section III-B), (iii) those that require Institutional Biosafety
Committee approval before initiation of human gene transfer (see Section III-C), (iv) those that require
Institutional Biosafety Committee approval before initiation (see Section III-D), (v) those that require
Institutional Biosafety Committee notification simultaneous with initiation (see Section III-E), and (vi) those
that are exempt from the NIH Guidelines (see Section III-F).
Note: If an experiment falls into Sections III-A, III-B, or III-C and one of the other sections, the rules
pertaining to Sections III-A, III-B, or III-C shall be followed. If an experiment falls into Section III-F and
into either Sections III-D or III-E as well, the experiment is considered exempt from the NIH Guidelines.
Any change in containment level, which is different from those specified in the NIH Guidelines, may not
be initiated without the express approval of NIH OSP (see Section IV-C-1-b-(2) and its subsections, Minor
Actions).
Section III-A.
Experiments that Require NIH Director Approval and Institutional Biosafety
Committee Approval Before Initiation (See Section IV-C-1-b-(1), Major Actions).
Section III-A-1. Major Actions under the NIH Guidelines
Experiments considered as Major Actions as defined in Section III-A-1-a under the NIH Guidelines cannot
be initiated without submission of relevant information on the proposed experiment to the Office of
Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov, the
publication of the proposal in the Federal Register for a minimum of 15 days of comment, and specific
approval by NIH. The containment conditions or stipulation requirements for such experiments will be set
by NIH at the time of approval. Such experiments require Institutional Biosafety Committee approval
before initiation. Specific experiments already approved are included in Appendix D, Major Actions Taken
under the NIH Guidelines.
Section III-A-1-a. The deliberate transfer of a drug resistance trait to microorganisms that are not known
to acquire the trait naturally (see Section V-B, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV), if such
acquisition could compromise the ability to control disease agents in humans, veterinary medicine, or
agriculture, will require NIH Director approval.
Consideration should be given as to whether the drug resistance trait to be used in the experiment would
render that microorganism resistant to the primary drug available to and/or indicated for certain
populations, for example children or pregnant women.
At the request of an Institutional Biosafety Committee, NIH OSP will make a determination regarding
whether a specific experiment involving the deliberate transfer of a drug resistance trait falls under
Section III-A-1-a and therefore requires NIH Director approval. An Institutional Biosafety Committee may
also consult with NIH OSP regarding experiments that do not meet the requirements of Section III-A-1-a
but nonetheless raise important public health issues.
Section III-B.
Experiments That Require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety Committee
Approval Before Initiation
Experiments in this category cannot be initiated without submission of relevant information on the
proposed experiment to NIH OSP. The containment conditions for such experiments will be determined
by NIH OSP in consultation with ad hoc experts. Such experiments require Institutional Biosafety
Committee approval before initiation (see Section IV-B-2-b-(1), Institutional Biosafety Committee).
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Section III-B-1. Experiments Involving the Cloning of Toxin Molecules with LD50 of Less than 100
Nanograms per Kilogram Body Weight
Deliberate formation of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules containing genes for the
biosynthesis of toxin molecules lethal for vertebrates at an LD50 of less than 100 nanograms per kilogram
body weight (e.g., microbial toxins such as the botulinum toxins, tetanus toxin, diphtheria toxin, and
Shigella dysenteriae neurotoxin). Specific approval has been given for the cloning in Escherichia coli K12 of DNA containing genes coding for the biosynthesis of toxic molecules which are lethal to vertebrates
at 100 nanograms to 100 micrograms per kilogram body weight. Specific experiments already approved
under this section may be obtained from the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health,
preferably by submitting a request for this information to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact
information is also available here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov).
Section III-B-2. Experiments that have been Approved (under Section III-A-1-a) as Major Actions
under the NIH Guidelines
Upon receipt and review of an application from the investigator, NIH OSP may determine that a proposed
experiment is equivalent to an experiment that has previously been approved by the NIH Director as a
Major Action, including experiments approved prior to implementation of these changes. An experiment
will only be considered equivalent if, as determined by NIH OSP, there are no substantive differences and
pertinent information has not emerged since submission of the initial III-A-1-a experiment that would
change the biosafety and public health considerations for the proposed experiments. If such a
determination is made by NIH OSP, these experiments will not require review and approval under Section
III-A.
Section III-C.
Experiments Involving Human Gene Transfer that Require Institutional Biosafety
Committee Approval Prior to Initiation
Section III-C-1. Experiments Involving the Deliberate Transfer of Recombinant or Synthetic
Nucleic Acid Molecules, or DNA or RNA Derived from Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid
Molecules, into One or More Human Research Participants
Human gene transfer is the deliberate transfer into human research participants of either:
1. Recombinant nucleic acid molecules, or DNA or RNA derived from recombinant nucleic acid
molecules, or
2. Synthetic nucleic acid molecules, or DNA or RNA derived from synthetic nucleic acid
molecules, that meet any one of the following criteria:
a. Contain more than 100 nucleotides; or
b. Possess biological properties that enable integration into the genome (e.g., cis
elements involved in integration); or
c. Have the potential to replicate in a cell; or
d. Can be translated or transcribed.
Research cannot be initiated until Institutional Biosafety Committee and all other applicable institutional
and regulatory authorization(s) and approvals have been obtained.
The deliberate transfer of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acids into one human research participant,
conducted under an FDA regulated individual patient expanded access IND or protocol, including for
emergency use, is not research subject to the NIH Guidelines and thus does not need to be submitted to
an IBC for review and approval.
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Section III-D. Experiments that Require Institutional Biosafety Committee Approval Before
Initiation
Prior to the initiation of an experiment that falls into this category, the Principal Investigator must submit a
registration document to the Institutional Biosafety Committee which contains the following information:
(i) the source(s) of DNA; (ii) the nature of the inserted DNA sequences; (iii) the host(s) and vector(s) to be
used; (iv) if an attempt will be made to obtain expression of a foreign gene, and if so, indicate the protein
that will be produced; and (v) the containment conditions that will be implemented as specified in the NIH
Guidelines. For experiments in this category, the registration document shall be dated, signed by the
Principal Investigator, and filed with the Institutional Biosafety Committee. The Institutional Biosafety
Committee shall review and approve all experiments in this category prior to their initiation. Requests to
decrease the level of containment specified for experiments in this category will be considered by NIH
(see Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(c), Minor Actions).
Section III-D-1. Experiments Using Risk Group 2, Risk Group 3, Risk Group 4, or Restricted
Agents as Host-Vector Systems (See Section II-A, Risk Assessment)
Section III-D-1-a. Experiments involving the introduction of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules into Risk Group 2 agents will usually be conducted at Biosafety Level (BL) 2 containment.
Experiments with such agents will usually be conducted with whole animals at BL2 or BL2-N (Animals)
containment.
Section III-D-1-b. Experiments involving the introduction of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules into Risk Group 3 agents will usually be conducted at BL3 containment. Experiments with
such agents will usually be conducted with whole animals at BL3 or BL3-N containment.
Section III-D-1-c. Experiments involving the introduction of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules into Risk Group 4 agents shall be conducted at BL4 containment. Experiments with such
agents shall be conducted with whole animals at BL4 or BL4-N containment.
Section III-D-1-d. Containment conditions for experiments involving the introduction of recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecules into restricted agents shall be set on a case-by-case basis following NIH
OSP review. A U.S. Department of Agriculture - Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(USDA/APHIS) permit is required for work with plant or animal pathogens (see Section V-G and V-M,
Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV). Experiments with such agents shall be conducted with
whole animals at BL4 or BL4-N containment.
Section III-D-2. Experiments in Which DNA From Risk Group 2, Risk Group 3, Risk Group 4, or
Restricted Agents is Cloned into Nonpathogenic Prokaryotic or Lower Eukaryotic Host-Vector
Systems
Section III-D-2-a. Experiments in which DNA from Risk Group 2 or Risk Group 3 agents (see Section IIA, Risk Assessment) is transferred into nonpathogenic prokaryotes or lower eukaryotes may be
performed under BL2 containment. Experiments in which DNA from Risk Group 4 agents is transferred
into nonpathogenic prokaryotes or lower eukaryotes may be performed under BL2 containment after
demonstration that only a totally and irreversibly defective fraction of the agent's genome is present in a
given recombinant. In the absence of such a demonstration, BL4 containment shall be used. The
Institutional Biosafety Committee may approve the specific lowering of containment for particular
experiments to BL1. Many experiments in this category are exempt from the NIH Guidelines (see Section
III-F, Exempt Experiments). Experiments involving the formation of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules for certain genes coding for molecules toxic for vertebrates require NIH OSP approval (see
Section III-B-1, Experiments Involving the Cloning of Toxin Molecules with LD50 of Less than 100
Nanograms Per Kilogram Body Weight) or shall be conducted under NIH specified conditions as
described in Appendix F, Containment Conditions for Cloning of Genes Coding for the Biosynthesis of
Molecules Toxic for Vertebrates.
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Section III-D-2-b. Containment conditions for experiments in which DNA from restricted agents is
transferred into nonpathogenic prokaryotes or lower eukaryotes shall be determined by NIH OSP
following a case-by-case review (see Section V-L, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV). A U.S.
Department of Agriculture permit is required for work with plant or animal pathogens (see Section V-G,
Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV).
Section III-D-3. Experiments Involving the Use of Infectious DNA or RNA Viruses or Defective
DNA or RNA Viruses in the Presence of Helper Virus in Tissue Culture Systems
Caution: Special care should be used in the evaluation of containment levels for experiments which are
likely to either enhance the pathogenicity (e.g., insertion of a host oncogene) or to extend the host range
(e.g., introduction of novel control elements) of viral vectors under conditions that permit a productive
infection. In such cases, serious consideration should be given to increasing physical containment by at
least one level.
Note: Recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules or nucleic acid molecules derived therefrom,
which contain less than two-thirds of the genome of any eukaryotic virus (all viruses from a single Family
(see Section V-J, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV) being considered identical (see Section VK, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV), are considered defective and may be used in the absence
of helper under the conditions specified in Section III-E-1, Experiments Involving the Formation of
Recombinant or Synthetic Molecules Containing No More than Two-Thirds of the Genome of any
Eukaryotic Virus.
Section III-D-3-a. Experiments involving the use of infectious or defective Risk Group 2 viruses (see
Appendix B-II, Risk Group 2 Agents) in the presence of helper virus may be conducted at BL2.
Section III-D-3-b. Experiments involving the use of infectious or defective Risk Group 3 viruses (see
Appendix B-III-D, Risk Group 3 (RG3) - Viruses and Prions) in the presence of helper virus may be
conducted at BL3.
Section III-D-3-c. Experiments involving the use of infectious or defective Risk Group 4 viruses (see
Appendix B-IV-D, Risk Group 4 (RG4) - Viral Agents) in the presence of helper virus may be conducted at
BL4.
Section III-D-3-d. Experiments involving the use of infectious or defective restricted poxviruses (see
Sections V-A and V-L, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV) in the presence of helper virus shall be
determined on a case-by-case basis following NIH OSP review. A U.S. Department of Agriculture permit
is required for work with plant or animal pathogens (see Section V-G, Footnotes and References of
Sections I-IV).
Section III-D-3-e. Experiments involving the use of infectious or defective viruses in the presence of
helper virus which are not covered in Sections III-D-3-a through III-D-3-d may be conducted at BL1.
Section III-D-4. Experiments Involving Whole Animals
This section covers experiments involving whole animals in which the animal's genome has been altered
by stable introduction of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules, or nucleic acids derived
therefrom, into the germ-line (transgenic animals) and experiments involving viable recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified microorganisms tested on whole animals. For the latter, other
than viruses which are only vertically transmitted, the experiments may not be conducted at BL1-N
containment. A minimum containment of BL2 or BL2-N is required.
Caution - Special care should be used in the evaluation of containment conditions for some experiments
with transgenic animals. For example, such experiments might lead to the creation of novel mechanisms
or increased transmission of a recombinant pathogen or production of undesirable traits in the host
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animal. In such cases, serious consideration should be given to increasing the containment conditions.
Section III-D-4-a. Recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules, or DNA or RNA molecules derived
therefrom, from any source except for greater than two-thirds of eukaryotic viral genome may be
transferred to any non-human vertebrate or any invertebrate organism and propagated under conditions
of physical containment comparable to BL1 or BL1-N and appropriate to the organism under study (see
Section V-B, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV). Animals that contain sequences from viral
vectors, which do not lead to transmissible infection either directly or indirectly as a result of
complementation or recombination in animals, may be propagated under conditions of physical
containment comparable to BL1 or BL1-N and appropriate to the organism under study. Experiments
involving the introduction of other sequences from eukaryotic viral genomes into animals are covered
under Section III-D-4-b, Experiments Involving Whole Animals. For experiments involving recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified Risk Groups 2, 3, 4, or restricted organisms, see Sections V-A,
V-G, and V-L, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV. It is important that the investigator
demonstrate that the fraction of the viral genome being utilized does not lead to productive infection. A
U.S. Department of Agriculture permit is required for work with plant or animal pathogens (see Section VG, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV).
Section III-D-4-b. For experiments involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules, or DNA or
RNA derived therefrom, involving whole animals, including transgenic animals, and not covered by
Section III-D-1, Experiments Using Human or Animal Pathogens (Risk Group 2, Risk Group 3, Risk Group
4, or Restricted Agents as Host-Vector Systems), or Section III-D-4-a, the appropriate containment shall
be determined by the Institutional Biosafety Committee.
Section III-D-4-c. Exceptions under Section III-D-4, Experiments Involving Whole Animals
Section III-D-4-c-(1). Experiments involving the generation of transgenic rodents that require BL1
containment are described under Section III-E-3, Experiments Involving Transgenic Rodents.
Section III-D-4-c-(2). The purchase or transfer of transgenic rodents is exempt from the NIH Guidelines
under Section III-F, Exempt Experiments (see Appendix C-VII, The Purchase or Transfer of Transgenic
Rodents).
Section III-D-5. Experiments Involving Whole Plants
Experiments to genetically engineer plants by recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule methods, to
use such plants for other experimental purposes (e.g., response to stress), to propagate such plants, or to
use plants together with microorganisms or insects containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules, may be conducted under the containment conditions described in Sections III-D-5-a through
III-D-5-e. If experiments involving whole plants are not described in Section III-D-5 and do not fall under
Sections III-A, III-B, III-D or III-F, they are included in Section III-E.
NOTE - For recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule experiments falling under Sections III-D-5-a
through III-D-5-d, physical containment requirements may be reduced to the next lower level by
appropriate biological containment practices, such as conducting experiments on a virus with an obligate
insect vector in the absence of that vector or using a genetically attenuated strain.
Section III-D-5-a. BL3-P (Plants) or BL2-P + biological containment is recommended for experiments
involving most exotic (see Section V-M, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV) infectious agents with
recognized potential for serious detrimental impact on managed or natural ecosystems when recombinant
or synthetic nucleic acid molecule techniques are associated with whole plants.
Section III-D-5-b. BL3-P or BL2-P + biological containment is recommended for experiments involving
plants containing cloned genomes of readily transmissible exotic (see Section V-M, Footnotes and
References of Sections I-IV) infectious agents with recognized potential for serious detrimental effects on
managed or natural ecosystems in which there exists the possibility of reconstituting the complete and
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functional genome of the infectious agent by genomic complementation in planta.
Section III-D-5-c. BL4-P containment is recommended for experiments with a small number of readily
transmissible exotic (see Section V-M, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV) infectious agents,
such as the soybean rust fungus (Phakospora pachyrhizi) and maize streak or other viruses in the
presence of their specific arthropod vectors, that have the potential of being serious pathogens of major
U.S. crops.
Section III-D-5-d. BL3-P containment is recommended for experiments involving sequences encoding
potent vertebrate toxins introduced into plants or associated organisms. Recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecules containing genes for the biosynthesis of toxin molecules lethal for vertebrates at
an LD50 of <100 nanograms per kilogram body weight fall under Section III-B-1, Experiments Involving the
Cloning of Toxin Molecules with LD50 of Less than 100 Nanograms Per Kilogram Body Weight, and
require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety Committee approval before initiation.
Section III-D-5-e. BL3-P or BL2-P + biological containment is recommended for experiments with
microbial pathogens of insects or small animals associated with plants if the recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecule-modified organism has a recognized potential for serious detrimental impact on
managed or natural ecosystems.
Section III-D-6. Experiments Involving More than 10 Liters of Culture
The appropriate containment will be decided by the Institutional Biosafety Committee. Where
appropriate, Appendix K, Physical Containment for Large Scale Uses of Organisms Containing
Recombinant or Synthetic Recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid Molecules, shall be used. Appendix K
describes containment conditions Good Large Scale Practice through BL3-Large Scale.
Section III-D-7. Experiments Involving Influenza Viruses
Experiments with influenza viruses generated by recombinant or synthetic methods (e.g., generation by
reverse genetics of chimeric viruses with reassorted segments, introduction of specific mutations) shall be
conducted at the biosafety level containment corresponding to the Risk Group of the virus that was the
source of the majority of segments in the recombinant or synthetic virus (e.g., experiments with viruses
containing a majority of segments from a RG3 virus shall be conducted at BL3). Experiments with
influenza viruses containing genes or segments from 1918-1919 H1N1 (1918 H1N1), human H2N2
(1957-1968) and highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 strains within the Goose/Guangdong/96-like H5
lineage (HPAI H5N1), including, but not limited to, strains of HPAI H5N1 virus that are transmissible
among mammals by respiratory droplets, as demonstrated in an appropriate animal model or clinically
in humans (hereinafter referred to as mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus), shall be conducted at
BL3 enhanced containment (see Appendix G-II-C-5, Biosafety Level 3 Enhanced for Research Involving
Risk Group 3 Influenza Viruses) unless indicated below.
Section III-D-7-a. Human H2N2 (1957-1968). Experiments with influenza viruses containing the H2
hemagglutinin (HA) segment shall be conducted at BL3 enhanced (see Appendix G-II-C-5, Biosafety
Level 3 Enhanced for Research Involving Risk Group 3 Influenza Viruses). Experiments with the H2 HA
gene in cold-adapted, live attenuated vaccine strains (e.g., A/Ann Arbor/6/60 H2N2) may be conducted at
BL2 containment provided segments with mutations conferring temperature sensitivity and attenuation
are not altered in the recombinant or synthetic virus. Experiments with Risk Group 2 influenza viruses
containing genes from human H2N2 other than the HA gene can be worked on at BL2.
Section III-D-7-b. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 strains within the
Goose/Guangdong/96-like H5 lineage (HPAI H5N1). Experiments involving influenza viruses
containing a majority of genes and/or segments from a HPAI H5N1 influenza virus shall be conducted at
BL3 enhanced containment, (see Appendix G-II-C-5, Biosafety Level 3 Enhanced for Research Involving
Risk Group 3 Influenza Viruses). Experiments involving influenza viruses containing a minority of genes
and/or segments from a HPAI H5N1 influenza virus shall be conducted at BL3 enhanced unless a risk
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assessment performed by the IBC determines that they can be conducted safely at biosafety level 2 and
after they have been excluded pursuant to 9 CFR 121.3(e). NIH OSP is available to IBCs to provide
consultation with influenza virus experts when risk assessments are being made to determine the
appropriate biocontainment for experiments with influenza viruses containing a minority of gene/segments
from HPAI H5N1. Such experiments may be performed at BL3 enhanced containment or containment
may be lowered to biosafety level 2, the level of containment for most research with other influenza
viruses. (USDA/APHIS regulations and decisions on lowering containment also apply.) In deciding to
lower containment, the IBC should consider whether, in at least two animal models (e.g., ferret, mouse,
Syrian golden hamster, cotton rat, non-human primates), there is evidence that the resulting influenza
virus shows reduced replication and virulence compared to the parental RG3 virus at relevant doses.
This should be determined by measuring biological indices appropriate for the specific animal model (e.g.,
severe weight loss, elevated temperature, mortality or neurological symptoms).
Section III-D-7-c. 1918 H1N1. Experiments involving influenza viruses containing any gene or segment
from 1918 H1N1 shall be conducted at BL3 enhanced containment (see Appendix G-II-C-5, Biosafety
Level 3 Enhanced for Research Involving Risk Group 3 Influenza Viruses).
Section III-D-7-d. Antiviral Susceptibility and Containment. The availability of antiviral drugs as
preventive and therapeutic measures is an important safeguard for experiments with 1918 H1N1, HPAI
H5N1, and human H2N2 (1957-1968). If an influenza virus containing genes from one of these viruses is
resistant to both classes of current antiviral agents, adamantanes and neuraminidase inhibitors, higher
containment may be required based on the risk assessment considering transmissibility to humans,
virulence, pandemic potential, alternative antiviral agents if available, etc.
Experiments with 1918 H1N1, human H2N2 (1957-1968) or HPAI H5N1 that are designed to create
resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors or other effective antiviral agents (including investigational antiviral
agents being developed for influenza) would be subject to Section III-A-1 (Major Actions). As per Section
I-A-1 of the NIH Guidelines, if the agent is a Select Agent, the NIH will defer to the appropriate Federal
agency (HHS or USDA Select Agent Divisions) on such experiments.
Section III-E.
with Initiation

Experiments that Require Institutional Biosafety Committee Notice Simultaneous

Experiments not included in Sections III-A, III-B, III-C, III-D, III-F, and their subsections are considered in
Section III-E. All such experiments may be conducted at BL1 containment. For experiments in this
category, a registration document (see Section III-D, Experiments that Require Institutional Biosafety
Committee Approval Before Initiation) shall be dated and signed by the investigator and filed with the
local Institutional Biosafety Committee at the time the experiment is initiated. The Institutional Biosafety
Committee reviews and approves all such proposals, but Institutional Biosafety Committee review and
approval prior to initiation of the experiment is not required (see Section IV-A, Policy). For example,
experiments in which all components derived from non-pathogenic prokaryotes and non-pathogenic lower
eukaryotes fall under Section III-E and may be conducted at BL1 containment.
Section III-E-1. Experiments Involving the Formation of Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid
Molecules Containing No More than Two-Thirds of the Genome of any Eukaryotic Virus
Recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules containing no more than two-thirds of the genome of
any eukaryotic virus (all viruses from a single Family being considered identical [see Section V-J,
Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV]) may be propagated and maintained in cells in tissue culture
using BL1 containment. For such experiments, it must be demonstrated that the cells lack helper virus for
the specific Families of defective viruses being used. If helper virus is present, procedures specified
under Section III-D-3, Experiments Involving the Use of Infectious Animal or Plant DNA or RNA Viruses or
Defective Animal or Plant DNA or RNA Viruses in the Presence of Helper Virus in Tissue Culture
Systems, should be used. The DNA may contain fragments of the genome of viruses from more than one
Family but each fragment shall be less than two-thirds of a genome.
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Section III-E-2. Experiments Involving Whole Plants
This section covers experiments involving nucleic acid molecule-modified whole plants, and/or
experiments involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified organisms associated with
whole plants, except those that fall under Section III-A, III-B, III-D, or III-F. It should be emphasized that
knowledge of the organisms and judgment based on accepted scientific practices should be used in all
cases in selecting the appropriate level of containment. For example, if the genetic modification has the
objective of increasing pathogenicity or converting a non-pathogenic organism into a pathogen, then a
higher level of containment may be appropriate depending on the organism, its mode of dissemination,
and its target organisms. By contrast, a lower level of containment may be appropriate for small animals
associated with many types of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified plants.
Section III-E-2-a. BL1-P is recommended for all experiments with recombinant or synthetic recombinant
or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-containing plants and plant-associated microorganisms not covered in
Section III-E-2-b or other sections of the NIH Guidelines. Examples of such experiments are those
involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified plants that are not noxious weeds or
that cannot interbreed with noxious weeds in the immediate geographic area, and experiments involving
whole plants and recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified non-exotic (see Section V-M,
Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV) microorganisms that have no recognized potential for rapid
and widespread dissemination or for serious detrimental impact on managed or natural ecosystems (e.g.,
Rhizobium spp. and Agrobacterium spp.).
Section III-E-2-b. BL2-P or BL1-P + biological containment is recommended for the following
experiments:
Section III-E-2-b-(1). Plants modified by recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules that are
noxious weeds or can interbreed with noxious weeds in the immediate geographic area.
Section III-E-2-b-(2). Plants in which the introduced DNA represents the complete genome of a nonexotic infectious agent (see Section V-M, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV).
Section III-E-2-b-(3). Plants associated with recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified
non-exotic microorganisms that have a recognized potential for serious detrimental impact on managed
or natural ecosystems (see Section V-M, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV).
Section III-E-2-b-(4). Plants associated with recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified
exotic microorganisms that have no recognized potential for serious detrimental impact on managed or
natural ecosystems (see Section V-M, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV).
Section III-E-2-b-(5). Experiments with recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified
arthropods or small animals associated with plants, or with arthropods or small animals with recombinant
or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified microorganisms associated with them if the recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified microorganisms have no recognized potential for serious
detrimental impact on managed or natural ecosystems (see Section V-M, Footnotes and References of
Sections I-IV).
Section III-E-3. Experiments Involving Transgenic Rodents
This section covers experiments involving the generation of rodents in which the animal's genome has
been altered by stable introduction of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules, or nucleic acids
derived therefrom, into the germ-line (transgenic rodents). Only experiments that require BL1
containment are covered under this section; experiments that require BL2, BL3, or BL4 containment are
covered under Section III-D-4, Experiments Involving Whole Animals.
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Section III-E-3-a. Experiments involving the breeding of certain BL1 transgenic rodents are exempt
under Section III-F, Exempt Experiments (See Appendix C-VIII, Generation of BL1 Transgenic Rodents
via Breeding).
Section III-F.

Exempt Experiments

The following recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules are exempt from the NIH Guidelines and
registration with the Institutional Biosafety Committee is not required; however, other federal and state
standards of biosafety may still apply to such research (for example, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC)/NIH publication Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories).
Section III-F-1. Those synthetic nucleic acids that: (1) can neither replicate nor generate nucleic acids
that can replicate in any living cell (e.g., oligonucleotides or other synthetic nucleic acids that do not
contain an origin of replication or contain elements known to interact with either DNA or RNA
polymerase), and (2) are not designed to integrate into DNA, and (3) do not produce a toxin that is lethal
for vertebrates at an LD50 of less than 100 nanograms per kilogram body weight. If a synthetic nucleic
acid is deliberately transferred into one or more human research participants and meets the criteria of
Section III-C, it is not exempt under this Section.
Section III-F-2. Those that are not in organisms, cells, or viruses and that have not been modified or
manipulated (e.g., encapsulated into synthetic or natural vehicles) to render them capable of penetrating
cellular membranes.
Section III-F-3. Those that consist solely of the exact recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid sequence
from a single source that exists contemporaneously in nature.
Section III-F-4. Those that consist entirely of nucleic acids from a prokaryotic host, including its
indigenous plasmids or viruses when propagated only in that host (or a closely related strain of the same
species), or when transferred to another host by well-established physiological means.
Section III-F-5. Those that consist entirely of nucleic acids from a eukaryotic host including its
chloroplasts, mitochondria, or plasmids (but excluding viruses) when propagated only in that host (or a
closely related strain of the same species).
Section III-F-6. Those that consist entirely of DNA segments from different species that exchange DNA
by known physiological processes, though one or more of the segments may be a synthetic equivalent. A
list of such exchangers will be prepared and periodically revised by the NIH Director after appropriate
notice and opportunity for public comment (see Section IV-C-1-b-(1)-(c), Major Actions). See Appendices
A-I through A-VI, Exemptions under Section III-F-6--Sublists of Natural Exchangers, for a list of natural
exchangers that are exempt from the NIH Guidelines.
Section III-F-7. Those genomic DNA molecules that have acquired a transposable element, provided the
transposable element does not contain any recombinant and/or synthetic DNA.
Section III-F-8. Those that do not present a significant risk to health or the environment (see Section IVC-1-b-(1)-(c), Major Actions), as determined by the NIH Director following appropriate notice and
opportunity for public comment. See Appendix C, Exemptions under Section III-F-8 for other classes of
experiments which are exempt from the NIH Guidelines.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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The safe conduct of experiments involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules depends on
the individual conducting such activities. The NIH Guidelines cannot anticipate every possible situation.
Motivation and good judgment are the key essentials to protection of health and the environment. The
NIH Guidelines are intended to assist the institution, Institutional Biosafety Committee, Biological Safety
Officer, and the Principal Investigator in determining safeguards that should be implemented. The NIH
Guidelines will never be complete or final since all conceivable experiments involving recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecules cannot be foreseen. The utilization of new genetic manipulation
techniques may enable work previously conducted using recombinant means to be accomplished faster,
more efficiently, or at larger scale. These techniques have not yet yielded organisms that present safety
concerns that fall outside the current risk assessment framework used for recombinant nucleic acid
research. Nonetheless, an appropriate risk assessment of experiments involving these techniques must
be conducted taking into account the way these approaches may alter the risk assessment. As new
techniques develop, the NIH Guidelines should be periodically reviewed to determine whether and how
such research should be explicitly addressed.
It is the responsibility of the institution and those associated with it to adhere to the intent of the NIH
Guidelines as well as to their specifics. Therefore, each institution (and the Institutional Biosafety
Committee acting on its behalf) is responsible for ensuring that all research with recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecules conducted at or sponsored by that institution is conducted in compliance with the
NIH Guidelines. The following roles and responsibilities constitute an administrative framework in which
safety is an essential and integral part of research involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules. Further clarifications and interpretations of roles and responsibilities will be issued by NIH as
necessary.
Section IV-B.

Responsibilities of the Institution

Section IV-B-1. General Information
Each institution conducting or sponsoring recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research which
is covered by the NIH Guidelines is responsible for ensuring that the research is conducted in full
conformity with the provisions of the NIH Guidelines. In order to fulfill this responsibility, the institution
shall:
Section IV-B-1-a. Establish and implement policies that provide for the safe conduct of recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecule research and that ensure compliance with the NIH Guidelines. As part of
its general responsibilities for implementing the NIH Guidelines, the institution may establish additional
procedures, as deemed necessary, to govern the institution and its components in the discharge of its
responsibilities under the NIH Guidelines. Such procedures may include: (i) statements formulated by
the institution for the general implementation of the NIH Guidelines, and (ii) any additional precautionary
steps the institution deems appropriate.
Section IV-B-1-b. Establish an Institutional Biosafety Committee that meets the requirements set forth in
Section IV-B-2-a and carries out the functions detailed in Section IV-B-2-b.
Section IV-B-1-c. Appoint a Biological Safety Officer (who is also a member of the Institutional Biosafety
Committee) if the institution: (i) conducts recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research at
Biosafety Level (BL) 3 or BL4, or (ii) engages in large-scale (greater than 10 liters) research. The
Biological Safety Officer carries out the duties specified in Section IV-B-3.
Section IV-B-1-d. Appoint at least one individual with expertise in plant, plant pathogen, or plant pest
containment principles (who is a member of the Institutional Biosafety Committee) if the institution
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conducts recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research that requires Institutional Biosafety
Committee approval in accordance with Appendix L, Physical and Biological Containment for
Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecule Research Involving Plants.
Section IV-B-1-e. Appoint at least one individual with expertise in animal containment principles (who is
a member of the Institutional Biosafety Committee) if the institution conducts recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecule research that requires Institutional Biosafety Committee approval in accordance
with Appendix M, Physical and Biological Containment for Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid
Molecule Research Involving Animals.
Section IV-B-1-f. Ensure that when the institution participates in or sponsors recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecule research involving human participants: (i) the Institutional Biosafety Committee has
adequate expertise and training (using ad hoc consultants as deemed necessary) and (ii) no human gene
transfer experiment shall be initiated until Institutional Biosafety Committee approval has been obtained
and all other applicable institutional and regulatory authorization(s) and approvals have been obtained.
Institutional Biosafety Committee approval must be obtained from the clinical trial site.
Section IV-B-1-g. Assist and ensure compliance with the NIH Guidelines by Principal Investigators
conducting research at the institution as specified in Section IV-B-7.
Section IV-B-1-h. Ensure appropriate training for the Institutional Biosafety Committee Chair and
members, Biological Safety Officer and other containment experts (when applicable), Principal
Investigators, and laboratory staff regarding laboratory safety and implementation of the NIH Guidelines.
The Institutional Biosafety Committee Chair is responsible for ensuring that Institutional Biosafety
Committee members are appropriately trained. The Principal Investigator is responsible for ensuring that
laboratory staff are appropriately trained. The institution is responsible for ensuring that the Principal
Investigator has sufficient training; however, this responsibility may be delegated to the Institutional
Biosafety Committee.
Section IV-B-1-i. Determine the necessity for health surveillance of personnel involved in connection
with individual recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule projects; and if appropriate, conduct a
health surveillance program for such projects. The institution shall establish and maintain a health
surveillance program for personnel engaged in large-scale research or production activities involving
viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules which require BL3
containment at the laboratory scale. The institution shall establish and maintain a health surveillance
program for personnel engaged in animal research involving viable recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecule-containing microorganisms that require BL3 or greater containment in the laboratory. The
Laboratory Safety Monograph discusses various components of such a program (e.g., records of agents
handled, active investigation of relevant illnesses, and the maintenance of serial serum samples for
monitoring serologic changes that may result from the employees' work experience). Certain medical
conditions may place a laboratory worker at increased risk in any endeavor where infectious agents are
handled. Examples cited in the Laboratory Safety Monograph include gastrointestinal disorders and
treatment with steroids, immunosuppressive drugs, or antibiotics. Workers with such disorders or
treatment should be evaluated to determine whether they should be engaged in research with potentially
hazardous organisms during their treatment or illness. Copies of the Laboratory Safety Monograph are
available from the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by submitting a
request for this information to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available
here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov).
Section IV-B-1-j. Report any significant problems, violations of the NIH Guidelines, or any significant
research-related accidents and illnesses to NIH OSP within thirty days, unless the institution determines
that a report has already been filed by the Principal Investigator or Institutional Biosafety Committee.
Reports shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to:
NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP website
(www.osp.od.nih.gov).

Page 28 - NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules

(April 2019)

Section IV-B-2. Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)
The institution shall establish an Institutional Biosafety Committee whose responsibilities need not be
restricted to recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research. The Institutional Biosafety
Committee shall meet the following requirements:
Section IV-B-2-a.

Membership and Procedures

Section IV-B-2-a-(1). The Institutional Biosafety Committee must comprise no fewer than five members
so selected that they collectively have experience and expertise in recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecule technology and the capability to assess the safety of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecule research and to identify any potential risk to public health or the environment. At least two
members shall not be affiliated with the institution (apart from their membership on the Institutional
Biosafety Committee) and who represent the interest of the surrounding community with respect to health
and protection of the environment (e.g., officials of state or local public health or environmental protection
agencies, members of other local governmental bodies, or persons active in medical, occupational health,
or environmental concerns in the community). The Institutional Biosafety Committee shall include at least
one individual with expertise in plant, plant pathogen, or plant pest containment principles when
experiments utilizing Appendix L, Physical and Biological Containment for Recombinant or Synthetic
Nucleic Acid Molecule Research Involving Plants, require prior approval by the Institutional Biosafety
Committee. The Institutional Biosafety Committee shall include at least one scientist with expertise in
animal containment principles when experiments utilizing Appendix M, Physical and Biological
Containment for Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecule Research Involving Animals, require
Institutional Biosafety Committee prior approval. When the institution conducts recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecule research at BL3, BL4, or Large Scale (greater than 10 liters), a Biological Safety
Officer is mandatory and shall be a member of the Institutional Biosafety Committee (see Section IV-B-3,
Biological Safety Officer). When the institution participates in or sponsors recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecule research involving human research participants, the institution must ensure that the
Institutional Biosafety Committee has adequate expertise and training (using ad hoc consultants as
deemed necessary). Institutional Biosafety Committee approval must be obtained from the clinical trial
site.
Note: Individuals, corporations, and institutions not otherwise covered by the NIH Guidelines, are
encouraged to adhere to the standards and procedures set forth in Sections I through IV (see Section IVD, Voluntary Compliance. The policy and procedures for establishing an Institutional Biosafety
Committee under Voluntary Compliance, are specified in Section IV-D-2, Institutional Biosafety
Committee Approval).
Section IV-B-2-a-(2). In order to ensure the competence necessary to review and approve recombinant
or synthetic nucleic acid molecule activities, it is recommended that the Institutional Biosafety Committee:
(i) include persons with expertise in recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule technology, biological
safety, and physical containment; (ii) include or have available as consultants persons knowledgeable in
institutional commitments and policies, applicable law, standards of professional conduct and practice,
community attitudes, and the environment, and (iii) include at least one member representing the
laboratory technical staff.
Section IV-B-2-a-(3). The institution shall file an annual report with NIH OSP which includes: (i) a roster
of all Institutional Biosafety Committee members clearly indicating the Chair, contact person, Biological
Safety Officer (if applicable), plant expert (if applicable), animal expert (if applicable), human gene
therapy expertise or ad hoc consultant (if applicable); and (ii) biographical sketches of all Institutional
Biosafety Committee members (including community members).
Section IV-B-2-a-(4). No member of an Institutional Biosafety Committee may be involved (except to
provide information requested by the Institutional Biosafety Committee) in the review or approval of a
project in which he/she has been or expects to be engaged or has a direct financial interest.
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Section IV-B-2-a-(5). The institution, that is ultimately responsible for the effectiveness of the Institutional
Biosafety Committee, may establish procedures that the Institutional Biosafety Committee shall follow in
its initial and continuing review and approval of applications, proposals, and activities.
Section IV-B-2-a-(6). When possible and consistent with protection of privacy and proprietary interests,
the institution is encouraged to open its Institutional Biosafety Committee meetings to the public.
Section IV-B-2-a-(7). Upon request, the institution shall make available to the public all Institutional
Biosafety Committee meeting minutes and any documents submitted to or received from funding
agencies which the latter are required to make available to the public. If public comments are made on
Institutional Biosafety Committee actions, the institution shall forward both the public comments and the
Institutional Biosafety Committee's response to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health,
preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here
and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov).
Section IV-B-2-b.

Functions

On behalf of the institution, the Institutional Biosafety Committee is responsible for:
Section IV-B-2-b-(1). Reviewing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research conducted at
or sponsored by the institution for compliance with the NIH Guidelines as specified in Section III,
Experiments Covered by the NIH Guidelines, and approving those research projects that are found to
conform with the NIH Guidelines. This review shall include: (i) independent assessment of the
containment levels required by the NIH Guidelines for the proposed research; (ii) assessment of the
facilities, procedures, practices, and training and expertise of personnel involved in recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecule research; (iii) for recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research
involving human research participants assessment focused on biosafety issues (e.g., administration,
shedding). IBC oversight may conclude after the last participant is administered the final dose of
product. However, IBCs may choose to establish other end points for oversight, based on their biosafety
assessment of the proposed research.
Section IV-B-2-b-(2). Notifying the Principal Investigator of the results of the Institutional Biosafety
Committee's review and approval.
Section IV-B-2-b-(3). Lowering containment levels for certain experiments as specified in Section III-D-2a, Experiments in which DNA from Risk Group 2, Risk Group 3, Risk Group 4, or Restricted Agents is
Cloned into Nonpathogenic Prokaryotic or Lower Eukaryotic Host-Vector Systems.
Section IV-B-2-b-(4). Setting containment levels as specified in Sections III-D-4-b, Experiments Involving
Whole Animals, and III-D-5, Experiments Involving Whole Plants.
Section IV-B-2-b-(5). Periodically reviewing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research
conducted at the institution to ensure compliance with the NIH Guidelines.
Section IV-B-2-b-(6). Adopting emergency plans covering accidental spills and personnel contamination
resulting from recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research.
Note: The Laboratory Safety Monograph describes basic elements for developing specific procedures
dealing with major spills of potentially hazardous materials in the laboratory, including information and
references about decontamination and emergency plans. The NIH and the CDC are available to provide
consultation and direct assistance, if necessary, as posted in the Laboratory Safety Monograph. The
institution shall cooperate with the state and local public health departments by reporting any significant
research-related illness or accident that may be hazardous to the public health.
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Section IV-B-2-b-(7). Reporting any significant problems with or violations of the NIH Guidelines and any
significant research-related accidents or illnesses to the appropriate institutional official and NIH OSP
within 30 days, unless the Institutional Biosafety Committee determines that a report has already been
filed by the Principal Investigator. Reports to NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy,
National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact
information is also available here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov).
Section IV-B-2-b-(8). The Institutional Biosafety Committee may not authorize initiation of experiments
which are not explicitly covered by the NIH Guidelines until NIH establishes the containment requirement.
Section IV-B-2-b-(9). Performing such other functions as may be delegated to the Institutional Biosafety
Committee under Section IV-B-2, Institutional Biosafety Committee.
Section IV-B-3. Biological Safety Officer (BSO)
Section IV-B-3-a. The institution shall appoint a Biological Safety Officer if it engages in large-scale
research or production activities involving viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules.
Section IV-B-3-b. The institution shall appoint a Biological Safety Officer if it engages in recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecule research at BL3 or BL4. The Biological Safety Officer shall be a member
of the Institutional Biosafety Committee.
Section IV-B-3-c. The Biological Safety Officer's duties include, but are not be limited to:
Section IV-B-3-c-(1). Periodic inspections to ensure that laboratory standards are rigorously followed;
Section IV-B-3-c-(2). Reporting to the Institutional Biosafety Committee and the institution any significant
problems, violations of the NIH Guidelines, and any significant research-related accidents or illnesses of
which the Biological Safety Officer becomes aware unless the Biological Safety Officer determines that a
report has already been filed by the Principal Investigator;
Section IV-B-3-c-(3). Developing emergency plans for handling accidental spills and personnel
contamination and investigating laboratory accidents involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecule research;
Section IV-B-3-c-(4). Providing advice on laboratory security;
Section IV-B-3-c-(5). Providing technical advice to Principal Investigators and the Institutional Biosafety
Committee on research safety procedures.
Note: See the Laboratory Safety Monograph for additional information on the duties of the Biological
Safety Officer.
Section IV-B-4. Plant, Plant Pathogen, or Plant Pest Containment Expert
When the institution conducts recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research that requires
Institutional Biosafety Committee approval in accordance with Appendix L, Physical and Biological
Containment for Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecule Research Involving Plants, the
institution shall appoint at least one individual with expertise in plant, plant pathogen, or plant pest
containment principles (who is a member of the Institutional Biosafety Committee).
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Section IV-B-5. Animal Containment Expert
When the institution conducts recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research that requires
Institutional Biosafety Committee approval in accordance with Appendix M, Physical and Biological
Containment for Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecule Research Involving Animals, the
institution shall appoint at least one individual with expertise in animal containment principles (who is a
member of the Institutional Biosafety Committee).
Section IV-B-6. Human Gene Therapy Expertise
When the institution participates in or sponsors recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research
involving human subjects, the institution must ensure that the Institutional Biosafety Committee has
adequate expertise and training (using ad hoc consultants as deemed necessary).
Section IV-B-7. Principal Investigator (PI)
On behalf of the institution, the Principal Investigator is responsible for full compliance with the NIH
Guidelines in the conduct of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research.
Section IV-B-7-a.

General Responsibilities

As part of this general responsibility, the Principal Investigator shall:
Section IV-B-7-a-(1). Initiate or modify no recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule research which
requires Institutional Biosafety Committee approval prior to initiation (see Sections III-A, III-B, III-C, III-D,
and III-E, Experiments Covered by the NIH Guidelines) until that research or the proposed modification
thereof has been approved by the Institutional Biosafety Committee and has met all other requirements of
the NIH Guidelines;
Section IV-B-7-a-(2). Determine whether experiments are covered by Section III-E, Experiments that
Require Institutional Biosafety Committee Notice Simultaneous with Initiation, and ensure that the
appropriate procedures are followed;
Section IV-B-7-a-(3). Report any significant problems, violations of the NIH Guidelines, or any significant
research-related accidents and illnesses to the Biological Safety Officer (where applicable),
Greenhouse/Animal Facility Director (where applicable), Institutional Biosafety Committee, NIH OSP, and
other appropriate authorities (if applicable) within 30 days. Reports to NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office
of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov;
additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov).
Section IV-B-7-a-(4). Report any new information bearing on the NIH Guidelines to the Institutional
Biosafety Committee and to NIH OSP (reports to NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy,
National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact
information is also available here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov).
Section IV-B-7-a-(5). Be adequately trained in good microbiological techniques;
Section IV-B-7-a-(6). Adhere to Institutional Biosafety Committee approved emergency plans for
handling accidental spills and personnel contamination; and
Section IV-B-7-a-(7). Comply with shipping requirements for recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules (see Appendix H, Shipment, for shipping requirements and the Laboratory Safety Monograph
for technical recommendations).
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Information to Be Submitted by the Principal Investigator to NIH OSP

The Principal Investigator shall:
Section IV-B-7-b-(1). Submit information to NIH OSP for certification of new host-vector systems;
Section IV-B-7-b-(2). Petition NIH OSP, with notice to the Institutional Biosafety Committee, for
proposed exemptions to the NIH Guidelines;
Section IV-B-7-b-(3). Petition NIH OSP, with concurrence of the Institutional Biosafety Committee, for
approval to conduct experiments specified in Sections III-A-1, Major Actions Under the NIH Guidelines,
and III-B, Experiments that Require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety Committee Approval Before
Initiation;
Section IV-B-7-b-(4). Petition NIH OSP for determination of containment for experiments requiring caseby-case review; and
Section IV-B-7-b-(5). Petition NIH OSP for determination of containment for experiments not covered by
the NIH Guidelines.
Section IV-B-7-c.
Committee

Submissions by the Principal Investigator to the Institutional Biosafety

The Principal Investigator shall:
Section IV-B-7-c-(1). Make an initial determination of the required levels of physical and biological
containment in accordance with the NIH Guidelines;
Section IV-B-7-c-(2). Select appropriate microbiological practices and laboratory techniques to be used
for the research;
Section IV-B-7-c-(3). Submit the initial research protocol and any subsequent changes (e.g., changes in
the source of DNA or host-vector system), if covered under Sections III-A, III-B, III-C, III-D, or III-E
(Experiments Covered by the NIH Guidelines), to the Institutional Biosafety Committee for review and
approval or disapproval; and
Section IV-B-7-c-(4). Remain in communication with the Institutional Biosafety Committee throughout
the conduct of the project.
Section IV-B-7-d.

Responsibilities of the Principal Investigator Prior to Initiating Research

The Principal Investigator shall:
Section IV-B-7-d-(1). Make available to all laboratory staff the protocols that describe the potential
biohazards and the precautions to be taken;
Section IV-B-7-d-(2). Instruct and train laboratory staff in: (i) the practices and techniques required to
ensure safety, and (ii) the procedures for dealing with accidents; and
Section IV-B-7-d-(3). Inform the laboratory staff of the reasons and provisions for any precautionary
medical practices advised or requested (e.g., vaccinations or serum collection).
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Responsibilities of the Principal Investigator During the Conduct of the

The Principal Investigator shall:
Section IV-B-7-e-(1). Supervise the safety performance of the laboratory staff to ensure that the required
safety practices and techniques are employed;
Section IV-B-7-e-(2). Investigate and report any significant problems pertaining to the operation and
implementation of containment practices and procedures in writing to the Biological Safety Officer (where
applicable), Greenhouse/Animal Facility Director (where applicable), Institutional Biosafety Committee,
NIH OSP, and other appropriate authorities (if applicable) (reports to NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office
of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov;
additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov).
Section IV-B-7-e-(3). Correct work errors and conditions that may result in the release of recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecule materials; and
Section IV-B-7-e-(4). Ensure the integrity of the physical containment (e.g., biological safety cabinets)
and the biological containment (e.g., purity and genotypic and phenotypic characteristics).
Section IV-C.

Responsibilities of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)

Section IV-C-1. NIH Director
The NIH Director is responsible for: (i) establishing the NIH Guidelines, (ii) overseeing their
implementation, and (iii) their final interpretation. The NIH Director has responsibilities under the NIH
Guidelines that involve OSP. OSP's responsibilities under the NIH Guidelines are administrative. In
certain circumstances, there is specific opportunity for public comment with published response prior to
final action.
Section IV-C-1-a.

General Responsibilities

The NIH Director is responsible for:
Section IV-C-1-a-(1). Promulgating requirements as necessary to implement the NIH Guidelines;
Section IV-C-1-a-(2). Establishing and maintaining NIH OSP to carry out the responsibilities defined in
Section IV-C-2, Office of Science Policy;
Section IV-C-1-a-(3). Conducting and supporting training programs in laboratory safety for Institutional
Biosafety Committee members, Biological Safety Officers and other institutional experts (if applicable),
Principal Investigators, and laboratory staff.
Section IV-C-1-b.

Specific Responsibilities

In carrying out the responsibilities set forth in this section, the NIH Director, or a designee shall weigh
each proposed action through appropriate analysis and consultation to determine whether it complies with
the NIH Guidelines and presents no significant risk to health or the environment.
Section IV-C-1-b-(1).

Major Actions

To execute Major Actions, the NIH Director shall provide an opportunity for public and Federal agency
comment. The NIH Director's decision/recommendation (at his/her discretion) may be published in the
Federal Register for a minimum of 15 days of comment before final action is taken. The NIH Director's
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final decision/recommendation, along with responses to public comments, shall be published in the
Federal Register. Institutional Biosafety Committee Chairs shall be notified of the following decisions:
Section IV-C-1-b-(1)-(a). Changing containment levels for types of experiments that are specified in the
NIH Guidelines when a Major Action is involved;
Section IV-C-1-b-(1)-(b). Assigning containment levels for types of experiments that are not explicitly
considered in the NIH Guidelines when a Major Action is involved;
Section IV-C-1-b-(1)-(c). Promulgating and amending a list of classes of recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecules to be exempt from the NIH Guidelines because they consist entirely of DNA
segments from species that exchange DNA by known physiological processes or otherwise do not
present a significant risk to health or the environment;
Section IV-C-1-b-(1)-(d). Permitting experiments specified by Section III-A, Experiments that Require
NIH Director Approval and Institutional Biosafety Committee Approval Before Initiation;
Section IV-C-1-b-(1)-(e). Certifying new host-vector systems with the exception of minor modifications
(e.g., those of minimal or no consequence to the properties relevant to containment) of already certified
systems (the standards and procedures for certification are described in Appendix I-II, Certification of
Host-Vector Systems); and
Section IV-C-1-b-(1)-(f). Adopting other changes in the NIH Guidelines.
Section IV-C-1-b-(2).

Minor Actions

NIH OSP shall carry out certain functions as delegated to it by the NIH Director (see Section IV-C-2,
Office of Science Policy). Minor Actions will be transmitted to Institutional Biosafety Committee Chairs:
Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(a). Changing containment levels for experiments that are specified in Section III,
Experiments Covered by the NIH Guidelines (except when a Major Action is involved);
Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(b). Assigning containment levels for experiments not explicitly considered in the
NIH Guidelines;
Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(c). Revising the Classification of Etiologic Agents for the purpose of these NIH
Guidelines (see Section V-A, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV).
Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(d). Interpreting the NIH Guidelines for experiments to which the NIH Guidelines do
not specifically assign containment levels;
Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(e). Setting containment under Sections III-D-1-d, Experiments Using Risk Group 2,
Risk Group 3, Risk Group 4, or Restricted Agents as Host-Vector Systems, and III-D-2-b, Experiments in
which DNA from Risk Group 2, Risk Group 3, Risk Group 4, or Restricted Agents is Cloned into
Nonpathogenic Prokaryotic or Lower Eukaryotic Host-Vector Systems;
Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(f). Approving minor modifications of already certified host-vector systems (the
standards and procedures for such modifications are described in Appendix I-II, Certification of HostVector Systems);
Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(g). Decertifying already certified host-vector systems;
Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(h). Adding new entries to the list of molecules toxic for vertebrates (see Appendix
F, Containment Conditions for Cloning of Genes Coding for the Biosynthesis of Molecules Toxic for
Vertebrates); and
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Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(i). Determining appropriate containment conditions for experiments according to
case precedents developed under Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(c).
Section IV-C-2. Office of Science Policy (OSP)
OSP shall serve as a focal point for information on recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule
activities and provide advice to all within and outside NIH including institutions, Biological Safety Officers,
Principal Investigators, Federal agencies, state and local governments, and institutions in the private
sector. OSP shall carry out such other functions as may be delegated to it by the NIH Director. OSP's
responsibilities include (but are not limited to) the following:
Section IV-C-2-a. Reviewing and approving experiments in conjunction with ad hoc experts involving the
cloning of genes encoding for toxin molecules that are lethal for vertebrates at an LD50 of less than or
equal to 100 nanograms per kilogram body weight in organisms other than Escherichia coli K-12 (see
Section III-B-1, Experiments Involving the Cloning of Toxin Molecules with LD50 of Less than 100
Nanograms Per Kilogram Body Weight, Appendix F, Containment Conditions for Cloning of Genes
Coding for the Biosynthesis of Molecules Toxic for Vertebrates);
Section IV-C-2-b. Publishing in the Federal Register, as needed.
Section IV-C-2-c. Reviewing and approving the membership of an institution's Institutional Biosafety
Committee, and where it finds the Institutional Biosafety Committee meets the requirements set forth in
Section IV-B-2, Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), giving its approval to the Institutional Biosafety
Committee membership.
Section IV-C-3. Other NIH Components
Other NIH components shall be responsible for certifying maximum containment (BL4) facilities,
inspecting them periodically, and inspecting other recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule facilities
as deemed necessary.
Section IV-D.

Voluntary Compliance

Section IV-D-1. Basic Policy - Voluntary Compliance
Individuals, corporations, and institutions not otherwise covered by the NIH Guidelines are encouraged to
follow the standards and procedures set forth in Sections I through IV. In order to simplify discussion,
references hereafter to “institutions” are intended to encompass corporations and individuals who have no
organizational affiliation. For purposes of complying with the NIH Guidelines, an individual intending to
carry out research involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules is encouraged to affiliate
with an institution that has an Institutional Biosafety Committee approved under the NIH Guidelines.
Since commercial organizations have special concerns, such as protection of proprietary data, some
modifications and explanations of the procedures are provided in Sections IV-D-2 through IV-D-5-b,
Voluntary Compliance, in order to address these concerns.
Section IV-D-2. Institutional Biosafety Committee Approval - Voluntary Compliance
It should be emphasized that employment of an Institutional Biosafety Committee member solely for
purposes of membership on the Institutional Biosafety Committee does not itself make the member an
institutionally affiliated member. Except for the unaffiliated members, a member of an Institutional
Biosafety Committee for an institution not otherwise covered by the NIH Guidelines may participate in the
review and approval of a project in which the member has a direct financial interest so long as the
member has not been, and does not expect to be, engaged in the project. Section IV-B-2-a-(4),
Institutional Biosafety Committee, is modified to that extent for purposes of these institutions.
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Section IV-D-3. Certification of Host-Vector Systems - Voluntary Compliance
A host-vector system may be proposed for certification by the NIH Director in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Appendix I-II, Certification of Host-Vector Systems. In order to ensure protection
for proprietary data, any public notice regarding a host-vector system which is designated by the
institution as proprietary under Section IV-D, Voluntary Compliance, will be issued only after consultation
with the institution as to the content of the notice.
Section IV-D-4. Requests for Exemptions and Approvals - Voluntary Compliance
Requests for exemptions or other approvals as required by the NIH Guidelines should be submitted
based on the procedures set forth in Sections I through IV. In order to ensure protection for proprietary
data, any public notice regarding a request for an exemption or other approval which is designated by the
institution as proprietary under Section IV-D-5-a, Voluntary Compliance, will be issued only after
consultation with the institution as to the content of the notice.
Section IV-D-5. Protection of Proprietary Data - Voluntary Compliance
Section IV-D-5-a.

General

In general, the Freedom of Information Act requires Federal agencies to make their records available to
the public upon request. However, this requirement does not apply to, among other things, “trade secrets
and commercial or financial information that is obtained from a person and that is privileged or
confidential.” Under 18 U.S.C. 1905, it is a criminal offense for an officer or employee of the U.S. or any
Federal department or agency to publish, divulge, disclose, or make known “in any manner or to any
extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment or official
duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or
filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or
relates to the trade secrets, (or) processes...of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association.”
This provision applies to all employees of the Federal Government, including special Government
employees.
In submitting to NIH for purposes of voluntary compliance with the NIH Guidelines, an institution may
designate those items of information which the institution believes constitute trade secrets, privileged,
confidential, commercial, or financial information. If NIH receives a request under the Freedom of
Information Act for information so designated, NIH will promptly contact the institution to secure its views
as to whether the information (or some portion) should be released. If NIH decides to release this
information (or some portion) in response to a Freedom of Information request or otherwise, the institution
will be advised and the actual release will be delayed in accordance with 45 Code of Federal Regulations,
Section 5.65(d) and (e).
Section IV-D-5-b.

Pre-submission Review

Any institution not otherwise covered by the NIH Guidelines, which is considering submission of data or
information voluntarily to NIH, may request pre-submission review of the records involved to determine if
NIH will make all or part of the records available upon request under the Freedom of Information Act.
A request for pre-submission review should be submitted to NIH OSP along with the records involved to
the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to:
NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP website
(www.osp.od.nih.gov). These records shall be clearly marked as being the property of the institution on
loan to NIH solely for the purpose of making a determination under the Freedom of Information Act. NIH
OSP will seek a determination from the responsible official under DHHS regulations (45 CFR Part 5) as to
whether the records involved, (or some portion) will be made available to members of the public under the
Freedom of Information Act. Pending such a determination, the records will be kept separate from NIH
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OSP files, will be considered records of the institution and not NIH OSP, and will not be received as part
of NIH OSP files. No copies will be made of such records.
NIH OSP will inform the institution of the NIH Freedom of Information Officer's determination and follow
the institution's instructions as to whether some or all of the records involved are to be returned to the
institution or to become a part of NIH OSP files. If the institution instructs NIH OSP to return the records,
no copies or summaries of the records will be made or retained by DHHS, NIH, or OSP. The NIH
Freedom of Information Officer's determination will represent that official's judgment at the time of the
determination as to whether the records involved (or some portion) would be exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act if at the time of the determination the records were in NIH OSP files
and a request was received for such files under the Freedom of Information Act.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES OF SECTIONS I THROUGH IV

Section V-A. The NIH Director may revise the classification for the purposes of the NIH Guidelines (see
Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(c), Minor Actions). The revised list of organisms in each Risk Group is reprinted in
Appendix B, Classification of Human Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard.
Section V-B. Section III, Experiments Covered by the NIH Guidelines, describes a number of places
where judgments are to be made. In all these cases, the Principal Investigator shall make the judgment
on these matters as part of his/her responsibility to "make the initial determination of the required levels of
physical and biological containment in accordance with the NIH Guidelines" (see Section IV-B-7-c-(1)).
For cases falling under Sections III-A through III-E, Experiments Covered by the NIH Guidelines, this
judgment is to be reviewed and approved by the Institutional Biosafety Committee as part of its
responsibility to make an "independent assessment of the containment levels required by the NIH
Guidelines for the proposed research" (see Section IV-B-2-b-(1), Institutional Biosafety Committee). The
Institutional Biosafety Committee may refer specific cases to NIH OSP as part of NIH OSP's functions to
"provide advice to all within and outside NIH" (see Section IV-C-2).
Section V-C. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health. Biosafety in Microbiological and
Biomedical Laboratories, 5th Edition, 2007. Copies are available from: Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20401-0001, Phone (202) 512-1800
[http://www.gpo.gov/].
Section V-D. Classification of Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, 4th Edition, July 1974, U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, Office
of Biosafety, Atlanta, Georgia 30333.
Section V-E. Chin, James ed., Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, 17th Edition, 2000. ISBN:
087553-242-X, American Public Health Association, 800 I Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Phone: (202)
777-2742.
Section V-F. World Health Organization Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 2nd edition. 1993. WHO Albany,
NY. Copies are available from: WHO Publication Centre, USA, (Q Corp) 49 Sheridan Avenue, Albany,
New York 12210; Phone: (518) 436-9686 (Order # 1152213).
Section V-G. A U.S. Department of Agriculture permit, required for import and interstate transport of
plant and animal pathogens, may be obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, ATTN: Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services, National Center for Import-Export,
Products Program, 4700 River Road, Unit 40, Riverdale, Maryland 20737. Phone: (301) 734-8499; Fax:
(301) 734-8226.
Section V-H. American Type Culture Collection Catalogues of plant viruses, animal viruses, cells,
bacteria, fungi, etc. are available from American Type Culture Collection, 10801 University Boulevard,
Manassas, VA 20110-2209. Phone: (703) 365-2700.
Section V-I. U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 29 CFR
1910.1030, Bloodborne Pathogens. See also, Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, OSHA 3127, 1996
(Revised).
Section V-J. As classified in the Virus Taxonomy: The Classification and Nomenclature of Viruses. The
Seventh Report of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses, Academic Press, 2000
(0123702003) San Diego, CA.
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Section V-K. i.e., the total of all genomes within a family shall not exceed two-thirds of the genome.
Section V-L. Organisms including alastrim, smallpox (variola) and whitepox may not be studied in the
United States except at specified facilities. All activities, including storage of variola and whitepox, are
restricted to the single national facility (World Health Organization Collaborating Center for Smallpox
Research, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia).
Section V-M. In accordance with accepted scientific and regulatory practices of the discipline of plant
pathology, an exotic plant pathogen (e.g., virus, bacteria, or fungus) is one that is unknown to occur within
the U.S. (see Section V-G, Footnotes and References of Sections I-IV). Determination of whether a
pathogen has a potential for serious detrimental impact on managed (agricultural, forest, grassland) or
natural ecosystems should be made by the Principal Investigator and the Institutional Biosafety
Committee, in consultation with scientists knowledgeable of plant diseases, crops, and ecosystems in the
geographic area of the research.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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EXEMPTIONS UNDER SECTION III-F-6--SUBLISTS OF NATURAL EXCHANGERS

Certain specified recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules that consist entirely of DNA segments
from different species that exchange DNA by known physiological processes, though one or more of the
segments may be a synthetic equivalent are exempt from these NIH Guidelines (see Section III-F-6,
Exempt Experiments). Institutional Biosafety Committee registration is not required for these exempt
experiments. A list of such exchangers will be prepared and periodically revised by the NIH Director after
appropriate notice and opportunity for public comment (see Section IV-C-1-b-(1)-(c), NIH Director-Specific Responsibilities). For a list of natural exchangers that are exempt from the NIH Guidelines, see
Appendices A-I through A-VI, Exemptions under Section III-F-6 Sublists of Natural Exchangers. Section
III-F-6, Exempt Experiments, describes recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules that are: (1)
composed entirely of DNA segments from one or more of the organisms within a sublist, and (2) to be
propagated in any of the organisms within a sublist (see Bergey’s Manual of Systematic Bacteriology; 2nd
edition, Springer-Verlag; New York, NY). Although these experiments are exempt, it is recommended
that they be performed at the appropriate biosafety level for the host or recombinant/synthetic organism
(see Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th edition, 2009, U.S. DHHS, Public
Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and National Institutes of Health).
Appendix A-I.

Sublist A

Genus Escherichia
Genus Shigella
Genus Salmonella - including Arizona
Genus Enterobacter
Genus Citrobacter - including Levinea
Genus Klebsiella - including oxytoca
Genus Erwinia
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Pseudomonas putida, Pseudomonas fluorescens, and Pseudomonas
mendocina
Serratia marcescens
Yersinia enterocolitica
Appendix A-II. Sublist B
Bacillus subtilis
Bacillus licheniformis
Bacillus pumilus
Bacillus globigii
Bacillus niger
Bacillus nato
Bacillus amyloliquefaciens
Bacillus aterrimus
Appendix A-III. Sublist C
Streptomyces aureofaciens
Streptomyces rimosus
Streptomyces coelicolor
Appendix A-IV. Sublist D
Streptomyces griseus
Streptomyces cyaneus
Streptomyces venezuelae
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Appendix A-V. Sublist E
One way transfer of Streptococcus mutans or Streptococcus lactis DNA into Streptococcus sanguis
Appendix A-VI. Sublist F
Streptococcus sanguis
Streptococcus pneumoniae
Streptococcus faecalis
Streptococcus pyogenes
Streptococcus mutans
***********************************************************************************************************************
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CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN ETIOLOGIC AGENTS ON THE BASIS OF HAZARD

This appendix includes those biological agents known to infect humans as well as selected animal agents
that may pose theoretical risks if inoculated into humans. Included are lists of representative genera and
species known to be pathogenic; mutated, recombined, and non-pathogenic species and strains are not
considered. Non-infectious life cycle stages of parasites are excluded.
This appendix reflects the current state of knowledge and should be considered a resource document.
Included are the more commonly encountered agents and is not meant to be all-inclusive. Information on
agent risk assessment may be found in the Agent Summary Statements of the CDC/NIH publication,
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (see Sections V-C, V-D, V-E, and V-F,
Footnotes and References of Sections I through IV. Further guidance on agents not listed in Appendix B
may be obtained through: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Biosafety Branch, Atlanta,
Georgia 30333, Phone: (404) 639-3883, Fax: (404) 639-2294; National Institutes of Health, Division of
Safety, Bethesda, Maryland 20892, Phone: (301) 496-1357; Biosafety Manager, National Animal
Disease Center, U.S. Department of Agriculture - ARS, Ames, Iowa 50010, Phone: (515) 337-7772.

Appendix B - Table 1.

Basis for the Classification of Biohazardous Agents by Risk Group (RG)

Risk Group 1 (RG1)

Agents that are not associated with disease in healthy adult humans

Risk Group 2 (RG2)

Agents that are associated with human disease which is rarely serious and for
which preventive or therapeutic interventions are often available

Risk Group 3 (RG3)

Agents that are associated with serious or lethal human disease for which
preventive or therapeutic interventions may be available (high individual risk
but low community risk)

Risk Group 4 (RG4)

Agents that are likely to cause serious or lethal human disease for which
preventive or therapeutic interventions are not usually available (high individual
risk and high community risk)

Appendix B-I.

Risk Group 1 (RG1) Agents

RG1 agents are not associated with disease in healthy adult humans. Examples of RG1 agents include
asporogenic Bacillus subtilis or Bacillus licheniformis (see Appendix C-IV-A, Bacillus subtilis or Bacillus
licheniformis Host-Vector Systems, Exceptions); adeno- associated virus (AAV – all serotypes); and
recombinant or synthetic AAV constructs, in which the transgene does not encode either a potentially
tumorigenic gene product or a toxin molecule and are produced in the absence of a helper virus. A strain
of Escherichia coli (see Appendix C-II-A, Escherichia coli K-12 Host Vector Systems, Exceptions) is an
RG1 agent if it (1) does not possess a complete lipopolysaccharide (i.e., lacks the O antigen); and (2)
does not carry any active virulence factor (e.g., toxins) or colonization factors and does not carry any
genes encoding these factors.
Those agents not listed in Risk Groups (RGs) 2, 3 and 4 are not automatically or implicitly classified in
RG1; a risk assessment must be conducted based on the known and potential properties of the agents
and their relationship to agents that are listed.
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Appendix B-II. Risk Group 2 (RG2) Agents
RG2 agents are associated with human disease which is rarely serious and for which preventive or
therapeutic interventions are often available.
Appendix B-II-A.

Risk Group 2 (RG2) - Bacterial Agents Including Chlamydia

--Acinetobacter baumannii (formerly Acinetobacter calcoaceticus)
--Actinobacillus
--Actinomyces pyogenes (formerly Corynebacterium pyogenes)
--Aeromonas hydrophila
--Amycolata autotrophica
--Archanobacterium haemolyticum (formerly Corynebacterium haemolyticum)
--Arizona hinshawii - all serotypes
--Bacillus anthracis
--Bartonella henselae, B. quintana, B. vinsonii
--Bordetella including B. pertussis
--Borrelia recurrentis, B. burgdorferi
--Burkholderia (formerly Pseudomonas species) except those listed in Appendix B-III-A (RG3))
--Campylobacter coli, C. fetus, C. jejuni
--Chlamydia psittaci, C. trachomatis, C. pneumoniae
--Clostridium botulinum, C. chauvoei, C. haemolyticum, C. histolyticum, C. novyi, C. septicum, C. tetani
--Coxiella burnetii – specifically the Phase II, Nine Mile strain, plaque purified, clone 4
--Corynebacterium diphtheriae, C. pseudotuberculosis, C. renale
--Dermatophilus congolensis
--Edwardsiella tarda
--Erysipelothrix rhusiopathiae
--Escherichia coli - all enteropathogenic, enterotoxigenic, enteroinvasive and strains bearing K1 antigen,
including E. coli O157:H7
--*Francisella tularensis specifically *F. tularensis subspecies novicida [aka F. novicida], strain Utah 112;
*F. tularensis subspecies holarctica LVS; *F. tularensis biovar tularensis strain ATCC 6223 (aka strain
B38)
*For research involving high concentrations, BL3 practices should be considered (see Appendix G-IIC-2. Special Practices (BL3)).
--Haemophilus ducreyi, H. influenzae
--Helicobacter pylori
--Klebsiella - all species except K. oxytoca (RG1)
--Legionella including L. pneumophila
--Leptospira interrogans - all serotypes
--Listeria
--Moraxella
--Mycobacterium (except those listed in Appendix B-III-A (RG3)) including M. avium complex, M.
asiaticum, M. bovis BCG vaccine strain, M. chelonae, M. fortuitum, M. kansasii, M. leprae, M.
malmoense, M. marinum, M. paratuberculosis, M. scrofulaceum, M. simiae, M. szulgai, M. ulcerans,
M. xenopi
--Mycoplasma, except M. mycoides and M. agalactiae which are restricted animal pathogens
--Neisseria gonorrhoeae, N. meningitidis
--Nocardia asteroides, N. brasiliensis, N. otitidiscaviarum, N. transvalensis
--Pseudomonas aeruginosa
--Rhodococcus equi
--Salmonella including S. arizonae, S. choleraesuis, S. enteritidis, S. gallinarum-pullorum, S. meleagridis,
S. paratyphi, A, B, C, S. typhi, S. typhimurium
--Shigella including S. boydii, S. dysenteriae, type 1, S. flexneri, S. sonnei
--Sphaerophorus necrophorus
--Staphylococcus aureus
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--Streptobacillus moniliformis
--Streptococcus including S. pneumoniae, S. pyogenes
--Treponema pallidum, T. carateum
--Vibrio cholerae, V. parahaemolyticus, V. vulnificus
--Yersinia enterocolitica
--Yersinia pestis specifically pgm(–) strains (lacking the 102 kb pigmentation locus) and lcr(–) strains
(lacking the LCR plasmid)
Appendix B-II-B.

Risk Group 2 (RG2) - Fungal Agents

--Blastomyces dermatitidis
--Cladosporium bantianum, C. (Xylohypha) trichoides
--Cryptococcus neoformans
--Dactylaria galopava (Ochroconis gallopavum)
--Epidermophyton
--Exophiala (Wangiella) dermatitidis
--Fonsecaea pedrosoi
--Microsporum
--Paracoccidioides braziliensis
--Penicillium marneffei
--Sporothrix schenckii
--Trichophyton
Appendix B-II-C.

Risk Group 2 (RG2) - Parasitic Agents

--Ancylostoma human hookworms including A. duodenale, A. ceylanicum
--Ascaris including Ascaris lumbricoides suum
--Babesia including B. divergens, B. microti
--Brugia filaria worms including B. malayi, B. timori
--Coccidia
--Cryptosporidium including C. parvum
--Cysticercus cellulosae (hydatid cyst, larva of T. solium)
--Echinococcus including E. granulosis, E. multilocularis, E. vogeli
--Entamoeba histolytica
--Enterobius
--Fasciola including F. gigantica, F. hepatica
--Giardia including G. lamblia
--Heterophyes
--Hymenolepis including H. diminuta, H. nana
--Isospora
--Leishmania including L. braziliensis, L. donovani, L. ethiopia, L. major, L. mexicana, L. peruviana, L.
tropica
--Loa loa filaria worms
--Microsporidium
--Naegleria fowleri
--Necator human hookworms including N. americanus
--Onchocerca filaria worms including, O. volvulus
--Plasmodium including simian species, P. cynomolgi, P. falciparum, P. malariae, P. ovale, P. vivax
--Sarcocystis including S. sui hominis
--Schistosoma including S. haematobium, S. intercalatum, S. japonicum, S. mansoni, S. mekongi
--Strongyloides including S. stercoralis
--Taenia solium
--Toxocara including T. canis
--Toxoplasma including T. gondii
--Trichinella spiralis
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--Trypanosoma including T. brucei brucei, T. brucei gambiense, T. brucei rhodesiense, T. cruzi
--Wuchereria bancrofti filaria worms
Appendix B-II-D.

Risk Group 2 (RG2) - Viruses

Adenoviruses, human - all types
Alphaviruses (Togaviruses) - Group A Arboviruses
--Chikungunya vaccine strain 181/25
--Eastern equine encephalomyelitis virus
--Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis vaccine strains TC-83 and V3526
--Western equine encephalomyelitis virus
Arenaviruses
--Junin virus candid #1 vaccine strain
--Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (non-neurotropic strains)
--Tacaribe virus complex
--Other viruses as listed in the reference source (see Section V-C, Footnotes and References of Sections
I through IV)
Bunyaviruses
--Bunyamwera virus
--Rift Valley fever virus vaccine strain MP-12
--Other viruses as listed in the reference source (see Section V-C, Footnotes and References of Sections
I through IV)
Caliciviruses
Coronaviruses
Flaviviruses - Group B Arboviruses
--Dengue virus serotypes 1, 2, 3, and 4
--Japanese encephalitis virus strain SA 14-14-2
--Yellow fever virus vaccine strain 17D
--Other viruses as listed in the reference source (see Section V-C, Footnotes and References of Sections
I through IV)
Hepatitis A, B, C, D, and E viruses
Herpesviruses - except Herpesvirus simiae (Monkey B virus) (see Appendix B-IV-D, Risk Group 4 (RG4) Viral Agents)
--Cytomegalovirus
--Epstein Barr virus
--Herpes simplex types 1 and 2
--Herpes zoster
--Human herpesvirus types 6 and 7
Orthomyxoviruses
--Influenza viruses types A, B, and C (except those listed in Appendix B-III-D, Risk Group 3 (RG3) Viruses and Prions)
--Tick-borne orthomyxoviruses
Papilloma viruses
--All human papilloma viruses
Paramyxoviruses
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--Newcastle disease virus
--Measles virus
--Mumps virus
--Parainfluenza viruses types 1, 2, 3, and 4
--Respiratory syncytial virus
Parvoviruses
--Human parvovirus (B19)
Picornaviruses
--Coxsackie viruses types A and B
--Echoviruses - all types
--Polioviruses - all types, wild and attenuated
--Rhinoviruses - all types
Poxviruses - all types except Monkeypox virus (see Appendix B-III-D, Risk Group 3 (RG3) - Viruses and
Prions) and restricted poxviruses including Alastrim, Smallpox, and Whitepox (see Section V-L, Footnotes
and References of Sections I through IV)
Reoviruses - all types including Coltivirus, human Rotavirus, and Orbivirus (Colorado tick fever virus)
Rhabdoviruses
--Rabies virus - all strains
--Vesicular stomatitis virus non exotic strains: VSV-Indiana 1 serotype strains (e.g. Glasgow, MuddSummers, Orsay, San Juan) and VSV-New Jersey serotype strains (e.g. Ogden, Hazelhurst)
Rubivirus (Togaviruses)
--Rubella virus
Appendix B-III. Risk Group 3 (RG3) Agents
RG3 agents are associated with serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic
interventions may be available.
Appendix B-III-A.

Risk Group 3 (RG3) - Bacterial Agents Including Rickettsia

--Bartonella
--Brucella including B. abortus, B. canis, B. suis
--Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei, B. pseudomallei
--Coxiella burnetii (except the Phase II, Nine Mile strain listed in Appendix B-II-A, Risk Group 2 (RG2) Bacterial Agents Including Chlamydia)
--Francisella tularensis (except those strains listed in Appendix B-II-A, Risk Group 2 (RG2) - Bacterial
Agents Including Chlamydia)
--Mycobacterium bovis (except BCG strain, see Appendix B-II-A, Risk Group 2 (RG2) - Bacterial Agents
Including Chlamydia), M. tuberculosis
--Orientia tsutsugamushi (was R. tsutsugamushi)
--Pasteurella multocida type B -"buffalo" and other virulent strains
--Rickettsia akari, R. australis, R. canada, R. conorii, R. prowazekii, R. rickettsii, R, siberica, R. typhi (R.
mooseri)
--Yersinia pestis (except those strains listed in Appendix B-II-A, Risk Group 2 (RG2) - Bacterial Agents
Including Chlamydia)
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Risk Group 3 (RG3) - Fungal Agents

--Coccidioides immitis (sporulating cultures; contaminated soil)
--Histoplasma capsulatum, H. capsulatum var. duboisii
Appendix B-III-C.

Risk Group 3 (RG3) - Parasitic Agents

None
Appendix B-III-D.

Risk Group 3 (RG3) - Viruses and Prions

Alphaviruses (Togaviruses) - Group A Arboviruses
--Chikungunya virus (except the vaccine strain 181/25 listed in Appendix B-II-D Risk Group2 (RG2) –
Viruses)
--Semliki Forest virus
--St. Louis encephalitis virus
--Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus (except the vaccine strains TC-83 and V3526, see Appendix
B-II-D (RG2) – Viruses)
--Other viruses as listed in the reference source (see Section V-C, Footnotes and References of Sections
I through IV)
Arenaviruses
--Flexal
--Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCM) (neurotropic strains)
Bunyaviruses
--Hantaviruses including Hantaan virus
--Rift Valley fever virus
Coronaviruses
--SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
--Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
Flaviviruses - Group B Arboviruses
--Japanese encephalitis virus (except those strains listed in Appendix B-II-D Risk Group2 (RG2) Viruses)
--West Nile virus (WNV)
--Yellow fever virus
--Other viruses as listed in the reference source (see Section V-C, Footnotes and References of Sections
I through IV)
Orthomyxoviruses
-- Influenza viruses 1918-1919 H1N1 (1918 H1N1), human H2N2 (1957-1968), and highly pathogenic
avian influenza H5N1 strains within the Goose/Guangdong/96-like H5 lineage (HPAI H5N1).
Poxviruses
--Monkeypox virus
Prions
--Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) agents (Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease and kuru
agents)(see Section V-C, Footnotes and References of Sections I through IV, for containment
instruction)
Retroviruses
--Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) types 1 and 2
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--Human T cell lymphotropic virus (HTLV) types 1 and 2
--Simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV)
Rhabdoviruses
--Vesicular stomatitis virus (except those strains listed in Appendix B-II-D Risk Group2 (RG2) - Viruses)
Appendix B-IV. Risk Group 4 (RG4) Agents

RG4 agents are likely to cause serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic
interventions are not usually available.
Appendix B-IV-A.

Risk Group 4 (RG4) - Bacterial Agents

None
Appendix B-IV-B.

Risk Group 4 (RG4) - Fungal Agents

None
Appendix B-IV-C.

Risk Group 4 (RG4) - Parasitic Agents

None
Appendix B-IV-D.

Risk Group 4 (RG4) - Viral Agents

Arenaviruses
--Guanarito virus
--Lassa virus
--Junin virus (except the candid #1 vaccine strain listed in Appendix B-II-D Risk Group2 (RG2) – Viruses)
--Machupo virus
--Sabia
Bunyaviruses (Nairovirus)
--Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus
Filoviruses
--Ebola virus
--Marburg virus
Flaviruses - Group B Arboviruses
--Tick-borne encephalitis virus complex including Absetterov, Central European encephalitis, Hanzalova,
Hypr, Kumlinge, Kyasanur Forest disease, Omsk hemorrhagic fever, and Russian spring-summer
encephalitis viruses
Herpesviruses (alpha)
--Herpesvirus simiae (Herpes B or Monkey B virus)
Paramyxoviruses
--Equine Morbillivirus (Hendra virus)
Hemorrhagic fever agents and viruses as yet undefined
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Appendix B-V. Animal Viral Etiologic Agents in Common Use
The following list of animal etiologic agents is appended to the list of human etiologic agents. None of
these agents is associated with disease in healthy adult humans; they are commonly used in laboratory
experimental work.
A containment level appropriate for RG1 human agents is recommended for their use. For agents that
are infectious to human cells, e.g., amphotropic and xenotropic strains of murine leukemia virus, a
containment level appropriate for RG2 human agents is recommended.
Baculoviruses
Herpesviruses
--Herpesvirus ateles
--Herpesvirus saimiri
--Marek's disease virus
--Murine cytomegalovirus
Papilloma viruses
--Bovine papilloma virus
--Shope papilloma virus
Polyoma viruses
--Polyoma virus
--Simian virus 40 (SV40)
Retroviruses
--Avian leukosis virus
--Avian sarcoma virus
--Bovine leukemia virus
--Feline leukemia virus
--Feline sarcoma virus
--Gibbon leukemia virus
--Mason-Pfizer monkey virus
--Mouse mammary tumor virus
--Murine leukemia virus
--Murine sarcoma virus
--Rat leukemia virus
Appendix B-V-1.

Murine Retroviral Vectors

Murine retroviral vectors to be used for human transfer experiments (less than 10 liters) that contain less
than 50% of their respective parental viral genome and that have been demonstrated to be free of
detectable replication competent retrovirus can be maintained, handled, and administered, under BL1
containment.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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EXEMPTIONS UNDER SECTION III-F-8

Section III-F-8 states that exempt from these NIH Guidelines are "those that do not present a significant
risk to health or the environment (see Section IV-C-1-b-(1)-(c), Major Actions), as determined by the NIH
Director following appropriate notice and opportunity for public comment. See Appendix C, Exemptions
under Sections III-F-8, for other classes of experiments which are exempt from the NIH Guidelines." The
following classes of experiments are exempt under Section III-F-8:
Appendix C-I.

Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules in Tissue Culture

Recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules containing less than one-half of any eukaryotic viral
genome (all viruses from a single family being considered identical -- see Appendix C-IX-E, Footnotes
and References of Appendix C), that are propagated and maintained in cells in tissue culture are exempt
from these NIH Guidelines with the exceptions listed in Appendix C-I-A.
Appendix C-I-A. Exceptions
The following categories are not exempt from the NIH Guidelines: (i) experiments described in Section
III-B which require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety Committee approval before initiation, (ii)
experiments involving DNA from Risk Groups 3, 4, or restricted organisms (see Appendix B, Classification
of Human Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, and Sections V-G and V-L, Footnotes and References
of Sections I through IV) or cells known to be infected with these agents, (iii) experiments involving the
deliberate introduction of genes coding for the biosynthesis of molecules that are toxic for vertebrates
(see Appendix F, Containment Conditions for Cloning of Genes Coding for the Biosynthesis of Molecules
Toxic for Vertebrates), and (iv) whole plants regenerated from plant cells and tissue cultures are covered
by the exemption provided they remain axenic cultures even though they differentiate into embryonic
tissue and regenerate into plantlets.
Appendix C-II. Escherichia coli K-12 Host-Vector Systems
Experiments which use Escherichia coli K-12 host-vector systems, with the exception of those
experiments listed in Appendix C-II-A, are exempt from the NIH Guidelines provided that: (i) the
Escherichia coli host does not contain conjugation proficient plasmids or generalized transducing phages;
or (ii) lambda or lambdoid or Ff bacteriophages or non-conjugative plasmids (see Appendix C-IX-B,
Footnotes and References of Appendix C) shall be used as vectors. However, experiments involving the
insertion into Escherichia coli K-12 of DNA from prokaryotes that exchange genetic information (see
Appendix C-IX-C, Footnotes and References of Appendix C) with Escherichia coli may be performed with
any Escherichia coli K-12 vector (e.g., conjugative plasmid). When a non-conjugative vector is used, the
Escherichia coli K-12 host may contain conjugation-proficient plasmids either autonomous or integrated,
or generalized transducing phages. For these exempt laboratory experiments, Biosafety Level (BL) 1
physical containment conditions are recommended. For large-scale fermentation experiments, the
appropriate physical containment conditions need be no greater than those for the host organism
unmodified by recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule techniques; the Institutional Biosafety
Committee can specify higher containment if deemed necessary.
Appendix C-II-A.

Exceptions

The following categories are not exempt from the NIH Guidelines: (i) experiments described in Section
III-B which require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety Committee approval before initiation, (ii)
experiments involving DNA from Risk Groups 3, 4, or restricted organisms (see Appendix B, Classification
of Human
Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, and Sections V-G and V-L, Footnotes and References of
Sections I
through IV) or cells known to be infected with these agents may be conducted under containment
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conditions specified in Section III-D-2 with prior Institutional Biosafety Committee review and approval, (iii)
large-scale experiments (e.g., more than 10 liters of culture), and (iv) experiments involving the cloning of
toxin molecule genes coding for the biosynthesis of molecules toxic for vertebrates (see Appendix F,
Containment Conditions for Cloning of Genes Coding for the Biosynthesis of Molecules Toxic for
Vertebrates).
Appendix C-III. Saccharomyces Host-Vector Systems
Experiments involving Saccharomyces cerevisiae and Saccharomyces uvarum host-vector systems, with
the exception of experiments listed in Appendix C-III-A, are exempt from the NIH Guidelines. For these
exempt experiments, BL1 physical containment is recommended. For large-scale fermentation
experiments, the appropriate physical containment conditions need be no greater than those for the
unmodified host organism; the Institutional Biosafety Committee can specify higher containment if
deemed necessary.
Appendix C-III-A.

Exceptions

The following categories are not exempt from the NIH Guidelines: (i) experiments described in Section
III-B which require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety Committee approval before initiation, (ii)
experiments involving DNA from Risk Groups 3, 4, or restricted organisms (see Appendix B, Classification
of Human Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, and Sections V-G and V-L, Footnotes and References
of Sections I through IV) or cells known to be infected with these agents may be conducted under
containment conditions specified in Section III-D-2 with prior Institutional Biosafety Committee review and
approval, (iii) large-scale experiments (e.g., more than 10 liters of culture), and (iv) experiments involving
the deliberate cloning of genes coding for the biosynthesis of molecules toxic for vertebrates (see
Appendix F, Containment Conditions for Cloning of Genes Coding for the Biosynthesis of Molecules Toxic
for Vertebrates).
Appendix C-IV. Kluyveromyces Host-Vector Systems
Experiments involving Kluyveromyces lactis host-vector systems, with the exception of experiments listed
in Appendix C-IV-A, are exempt from the NIH Guidelines provided laboratory-adapted strains are used
(i.e. strains that have been adapted to growth under optimal or defined laboratory conditions). For these
exempt experiments, BL1 physical containment is recommended. For large-scale fermentation
experiments, the appropriate physical containment conditions need be no greater than those for the
unmodified host organism; the Institutional Biosafety Committee may specify higher containment if
deemed necessary.
Appendix C-IV-A

Exceptions

The following categories are not exempt from the NIH Guidelines: (i) experiments described in Section
III-B, which require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety Committee approval before initiation; (ii)
experiments involving DNA from Risk Groups 3, 4, or restricted organisms (see Appendix B, Classification
of Human Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, and Sections V-G and V-L, Footnotes and References
of Sections I through IV) or cells known to be infected with these agents may be conducted under
containment conditions specified in Section III-D-2 with prior Institutional Biosafety Committee review and
approval; (iii) large-scale experiments (e.g., more than 10 liters of culture), and (v) experiments involving
the deliberate cloning of genes coding for the biosynthesis of molecules toxic for vertebrates (see
Appendix F, Containment Conditions for Cloning of Genes Coding for the Biosynthesis of Molecules Toxic
for Vertebrates).
Appendix C-V. Bacillus subtilis or Bacillus licheniformis Host-Vector Systems
Any asporogenic Bacillus subtilis or asporogenic Bacillus licheniformis strain which does not revert to a
spore-former with a frequency greater than 10-7 may be used for cloning DNA with the exception of those
experiments listed in Appendix C-V-A, Exceptions. For these exempt laboratory experiments, BL1
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physical containment conditions are recommended. For large-scale fermentation experiments, the
appropriate physical containment conditions need be no greater than those for the unmodified host
organism; the Institutional Biosafety Committee can specify higher containment if it deems necessary.
Appendix C-V-A.

Exceptions

The following categories are not exempt from the NIH Guidelines: (i) experiments described in Section
III-B which require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety Committee approval before initiation, (ii)
experiments involving DNA from Risk Groups 3, 4, or restricted organisms (see Appendix B, Classification
of Human Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, and Sections V-G and V-L, Footnotes and References
of Sections I through IV) or cells known to be infected with these agents may be conducted under
containment conditions specified in Section III-D-2 with prior Institutional Biosafety Committee review and
approval, (iii) large-scale experiments (e.g., more than 10 liters of culture), and (iv) experiments involving
the deliberate cloning of genes coding for the biosynthesis of molecules toxic for vertebrates (see
Appendix F, Containment Conditions for Cloning of Genes Coding for the Biosynthesis of Molecules Toxic
for Vertebrates).
Appendix C-VI. Extrachromosomal Elements of Gram Positive Organisms
Recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules derived entirely from extrachromosomal elements of the
organisms listed below (including shuttle vectors constructed from vectors described in Appendix C),
propagated and maintained in organisms listed below are exempt from these NIH Guidelines.
Bacillus amyloliquefaciens
Bacillus amylosacchariticus
Bacillus anthracis
Bacillus aterrimus
Bacillus brevis
Bacillus cereus
Bacillus globigii
Bacillus licheniformis
Bacillus megaterium
Bacillus natto
Bacillus niger
Bacillus pumilus
Bacillus sphaericus
Bacillus stearothermophilus
Bacillus subtilis
Bacillus thuringiensis
Clostridium acetobutylicum
Lactobacillus casei
Listeria grayi
Listeria monocytogenes
Listeria murrayi
Pediococcus acidilactici
Pediococcus damnosus
Pediococcus pentosaceus
Staphylococcus aureus
Staphylococcus carnosus
Staphylococcus epidermidis
Streptococcus agalactiae
Streptococcus anginosus
Streptococcus avium
Streptococcus cremoris
Streptococcus dorans
Streptococcus equisimilis
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Streptococcus faecalis
Streptococcus ferus
Streptococcus lactis
Streptococcus ferns
Streptococcus mitior
Streptococcus mutans
Streptococcus pneumoniae
Streptococcus pyogenes
Streptococcus salivarius
Streptococcus sanguis
Streptococcus sobrinus
Streptococcus thermophilus
Appendix C-VI-A.

Exceptions

The following categories are not exempt from the NIH Guidelines: (i) experiments described in Section
III-B which require NIH OSP and Institutional Biosafety Committee approval before initiation, (ii)
experiments involving DNA from Risk Groups 3, 4, or restricted organisms (see Appendix B, Classification
of Human Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, and Sections V-G and V-L, Footnotes and References
of Sections I through IV) or cells known to be infected with these agents may be conducted under
containment conditions specified in Section III-D-2 with prior Institutional Biosafety Committee review and
approval, (iii) large-scale experiments (e.g., more than 10 liters of culture), and (iv) experiments involving
the deliberate cloning of genes coding for the biosynthesis of molecules toxic for vertebrates (see
Appendix F, Containment Conditions for Cloning of Genes Coding for the Biosynthesis of Molecules Toxic
for Vertebrates).
Appendix C-VII. The Purchase or Transfer of Transgenic Rodents
The purchase or transfer of transgenic rodents for experiments that require BL1 containment (See
Appendix G-III-M, Footnotes and References of Appendix G) are exempt from the NIH Guidelines.
Appendix C-VIII.

Generation of BL1 Transgenic Rodents via Breeding

The breeding of two different transgenic rodents or the breeding of a transgenic rodent and a nontransgenic rodent with the intent of creating a new strain of transgenic rodent that can be housed at BL1
containment will be exempt from the NIH Guidelines if:
(1) Both parental rodents can be housed under BL1 containment; and
(2) neither parental transgenic rodent contains the following genetic modifications: (i) incorporation of
more than one-half of the genome of an exogenous eukaryotic virus from a single family of viruses; or (ii)
incorporation of a transgene that is under the control of a gammaretroviral long terminal repeat (LTR);
and
(3) the transgenic rodent that results from this breeding is not expected to contain more than one-half of
an exogenous viral genome from a single family of viruses.
Appendix C-IX. Footnotes and References of Appendix C
Appendix C-IX-A. The NIH Director may revise the classification for the purposes of these NIH
Guidelines (see Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(b), Minor Actions). The revised list of organisms in each Risk
Group is located in Appendix B.
Appendix C-IX-B. A subset of non-conjugative plasmid vectors are poorly mobilizable (e.g., pBR322,
pBR313). Where practical, these vectors should be employed.
Appendix C-IX-C. Defined as observable under optimal laboratory conditions by transformation,
transduction, phage infection, and/or conjugation with transfer of phage, plasmid, and/or chromosomal
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genetic information. Note that this definition of exchange may be less stringent than that applied to
exempt organisms under Section III-F-6, Exempt Experiments.
Appendix C-IX-D. As classified in the Third Report of the International Committee on Taxonomy of
Viruses: Classification and Nomenclature of Viruses, R. E. F. Matthews (ed.), Intervirology 12 (129-296),
1979.
Appendix C-IX-E. i.e., the total of all genomes within a Family shall not exceed one-half of the genome.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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MAJOR ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THE NIH GUIDELINES

As noted in the subsections of Section IV-C-1-b-(1), the Director, NIH, may take certain actions with
regard to the NIH Guidelines (Entries up to and including D-118 were approved using a process that
involved the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC)). Some of the actions taken to date include
the following:
Appendix D-1. Permission is granted to clone foot and mouth disease virus in the EK1 host-vector
system consisting of E. coli K-12 and the vector pBR322, all work to be done at the Plum Island Animal
Disease Center.
Appendix D-2. Certain specified clones derived from segments of the foot and mouth disease virus may
be transferred from Plum Island Animal Disease Center to the facilities of Genentech, Inc., of South San
Francisco, California. Further development of the clones at Genentech, Inc., has been approved under
BL1 + EK1 conditions.
Appendix D-3. The Rd strain of Hemophilus influenzae can be used as a host for the propagation of the
cloned Tn 10 tet R gene derived from E. coli K-12 employing the non-conjugative Hemophilus plasmid,
pRSF0885, under BL1 conditions.
Appendix D-4. Permission is granted to clone certain subgenomic segments of foot and mouth disease
virus in HV1 Bacillus subtilis and Saccharomyces cerevisiae host-vector systems under BL1 conditions at
Genentech, Inc., South San Francisco, California.
Appendix D-5. Permission is granted to Dr. Ronald Davis of Stanford University to field test corn plants
modified by recombinant DNA techniques under specified containment conditions.
Appendix D-6. Permission is granted to clone in E. coli K-12 under BL1 physical containment conditions
subgenomic segments of rift valley fever virus subject to conditions which have been set forth by the
RAC.
Appendix D-7. Attenuated laboratory strains of Salmonella typhimurium may be used under BL1
physical containment conditions to screen for the Saccharomyces cerevisiae pseudouridine synthetase
gene. The plasmid YEp13 will be employed as the vector.
Appendix D-8. Permission is granted to transfer certain clones of subgenomic segments of foot and
mouth disease virus from Plum Island Animal Disease Center to the laboratories of Molecular Genetics,
Inc., Minnetonka, Minnesota, and to work with these clones under BL1 containment conditions. Approval
is contingent upon review of data on infectivity testing of the clones by a working group of the RAC.
Appendix D-9. Permission is granted to Dr. John Sanford of Cornell University to field test tomato and
tobacco plants transformed with bacterial (E.coli K-12) and yeast DNA using pollen as a vector.
Appendix D-10. Permission is granted to Drs. Steven Lindow and Nickolas Panopoulos of the University
of California, Berkeley, to release under specified conditions Pseudomonas syringae, pathovars (pv.)
syringae, and Erwinia herbicola carrying in vitro generated deletions of all or part of the genes involved in
ice nucleation.
Appendix D-11. Agracetus of Middleton, Wisconsin, may field test under specified conditions disease
resistant tobacco plants prepared by recombinant DNA techniques.
Appendix D-12. Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana, may conduct large-scale experiments
and production involving Cephalosporium acremonium strain LU4-79-6 under less than Biosafety Level 1
- Large Scale (BL1-LS) conditions.
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Appendix D-13. Drs. W. French Anderson, R. Michael Blaese, and Steven Rosenberg of the NIH,
Bethesda, Maryland, can conduct experiments in which a bacterial gene coding for neomycin
phosphotransferase will be inserted into a portion of the tumor infiltrating lymphocytes (TIL) of cancer
patients using a retroviral vector, N2. The marked TIL then will be combined with unmarked TIL, and
reinfused into the patients. This experiment is an addition to an ongoing adoptive immunotherapy
protocol in which TIL are isolated from a patient's tumor, grown in culture in the presence of interleukin-2,
and reinfused into the patient. The marker gene will be used to detect TIL at various time intervals
following reinfusion.
Approval is based on the following four stipulations: (I) there will be no limitation of the number of
patients in the continuing trial; (ii) the patients selected will have a life expectancy of about 90 days; (iii)
the patients give fully informed consent to participate in the trial; and (iv) the investigators will provide
additional data before inserting a gene for therapeutic purposes. (Protocol #8810-001)
Appendix D-14. U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) may conduct
certain experiments involving products of a yellow fever virus originating from the 17-D yellow fever clone
at the Biosafety Level 3 containment level using HEPA filters and vaccination of laboratory personnel.
In addition, USAMRIID may conduct certain experiments involving vaccine studies of Venezuelan equine
encephalitis virus at the Biosafety Level 3 containment level using HEPA filters and vaccination of
laboratory personnel.
Appendix D-15. Drs. R. Michael Blaese and W. French Anderson of the NIH, Bethesda, Maryland, can
conduct experiments in which a gene coding for adenosine deaminase (ADA) will be inserted into T
lymphocytes of patients with severe combined immunodeficiency disease, using a retroviral vector, LASN.
Following insertion of the gene, these T lymphocytes will be reinfused into the patients. The patients will
then be followed for evidence of clinical improvement in the disease state, and measurement of multiple
parameters of immune function by laboratory testing.
Approval is based on the following two stipulations: (I) that intraperitoneal administration of transduced T
lymphocytes not be used before clearance by the Chair of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee;
and (ii) that the number of research patients be limited to 10 at this time.
In addition to the conditions outlined in the initial approval, patients may be given a supplement of a CD34+-enriched peripheral blood lymphocytes (PBL) which have been placed in culture conditions that favor
progenitor cell growth. This enriched population of cells will be transduced with the retroviral vector,
G1NaSvAd. G1NaSvAd is similar to LASN, yet distinguishable by PCR. LASN has been used to
transduce peripheral blood T lymphocytes with the ADA gene. Lymphocytes and myeloid cells will be
isolated from patients over time and assayed for the presence of the LASN or G1NaSvAd vectors. The
primary objectives of this protocol are to transduce CD 34+ peripheral blood cells with the adenosine
deaminase gene, administer these cells to patients, and determine if such cells can differentiate into
lymphoid and myeloid cells in vivo. There is a potential for benefit to the patients in that these
hematopoietic progenitor cells may survive longer, and divide to yield a broader range of gene-corrected
cells. (Protocol #9007-002)
Appendix D-16. Dr. Steven A. Rosenberg of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, can
conduct experiments on patients with advanced melanoma who have failed all effective therapy. These
patients will be treated with escalating doses of autologous tumor infiltrating lymphocytes (TIL)
transduced with a gene coding for tumor necrosis factor (TNF). Escalating numbers of transduced TIL
will be administered at three weekly intervals along with the administration of interleukin-2 (IL-2). The
objective is to evaluate the toxicity and possible therapeutic efficacy of the administration of tumor
infiltrating lymphocytes (TIL) transduced with the gene coding for TNF. (Protocol #9007-003)
Appendix D-17. Dr. Malcolm K. Brenner of St. Jude Children's Research Hospital of Memphis,
Tennessee, can conduct experiments on patients with acute myelogenous leukemia (AML). Using the
LNL6 retroviral vector, the autologous bone marrow cells will be transduced with the gene coding for
neomycin resistance. The purpose of this gene marking experiment is to determine whether the source
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of relapse after autologous bone marrow transplantation for acute myelogenous leukemia is residual
malignant cells in the harvested marrow or reoccurrence of tumor in the patient. Determining the source
of relapse should indicate whether or not purging of the bone marrow is a necessary procedure. (Protocol
#9102-004)
Appendix D-18. Dr. Malcolm K. Brenner of St. Jude Children's Research Hospital of Memphis,
Tennessee, can conduct experiments on pediatric patients with Stage D (disseminated) neuroblastoma
who are being treated with high-dose carboplatin and etoposide in either phase I/II or phase II trials. All
the patients in these studies will be subjected to bone marrow transplantation since it will allow them to be
exposed to chemoradiation that would be lethal were it not for the availability of stored autologous marrow
for rescue. The bone marrow cells of these patients will be transduced with the gene coding for neomycin
resistance using the LNL6 vector. The purpose of this gene marking study is to determine whether the
source of relapse after autologous bone marrow transplantation is residual malignant cells in the
harvested marrow or residual disease in the patient. Secondly,
it is hoped to determine the contribution of marrow autographs to autologous reconstitution. (Protocol
#9105-005/9105-006)
Appendix D-19. Dr. Albert B. Deisseroth of the MD Anderson Cancer Center of Houston, Texas, can
conduct experiments on patients with chronic myelogenous leukemia who have been reinduced into a
second chronic phase or blast cells. The patients in these studies will receive autologous bone marrow
transplantation. Using the LNL6 vector, the bone marrow cells will be transduced with the gene coding
for neomycin resistance. The purpose of these marking studies is to determine if the origin of relapse
arises from residual leukemic cells in the patients or from viable leukemic cells remaining in the bone
marrow used for autologous transplantation. (Protocol #9105-007)
Appendix D-20. Drs. Fred D. Ledley and Savio L. C. Woo of Baylor College of Medicine of Houston,
Texas, can conduct experiments on pediatric patients with acute hepatic failure who are identified as
candidates for hepatocellular transplantation. Using the LNL6 vector, the hepatocytes will be transduced
with the gene coding for neomycin resistance. The purpose of using a genetic marker is to demonstrate
the pattern of engraftment of transplanted hepatocytes and to help determine the success or failure of
engraftment. (Protocol #9105-008)
Appendix D-21. Dr. Steven A. Rosenberg of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, can
conduct experiments on patients with advanced melanoma, renal cell cancer, and colon carcinoma who
have failed all effective therapy. In an attempt to increase these patients' immune responses to the
tumor, the tumor necrosis factor gene or the interleukin-2 gene will be introduced into a tumor cell line
established from the patient. These gene-modified autologous tumor cells will then be injected into the
thigh of the patient. To further utilize the immune system of the patient to fight the tumor, stimulated
lymphocytes will be cultured from either the draining regional lymph nodes or the injected tumor itself.
The patients will be evaluated for antitumor effects engendered by the injection of the gene modified
tumor cells themselves as well as after the infusion of the cultured lymphocytes. (Protocol #9110010/9110-011)
Appendix D-22. Dr. James M. Wilson of the University of Michigan Medical Center of Ann Arbor,
Michigan, can conduct experiments on three patients with the homozygous form of familial
hypercholesterolemia. Both children and adults will be eligible for this therapy. In an attempt to correct
the basic genetic defect in this disease, the gene coding for the low-density lipoprotein (LDL) receptor will
be introduced into liver cells taken from the patient. The gene-corrected hepatocytes will then be infused
into the portal circulation of the patient through an indwelling catheter. The patients will be evaluated for
engraftment of the these treated hepatocytes through a series of metabolic studies; three months after
gene therapy, a liver biopsy will be taken and analyzed for the presence of recombinant derived RNA and
DNA to document the presence of the gene coding for the normal LDL receptor. (Protocol #9110-012)
Appendix D-23. Dr. Michael T. Lotze of the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, can conduct experiments on 20 patients with metastatic melanoma who have failed
conventional therapy. A gene transfer experiment will be performed, transducing the patients' tumor
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infiltrating lymphocytes (TILs) with the gene for neomycin resistance. Through the use of this gene
marking technique, it is proposed to determine how long TIL cells can be detected in vivo in the peripheral
blood of the patients, and how the administration of interleukin-2 and interleukin-4 affects localization and
survival of TIL cells in tumor sites. (Protocol #9105-009)
Appendix D-24. Dr. Gary J. Nabel of the University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
can conduct gene therapy experiments on twelve patients with melanoma or adenocarcinoma. Patient
population will be limited to adults over the age of 18 and female patients must be postmenopausal or
have undergone tubal ligation or orchiectomy. The patient's immune response will be stimulated by the
introduction of a gene encoding for a Class I MHC protein, HLA-B7, in order to enhance tumor regression.
DNA/liposome-mediated transfection techniques will be used to directly transfer this foreign gene into
tumor cells. HLA-B7 expression will be confirmed in vivo, and the immune response stimulated by the
expression of this antigen will be characterized. These experiments will be analyzed for their efficacy in
treating cancer. (Protocol #9202-013)
Appendix D-25. Kenneth Cornetta of Indiana University, Indianapolis, Indiana, can conduct gene
transfer experiments on up to 10 patients with acute myelogenous leukemia (AML) and up to 10 patients
with acute lymphocytic leukemia (ALL). The patient population will be limited to persons between 18 and
65 years of age. Using the LNL-6 vector, autologous bone marrow cells will be marked with the neomycin
resistance gene. Gene marked and untreated bone marrow cells will be reinfused at the time of bone
marrow transplantation. Patients will then be monitored for evidence of the neomycin resistance gene in
peripheral blood and bone marrow cells in order to determine whether relapse of their disease is a result
of residual malignant cells remaining in the harvested marrow or inadequate ablation of the tumor cells by
chemotherapeutic agents. Determining the source of relapse may indicate whether or not purging of the
bone marrow is a necessary procedure for these leukemia patients. Further studies will be performed in
order to determine the percentage of leukemic cells that contain the LNL-6 vector and the clonality of the
marked cells. (Protocol #9202-014)
Appendix D-26. Dr. James S. Economou of the University of California, Los Angeles, can conduct gene
transfer experiments on 20 patients with metastatic melanoma and 20 patients with renal cell carcinoma.
These patients will be treated with various combinations of tumor-infiltrating lymphocytes and peripheral
blood leukocytes, including CD8 and CD4 subsets of both types of cells. These effector cell populations
will be given in combination with interleukin-2 (IL-2) in the melanoma patients and IL-2 plus alpha
interferon in the renal cell carcinoma patients. The effector cells will be transduced with the neomycin
resistance gene using either the LNL6 or G1N retroviral vectors. This "genetic marking" of the tumorinfiltrating lymphocytes and peripheral blood lymphocytes is designed to answer questions about the
trafficking of these cells, their localization to tumors, and their in vivo life span. (Protocol #9202-015)
Appendix D-27. Drs. Philip Greenberg and Stanley R. Riddell of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research
Center, Seattle, Washington, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 15 human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) seropositive patients (18-45 years old) undergoing allogeneic bone marrow transplantation for
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and 15 HIV-seropositive patients (18-50 years old) who do not have acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)-related lymphoma and who are not undergoing bone marrow
transplantation to evaluate the safety and efficacy of HIV-specific cytotoxic T lymphocyte (CTL) therapy.
CTL will be transduced with a retroviral vector (HyTK) encoding a gene that is a fusion product of the
hygromycin phosphotransferase gene (HPH) and the herpes simplex virus thymidine kinase (HSV-TK)
gene. This vector will deliver both a marker gene and an ablatable gene in these T cell clones in the
event that patients develop side effects as a consequence of CTL therapy. Data will be correlated over
time, looking at multiple parameters of HIV disease activity. The objectives of these studies include
evaluating the safety and toxicity of CTL therapy, determining the duration of in vivo survival of HIVspecific CTL clones, and determining if ganciclovir therapy can eradicate genetically modified, adoptively
transferred CTL cells. (Protocol #9202-017)
Appendix D-28. Dr. Malcolm Brenner of St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee,
can conduct gene therapy experiments on twelve patients with relapsed/refractory neuroblastoma who
have relapsed after receiving autologous bone marrow transplant. In an attempt to stimulate the patient's
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immune response, the gene coding for Interleukin-2 (IL-2) will be used to transduce tumor cells, and
these gene-modified cells will be injected subcutaneously in a Phase 1 dose escalation trial. Patients will
be evaluated for an anti-tumor response. (Protocol #9206-018)
Appendix D-29. Drs. Edward Oldfield, Kenneth Culver, Zvi Ram, and R. Michael Blaese of the National
Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, can conduct gene therapy experiments on ten patients with
primary malignant brain tumors and ten patients with lung cancer, breast cancer, malignant melanoma, or
renal cell carcinoma who have brain metastases. The patient population will be limited to adults over the
age of 18.
Patients will be divided into two groups based on the surgical accessibility of their lesions. Both surgically
accessible and surgically inaccessible lesions will receive intra-tumoral injections of the retroviral Herpes
simplex thymidine kinase (HS-tk) vector-producer cell line, G1TkSvNa, using a guided stereotaxic
approach. Surgically accessible lesions will be excised seven days after stereotaxic injection, and the
tumor bed will be infiltrated with the HS-tk producer cells. The removed tumor will be evaluated for the
efficiency of transduction. Ganciclovir (GCV) will be administered beginning on the fifth postoperative
day. In the case of surgically inaccessible lesions, the patients will receive intravenous therapy with GCV
seven days after receiving the intra-tumoral injections of the retroviral HS-tk vector-producer cells.
(Protocol #9206-019)
Appendix D-30. Dr. Albert D. Deisseroth of MD Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, Texas, can conduct
gene transfer experiments on ten patients who have developed blast crisis or accelerated phase chronic
myelogenous leukemia (CML). The retroviral vectors G1N and LNL6 which code for neomycin resistance
will be used to transduce autologous peripheral blood and bone marrow cells that have been removed
and stored at the time of cytogenetic remission or re-induction of chronic phase in Philadelphia
chromosome positive CML patients. Following reinduction of the chronic phase of CML and preparative
chemotherapy, patients will be infused with the transduced autologous cells.
This protocol is designed to determine the cause of relapse of CML. If polyclonal CML neomycin marked
blastic cells appear at the time of relapse, their presence will indicate that relapse arises from the
leukemic CML blast cells present in the autologous cells infused following chemotherapy. If residual
systemic disease contributes to relapse, the neomycin resistance gene will not be detected in the CML
leukemic blasts at the time of relapse.
This study will compare the relative contributions of the peripheral blood and bone marrow to generate
hematopoietic recovery after bone marrow transplantation and evaluate purging and selection of
peripheral blood or bone marrow as a source of stem cells for transplant. The percentage of neomycin
resistant CML cells which are leukemic will be determined by PCR analysis and detection of bcr-abl
mRNA. (Protocol #9206-020)
Appendix D-31. Dr. Cynthia Dunbar of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, can
conduct gene transfer experiments on up to 48 patients with multiple myeloma, breast cancer, or chronic
myelogenous leukemia. The retroviral vectors G1N and LNL6 will be used to transfer the neomycin
resistance marker gene into autologous bone marrow and peripheral blood stem cells in the presence of
growth factors to examine hematopoietic reconstitution after bone marrow transplantation. The efficiency
of transduction of both short and long term autologous bone marrow reconstituting cells will be examined.
Autologous bone marrow and CD34+ peripheral blood stem cells will be enriched prior to transduction.
Myeloma and CML patients will receive both autologous bone marrow and peripheral blood stem cell
transplantation. These separate populations will be marked with both the G1N and LNL6 retroviral
vectors. If short and long term marking experiments are successful, important information may be
obtained regarding the biology of autologous reconstitution, the feasibility of retroviral gene transfer into
hematopoietic cells, and the contribution of viable tumor cells within the autograft to disease relapse.
(Protocol #9206-023/9206-024/9206-025)
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Appendix D-32. Dr. Bernd Gansbacher of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, New York, New
York, can conduct gene therapy experiments on twelve patients over 18 years of age with metastatic
melanoma who are HLA-A2 positive and who have failed conventional therapy. This is a phase I study to
examine whether allogeneic HLA-A2 matched melanoma cells expressing recombinant human
Interleukin-2 (IL-2) can be injected subcutaneously and used to create a potent tumor specific immune
response without producing toxicity. By allowing the tumor cells to present the MHC Class I molecule as
well as the secreted IL-2, a clonal expansion of tumor specific effector cells is expected. These effector
populations may access residual tumor at distant sites via the systemic circulation. (Protocol #9206-021)
Appendix D-33. Dr. Bernd Gansbacher of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, New York, New
York, can conduct gene therapy experiments on twelve patients over 18 years of age with renal cell
carcinoma who are HLA-A2 positive and who have failed conventional therapy. This Phase I study will
examine whether allogeneic HLA-A2 matched renal cell carcinoma cells expressing recombinant human
Interleukin-2 (IL-2) can be injected subcutaneously and used to create a potent tumor specific immune
response without producing toxicity. By allowing the tumor cells to present the MHC Class I molecule as
well as the secreted IL-2, a clonal expansion of tumor specific effector cells is expected. These effector
populations may access residual tumor at distant sites via the systemic circulation. (Protocol #9206-022)
Appendix D-34. Dr. Michael T. Lotze, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, can conduct
experiments on twenty patients with metastatic, and/or unresectable, locally advanced melanoma, renal
cell carcinoma, breast cancer, or colon cancer who have failed standard therapy. Patients will receive
multiple subcutaneous injections of autologous tumor cells combined with an autologous fibroblast cell
line that has been transduced in vitro with the gene coding for Interleukin-4 (IL-4) to augment the in vivo
antitumor effect. Patients will be monitored for antitumor effect by PCR analysis and multiple biopsy of
the injection site. (Protocol #9209-033)
Appendix D-35. Dr. Friedrich G. Schuening, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle,
Washington, can conduct human gene transfer experiments on patients ≥ 18 years of age with breast
cancer, Hodgkin's disease, or non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. A total of 10 patients per year will be enrolled in
the studies over a period of four years. Patients will undergo autologous bone marrow transplantation
with a selected population of Interleukin-3 (IL-3) or granulocyte colony-stimulating factor (G-CSF)
stimulated CD34(+) peripheral blood repopulating cells (PBRC) that have been transduced with the gene
coding for neomycin resistance (neoR) using the retroviral vector, LN. Patients will be continuously
monitored for neoR to determine the relative contribution
of autologous PBRCs to long-term hematopoietic reconstitution. Demonstration of long-term contribution
of autologous PBRC to hematopoiesis will enable the use of PBRC alone for autologous transplants and
suggest the use of PBRC as long-term carriers of therapeutically relevant genes. (Protocol #9209027/9209-028)
Appendix D-36. Dr. Friedrich G. Schuening, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle,
Washington, can conduct human gene transfer experiments on patients ≥ 18 years of age with breast
cancer, Hodgkin's disease, or non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. A total of 5 patients per year will be enrolled in
the study over a period of four years. Patients will undergo allogeneic bone marrow transplant with
granulocyte colony-stimulating factor (G-CSF) stimulated CD34(+) PBRC harvested from an identical twin
that have been transduced with neoR using the retroviral vector, LN. Patients will be continuously
monitored for neoR to determine the relative contribution of G-CSF stimulated allogeneic PBRCs to longterm bone marrow engraftment. Demonstration of long-term contribution of allogeneic PBRC to
hematopoiesis will enable the use of PBRC alone for allogeneic transplants and suggest the use of PBRC
as long-term carriers of therapeutically relevant genes. (Protocol #9209-029)
Appendix D-37. Dr. Malcolm K. Brenner of St. Jude Children's Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, and Dr.
Bonnie J. Mills of Baxter Healthcare Corporation, Santa Ana, California, can conduct a multicenter
uncontrolled human gene transfer experiment on 12 patients ≤ 21 years of age with Stage D
Neuroblastoma in first or second marrow remission. Autologous bone marrow cells will be separated into
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two fractions, purged and unpurged. Each fraction will be transduced with the neoR gene by either LNL6
or G1Na. Patients will be monitored by the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for the presence of neoR.
The protocol is designed to evaluate the safety and efficacy of the Neuroblastoma Bone Marrow Purging
System following high dose chemotherapy. (Protocol #9209-032)
Appendix D-38. Drs. Carolyn Keierleber and Ann Progulske-Fox of the University of Florida, Gainesville,
Florida, can conduct experiments involving the introduction of a gene coding for tetracycline resistance
into Porphyromonas gingivalis at a physical containment level of Biosafety Level-2 (BL-2).
Appendix D-39. Dr. Scott M. Freeman of Tulane University Medical Center, New Orleans, Louisiana,
can conduct experiments on patients with epithelial ovarian carcinoma who have clinical evidence of
recurrent, progressive, or residual disease who have no other therapy available to prolong survival.
Patients will be injected intraperitoneally with the irradiated PA-1 ovarian carcinoma cell line which has
been transduced with the herpes simplex thymidine kinase (HSV-TK) gene. The patients will then receive
ganciclovir therapy. Previous, data indicates that HSV-TK+ tumor cells exhibit a killing effect on HSV-TKcells when exposed to ganciclovir therapy. Patients will be evaluated for safety and side effects of this
treatment. (Protocol #9206-016)
Appendix D-40. Dr. Michael J. Welsh, Howard Hughes Medical Institute Research Laboratories,
University of Iowa College of Medicine, Iowa City, Iowa, may conduct experiments on 3 cystic fibrosis
(CF) patients ≥ 18 years of age with mild to moderate disease. This Phase I study will determine the: (1)
in vivo safety and efficacy of the administration of the replication-deficient type 2 adenovirus vector,
Ad2/CFTR-1, to the nasal epithelium; (2) efficacy in correcting the CF chloride transport defect in vivo;
and (3) effect of adenovirus vector dosage on safety and efficacy. (Protocol #9212-036)
Appendix D-41. Dr. Ronald G. Crystal, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, may conduct
experiments on 10 cystic fibrosis (CF) patients ≥ 21 years of age. Patients will receive an initial
administration of the replication-deficient type 5 adenovirus vector, AdCFTR, to their left nares. If no
toxicity is observed from intranasal administration, patients will receive a single administration of AdCFTR
to the respiratory epithelium of their left large bronchi. Five groups of patients (2 patients per group) will
be studied based on increased dosage administration of AdCFTR. This study will determine the: (1) in
vivo safety and efficacy of the administration of AdCFTR into the respiratory epithelium; (2) efficacy of the
correction of the biologic abnormalities of CF in the respiratory epithelium; (3) duration of the biologic
correction; (4) efficacy of the correction of the abnormal electrical potential difference of the airway
epithelial sheet; (5) clinical parameters relevant to the disease process; and (6) if humoral immunity
develops against AdCFTR sufficient to prevent repeat administration. (Protocol #9212-034)
Appendix D-42. Dr. Kenneth Culver, Iowa Methodist Medical Center, Des Moines, Iowa, and Dr. John
Van Gilder, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, may conduct experiments on 15 patients ≥ 18 years of
age with recurrent malignant primary brain tumors or lung, melanoma, renal cell carcinoma, or breast
carcinoma brain metastases who have failed standard therapy for their disease. Patient eligibility will be
limited to those patients who have measurable residual tumor immediately following the post-operative
procedure as demonstrated by imaging studies. The number of patients treated will be equally divided
between the Iowa Methodist Medical Center and the University of Iowa. If a positive response is
observed in any of the first 15 patients, the investigators may submit a request to treat an additional 15
patients.
Following surgical debulking, patients will receive a maximum of 3 intralesional injections of the
G1TkSvNa vector- producing cell line (VPC) to induce regression of residual tumor cells by ganciclovir
(GCV) therapy. Patients who demonstrate stable disease for a minimum of 6 months following this
treatment will be eligible for additional VPC injections and subsequent GCV therapy. (Protocol #9303037)
Appendix D-43. Drs. Malcolm Brenner, Robert Krance, Helen E. Heslop, Victor Santana, and James
Ihle, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, may conduct experiments on 35
patients ≥ 1 year and ≤ 21 years of age at the time of initial diagnosis of acute myelogenous leukemia
(AML). The investigators will use the two retroviral vectors, LNL6 and G1Na, to determine the efficacy of
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the bone marrow purging techniques: 4-hydroxyperoxicyclophosphamide and interleukin-2 (IL-2)
activation of endogenous cytotoxic effector cells, in preventing relapse from the reinfusion of autologous
bone marrow cells. (Protocol #9303-039)
Appendix D-44. Drs. Helen E. Heslop, Malcolm Brenner, and Cliona Rooney, St Jude Children's
Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, may conduct experiments of 35 patients ≤ 21 years of age who
will be recipients of mismatched-related or phenotypically similar unrelated donor marrow grafts for
leukemia. In this Phase I dose escalation study, spontaneous lymphoblastoid cell lines will be
established that express the same range of Epstein-Barr Virus (EBV) encoded proteins as the recipient.
These EBV-specific cell lines will be transduced with LNL6 or G1Na and readministered at the time of
bone marrow transplant. This study will determine: (1) survival and expansion of these EBV-specific cell
lines in vivo, (2) the ability of these adoptively transferred cells to confer protection against EBV infection,
and (3) appropriate dosage and administration schedules. (Protocol #9303-038)
Appendix D-45. Drs. Robert W. Wilmott and Jeffrey Whitsett, Children's Hospital Medical Center,
Cincinnati, Ohio, and Dr. Bruce Trapnell, Genetic Therapy, Inc., Gaithersburg, Maryland, may conduct
experiments on 15 cystic fibrosis (CF) patients who have mild to moderate disease ≥ 21 years of age.
The replication-deficient type 5 adenovirus vector, Av1CF2, will be administered to the nasal and lobar
bronchial respiratory tract of patients. This study will demonstrate the: (1) expression of normal cystic
fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) mRNA in vivo, (2) synthesis of CFTR protein, and
(3) correction of epithelial cell cAMP dependent Cl- permeability. The pharmacokinetics of CFTR
expression and ability to re-infect the respiratory tract with AvCF2 will be determined. Systemic and local
immunologic consequences of Av1CF2 infection, the time of viral survival, and potential for recombination
or complementation of the virus will be monitored. (Protocol #9303-041)
Appendix D-46. Dr. James M. Wilson of the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, may conduct experiments on 20 adult patients with advanced cystic fibrosis lung disease.
An isolated segment of the patients' lung will be transduced with the E1 deleted, replication-incompetent
adenovirus vector, Ad.CΒ-CFTR using a bronchoscope for gene delivery. Ad.CB-CFTR contains the
human gene encoding the cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) protein.
Pulmonary biopsies will be obtained by bronchoscopy at 4 days, 6 weeks, and 3 months following
treatment. Patients will be monitored for evidence of CFTR gene transfer and expression, immunological
responses to CFTR or adenovirus proteins, and toxicity. (Protocol #9212-035)
Appendix D-47. Dr. Hilliard F. Seigler of Duke University Medical Center, Durham, North Carolina, may
conduct experiments on 20 patients with disseminated malignant melanoma. Autologous tumor cells will
be transduced with a retroviral vector, pHuγ-IFN, that contains the gene encoding human γ-IFN.
Following lethal irradiation, the transduced cells will be readministered to patients for the purpose of
generating cytotoxic T cells that are tumor specific along with the up-regulation of Class I major
histocompatibility antigens. Patients will be monitored for clinical regression of tumors and generation of
tumor-specific cytotoxic T lymphocytes. (Protocol #9306-043)
Appendix D-48. Drs. Stefan Karlsson and Cynthia Dunbar of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda,
Maryland, and Dr. Donald B. Kohn of the Children’s Hospital of Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California,
may conduct experiments on 10 patients with Gaucher disease. CD34(+) hematopoietic stem cells will be
isolated from bone marrow or from peripheral blood treated with granulocyte-colony stimulating factor.
CD34(+) cells will be transduced with a retrovirus vector, G1Gc, containing cDNA encoding human
glucocerebrosidase and administered intravenously. Patients will be monitored for toxicity and
glucocerebrosidase expression. (Protocol #9306-047)
Appendix D-49. Dr. Gary J. Nabel of the University of Michigan Medical Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
may conduct experiments on 12 patients with AIDS to be divided into 4 experimental groups. CD4(+)
lymphocytes will be isolated from peripheral blood and transduced with Rev M10, a transdominant
inhibitory mutant of the rev gene of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Transduction of the rev
mutant will be mediated either by the retrovirus vector, PLJ-cREV M10, or by particle-mediated gene
transfer of plasmid DNA. Patients will be monitored for survival of the transduced CD4(+) cells by
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polymerase chain reaction and whether Rev M10 can confer protection against HIV infection to CD4(+)
cells. (Protocol #9306-049)
Appendix D-50. Dr. Gary J. Nabel of the University of Michigan Medical Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
may conduct experiments on 24 patients with advanced cancer. Patients will undergo in vivo
transduction with DNA/liposome complexes containing genes encoding the HLA-B7 histocompatibility
antigen and beta-2 microglobulin in a non-viral plasmid. These DNA/liposome complexes will be
administered either by intratumoral injection or catheter delivery. Patients will be monitored for enhanced
immune responses against tumor cells, and safe and effective doses will be determined. (Protocol #9306045)
Appendix D-51. Dr. John A. Barranger of the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, may
conduct experiments on 5 patients with Gaucher disease. The CD34(+) hematopoietic stem cells will be
isolated from peripheral blood and transduced in vitro with the retrovirus vector, N2-Sv-GC, encoding the
glucocerebrosidase (GC) enzyme. Following reinfusion of the transduced cells, patients will be monitored
by PCR analysis for GC expression in peripheral blood leukocytes. Patients currently receiving GC
replacement therapy and who demonstrate clinical responsiveness will be withdrawn from exogenous GC
therapy. Patients not previously treated with exogenous GC, will be monitored for clinical reversal of lipid
storage symptoms. (Protocol #9306-046)
Appendix D-52. Dr. Robert Walker of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, may conduct
experiments on 12 HIV-infected patients who have a seronegative identical twin. CD4(+) and CD8(+)
cells will be isolated from the seronegative twin and induced to polyclonal proliferation with anti-CD3 and
interleukin-2. The enriched population of cells will be transduced with either LNL6 or G1Na, which
contain the neoR gene. The transduced cells will be expanded in tissue culture and administered to the
HIV-infected twin. Patients will be monitored for immune function and the presence of marked cells.
(Protocol #9209-026)
Appendix D-53. Dr. Corey Raffel of the Children’s Hospital Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, and
Dr. Kenneth Culver of Iowa Methodist Medical Center, Des Moines, Iowa, may conduct experiments on
30 patients between 2 and 18 years of age with recurrent malignant astrocytoma. Fifteen patients will be
accrued into this study initially. If at least one patient responds to therapy, an additional 14 patients will
be treated. Patients with either surgically accessible or non-accessible tumors will be treated with the
vector producing cell line (PA317) carrying the retrovirus vector, G1TkSvNa. This vector will transduce
tumor cells in vivo with the Herpes simplex thymidine kinase (HS-tk) gene that renders the cells sensitive
to killing by ganciclovir. Surgically accessible patients will undergo surgical debulking of their tumor
followed by repeated administration of the HS-tk vector producer cells into the tumor bed. Children with
unresectable tumors will undergo stereotaxic injection of vector producer cells into tumors. (Protocol
#9306-050)
Appendix D-54. Dr. Jeffrey E. Galpin of the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California,
and Dr. Dennis A. Casciato of the University of California, Los Angeles, California, may conduct
experiments on 15 HIV(+) asymptomatic patients. Patients will receive 3 monthly intramuscular injections
of the retrovirus vector (N2IIIBenv) encoding the HIV-1 IIIB envelope protein. Patients will be monitored
for acute toxicity, CD4 levels, HIV-specific CTL responses, and viral burdens. (Protocol #9306-048)
Appendix D-55. Drs. Charles Hesdorffer and Karen Antman of Columbia University College of
Physicians and Surgeons, New York, New York, may conduct experiments on 20 patients with advanced
breast, ovary, and brain cancer. CD34(+) hematopoietic stem cells will be isolated from bone marrow,
transduced with the retrovirus vector, PHaMDR1/A, and readministered to patients. Patients will be
monitored for the presence and expression of the MDR-1 gene. The investigators will determine whether
MDR-1 expression increases following chemotherapy. (Protocol #9306-051)
Appendix D-56. Dr. Enzo Paoletti of Virogenetics Corporation, Troy, New York, may conduct
experiments with poxvirus vectors NYVAC, ALVAC, and TROVAC at Biosafety Level 1.
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Appendix D-57. Drs. Richard C. Boucher and Michael R. Knowles of the University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, may conduct experiments on 9 patients (18 years old or greater) with cystic
fibrosis to test for the safety and efficacy of an E1-deleted recombinant adenovirus containing the cystic
fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) cDNA, Ad.CB-CFTR. A single dose of 108, 3 x
109 or 1011 pfu/ml will be administered to the nasal cavity of 3 patients in each dose group. Patients will
be monitored by nasal lavage and biopsy to assess safety and restoration of normal epithelial function.
(Protocol #9303-042)
Appendix D-58. Dr. Joyce A. O'Shaughnessy of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland,
may conduct experiments on 18 patients (18-60 years old) with Stage IV breast cancer who have
achieved a partial or complete response to induction chemotherapy. This study will determine the
feasibility of obtaining engraftment of CD34(+) hematopoietic stem cells transduced by a retroviral vector,
G1MD, and expressing a cDNA for the human multi-drug resistance-1 (MDR-1) gene following high dose
chemotherapy, and whether the transduced MDR-1 gene confers drug resistance to hematopoietic cells
and functions as an in vivo dominant selectable marker. Patients will be monitored for evidence of
myeloprotection and presence of the transduced MDR-1 gene." (Protocol #9309-054)
Appendix D-59. Drs. Larry E. Kun, R. A. Sanford, Malcolm Brenner, and Richard L. Heideman of St.
Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, and Dr. Edward H. Oldfield of the National
Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, may conduct experiments on 6 patients (3-21 years old) with
progressive or recurrent malignant supratentorial tumors resistant to standard therapies. Mouse cells
producing the retroviral vector containing the herpes simplex thymidine kinase gene (G1TKSVNa) will be
instilled into the tumor areas via multiple stereotactically placed cannulas. Patients will be treated with
ganciclovir to eliminate cells expressing the transduced gene. Patients will be monitored for central
nervous system, hematologic, renal or other toxicities, and for anti-tumor responses by magnetic
resonance imaging studies. (Protocol #9309-055)
Appendix D-60. The physical containment level may be reduced from Biosafety Level 3 to Biosafety
Level 2 for a Semliki Forest Virus (SFV) vector expression system of Life Technologies, Inc.,
Gaithersburg, Maryland.
Appendix D-61. Dr. Albert B. Deisseroth of the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center,
Houston, Texas, may conduct experiments on 10 patients (≥ 16 to ≤ 60 years of age) with chronic
lymphocytic leukemia. Autologous peripheral blood and bone marrow cells will be removed from patients
following chemotherapy and marked by transduction with two distinguishable retroviral vectors, G1Na and
LNL6, containing the neomycin resistance gene. The gene marked cells will be reinfused into patients to
determine the efficiency of bone marrow purging and the origin of relapse following autologous bone
marrow transplantation. (Protocol #9209-030)
Appendix D-62. Dr. Jonathan Simons of the Johns Hopkins Oncology Center, Baltimore, Maryland, may
conduct experiments on 26 patients (≥ 18 years of age) with metastatic renal cell carcinoma to evaluate
the safety and tolerability of intradermally injected autologous irradiated tumor cells transduced with the
retrovirus vector, MFG, containing the human granulocyte-macrophage colony stimulating factor gene.
Acute and long-term clinical toxicities and in vitro and in vivo induction of specific anti-tumor immune
responses will be monitored. (Protocol #9303-040)
Appendix D-63. Dr. Albert B. Deisseroth of the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center,
Houston, Texas, may conduct experiments on 20 patients (≥ 18 and ≤ 60 years old) with ovarian cancer.
A murine viral vector was constructed from the third generation of L series retroviruses with the insert of
the human multi-drug resistance-1 (MDR-1) transduced gene. The investigators will assess the safety
and feasibility of administering CD34 (+) autologous peripheral blood and bone marrow cells. Patients
will be monitored for the presence of the MDR-1 gene and for the effect of gene transfer on hematopoietic
function following the transplantation. (Protocol #9306-044)
Appendix D-64. Dr. Joseph Ilan of the Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine and
University Hospital of Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, may conduct experiments on 12 patients (≥ 18 years of
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age) with advanced brain cancer. Human malignant glioma tumor cells will be cultured, transfected with
Epstein-Barr virus (EBV)-based vector, anti-Insulin growth factor-I, lethally irradiated, and injected
subcutaneously into patients in an attempt to express antisense Insulin growth factor-1. Patients will be
monitored for toxicity and immunologic responses to the vector. (Protocol #9306-052)
Appendix D-65. Drs. James S. Economou and John Glaspy of the University of California, Los Angeles,
California, may conduct experiments on 30 patients (≥ 18 to ≤ 70 years of age) with metastatic
melanoma. A human melanoma cell line (M-24) will be transduced with the retroviral vector, G1NaCvi2,
expressing the human interleukin-2 (IL-2) gene. The IL-2 producing cells will be mixed with the patient's
autologous tumor cells, irradiated, and injected subcutaneously in an attempt to enhance the tumorspecific immunologic response. Patients will be monitored for toxicity, in vitro and in vivo immunologic
responses, and clinical anti-tumor effects. (Protocol #9309-058)
Appendix D-66. Drs. Peter Cassileth, Eckhard R. Podack, and Kasi Sridhar of the University of Miami,
and Niramol Savaraj of the Miami Veterans Administration Hospital, Miami, Florida, may conduct
experiments on 12 patients (≥ 18 years of age) with limited stage small cell lung cancer. Autologous
tumor cells will be removed, expanded in culture, and transduced by lipofection with the BMG-Neo-hIL2
vector (derived from bovine papilloma virus). The objective of this protocol is to demonstrate the safety
and efficacy of administering IL-2 transduced autologous tumor cells in an attempt to stimulate a tumorspecific cytotoxic T lymphocyte (CTL) response, and to determine the quantity and characteristics of the
CTL that have been generated. (Protocol #9309-053)
Appendix D-67. Drs. Edward H. Oldfield and Zvi Ram of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda,
Maryland, may conduct experiments on 20 patients (≥ 18 years of age) with leptomeningeal
carcinomatosis. The patients will receive intraventricular or subarachnoid injection of murine vector
producing cells containing the retroviral vector, G1Tk1SvNa. Tumor cells expressing the herpes simplex
thymidine kinase gene will be rendered sensitive to killing by subsequent administration of ganciclovir.
Patients will be monitored for safety and anti-tumor response by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and
cerebral spinal fluid cytological analysis. (Protocol #9312-059)
Appendix D-68. Drs. Tapas K. Das Gupta and Edward P. Cohen of the University of Illinois College of
Medicine, Chicago, Illinois, may conduct experiments on 12 subjects who differ in at least 3 out of 6
alleles at the Class I histocompatibility locus (≥ 18 years of age) with Stage IV malignant melanoma. The
subjects will be immunized with a lethally irradiated allogeneic human melanoma cell line transduced with
the human interleukin-2 expressing retroviral vector, pZipNeoSv-IL-2. Subjects will be monitored for
toxicity, induction of B and T cell antitumor responses in vitro and in vivo, and any clinical evidence of
antitumor effect. (Protocol #9309-056)
Appendix D-69A. Dr. Michael J. Welsh of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Iowa City, Iowa, may
conduct experiments on 20 patients (≥ 18 years of age) with cystic fibrosis. The investigator will
administer increasing doses of either of the two adenovirus vectors, AD2/CFTR-1 or AD2-ORF6/PGKCFTR, to the nasal epithelium of 10 patients (1 nostril) or maxillary sinus epithelium of 10 patients (1
maxillary sinus). Patients will be isolated for a period of 24 hours following vector administration;
however, if 1 patient demonstrates secreted virus at 24 hours, the investigator will notify the Recombinant
DNA Advisory Committee for reconsideration of the isolated period. Patients will be assessed for the
safety and efficacy of multiply administration of adenovirus vectors encoding the cystic fibrosis
transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) gene. (Protocol #9312-067)
Appendix D-69B. Dr. Richard Haubrich of the University of California at San Diego Treatment Center,
San Diego, California, may conduct experiments on 25 human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-infected,
seropositive, asymptomatic subjects (≥ 18 to ≤ 65 years of age). Subjects will receive 3 monthly
intramuscular injections of the retroviral vector, N2/IIIB env/rev, which encodes for HIV-1 IIIB env/rev
proteins. The objective of the study is to induce HIV-1- specific CD8(+) cytotoxic T lymphocyte and
antibody responses in order to eliminate HIV-infected cells and residual virus. This Phase I/II study will
evaluate acute toxicity, identify long-term treatment effects, and evaluate the disease progression.
(Protocol #9312-062)
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Appendix D-70. Dr. Mario Sznol of the National Institutes of Health, Frederick, Maryland, may conduct
experiments on 50 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with advanced stage melanoma. Subjects will receive
subcutaneous injections of lethally irradiated allogeneic melanoma cells that have been transduced by
lipofection with the plasmid DNA vector, CMV-B7, derived from bovine papilloma virus to express the
human B7 antigen. The B7 antigen, which binds to the CD28 receptor of T cells, will serve as a costimulatory signal to elicit an antitumor immune response. Subjects will be monitored for induction of
cytotoxic T lymphocyte, antitumor responses in vitro and in vivo and any clinical evidence of antitumor
effect. (Protocol #9312-063)
Appendix D-71. Dr. Joseph Rubin of the Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota, may conduct experiments
on 15 subjects with hepatic metastases from advanced colorectal cancer (≥ 18 years of age). Subjects
will receive intratumoral hepatic injections of the plasmid DNA/lipid complex, pHLA-B7/β-2 microglobulin,
expressing a heterodimeric cell surface protein consisting of the HLA-B7 histocompatibility antigen and β2 microglobulin. Subjects must be HLA-B7 negative. The objective of this study is to determine a safe
and effective dose of the DNA/lipid complex. Subjects will be monitored for antigen-specific immune
responses and in vivo HLA-B7 expression. (Protocol #9312-064)
Appendix D-72. Dr. Nicholas J. Vogelzang of the University of Chicago Medical Center, Chicago, Illinois,
may conduct experiments on 15 subjects with metastatic renal cell carcinoma ≥ 18 years of age.
Subjects will receive intratumoral injections of the plasmid DNA/liposome vector pHLA-B7/β-2
microglobulin, expressing a heterodimeric cell surface protein consisting of the HLA-B7 histocompatibility
antigen and β-2 microglobulin. Subjects must be HLA-B7 negative. Subjects will be monitored for
antigen-specific immune responses and in vivo HLA-B7 expression. (Protocol #9403-071)
Appendix D-73. Dr. Evan M. Hersh of the Arizona Cancer Center and Drs. Emmanuel Akporiaye, David
Harris, Alison T. Stopeck, Evan C. Unger, and James A. Warneke of the University of Arizona, Tucson,
Arizona, may conduct experiments on 15 subjects with metastatic malignant melanoma ≥ 18 years of age.
Subjects will receive intratumoral injections of the plasmid DNA/liposome vector, pHLA-B7/β-2
microglobulin, expressing a heterodimeric cell surface protein consisting of the HLA-B7 histocompatibility
antigen and β-2 microglobulin. Subjects must be HLA-B7 negative. Subjects will be monitored for
antigen-specific immune responses and in vivo HLA-B7 expression. (Protocol #9403-072)
Appendix D-74. Dr. Ralph Freedman of MD Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, Texas, may conduct
gene marking experiments on 9 subjects with ovarian carcinoma or peritoneal carcinomatosis (≥ 16 years
of age). Autologous CD3(+)/CD8(+) tumor infiltrating lymphocyte derived T cells will be transduced with
the retroviral vector G1Na that encodes for neoR. Subjects will receive intraperitoneal administration of
bulk expanded transduced and nontransduced T cells and recombinant interleukin-2. Previously
documented tumor sites and normal tissues will be monitored for neoR and the proportion of
CD3(+)/CD8(+) T cells will be determined. (Protocol #9406-075)
Appendix D-75. Drs. Helen Heslop, Malcolm Brenner, and Robert Krance of St. Jude Children’s
Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, may conduct gene marking experiments on 20 subjects
undergoing autologous bone marrow transplantation for therapy of leukemia or solid tumor (< 21 years of
age). The distinguishable retroviral vectors, LNL6 and G1Na (both encoding neoR), will be used to
determine the rate of reconstitution of untreated versus cytokine expanded CD34(+) selected autologous
bone marrow cells. (Protocol #9406-076)
Appendix D-76. Drs. Albert Deisseroth, Gabriel Hortobagyi, Richard Champlin, and Frankie Holmes of
MD Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, Texas, may conduct experiments on 10 fully evaluable subjects
(maximum of 20 entered) with Stage III or IV breast cancer (≥ 18 and ≤ 60 years of age). Subjects will
receive autologous CD34(+) peripheral blood cells that have been transduced with the retroviral vector,
pVMDR-1, which encodes the multi-drug resistance gene. The objective of this study is to evaluate the
safety and feasibility of transducing early hematopoietic progenitor cells with pVMDR-1 and to determine
in vivo selection of chemotherapy resistant hematopoietic cells. (Protocol #9406-077)
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Appendix D-77. Drs. Johnson M. Liu and Neal S. Young of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda,
Maryland, may conduct experiments on 6 patients with Fanconi anemia (≥ 5 years of age). Subjects will
receive autologous CD34(+) cells that have been transduced with the retroviral vector, FACC, which
encodes the normal Fanconi anemia complementation group C gene. The objective of this study is to
determine whether autologous FACC transduced hematopoietic progenitor cells can be safely
administered to subjects, the extent of engraftment, and correction of cell phenotype. (Protocol #9406078)
Appendix D-78. Drs. Robert E. Sobol and Ivor Royston of the San Diego Regional Cancer Center, San
Diego, California, may conduct experiments on 15 subjects with recurrent residual glioblastoma multiforme (≥ 18 years of age). Subjects will receive subcutaneous injections of autologous tumor cells that
have been lethally irradiated and transduced with the retroviral vector, G1NaCvi2.23, which encodes for
interleukin-2. Subjects will be monitored in vitro for cellular and humoral antitumor responses and in vivo
for antitumor activity. (Protocol #9406-080)
Appendix D-79. Dr. Alfred E. Chang of the University of Michigan Medical Center, Ann Arbor Michigan,
may conduct gene marking experiments on 15 subjects with metastatic melanoma (≥ 18 years of age).
Subjects will undergo adoptive immunotherapy of anti-CD3/interleukin-2 activated lymph node cells that
have been primed in vivo with tumor cells that have been transduced with the retrovirus vector, GBAH4,
encoding the gene for interleukin-4. The investigator will evaluate the antitumor efficacy and in vivo
immunological reactivity in subjects receiving adoptively transferred T cells, and the in vitro immunological
reactivities of the activated T cells that might correlate with their in vivo antitumor function. (Protocol
#9312-065)
Appendix D-80. Dr. Robert Walker of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, may conduct
gene marking experiments on 40 HIV(+) subjects (≥ 18 years of age). The investigator may also enter an
additional number of subjects (to be determined by the investigator) who will receive a single
administration of 1 x 107 HIV-specific CD8(+) cells. The investigator will: (1) Assess the safety and
tolerance of the adoptive transfer of anti-HIV cytotoxic, syngeneic, CD8(+) peripheral blood lymphocytes
that have been transduced with the retrovirus
vector, rkat4svgF3e-, that encodes for a universal chimeric T cell receptor. (2) Determine the longevity of
the genetically marked CD8(+) lymphocytes in the subject's peripheral blood. (Protocol #9403-069)
Appendix D-81. Dr. Joseph Rosenblatt of the University of California, Los Angeles, California, and Dr.
Robert Seeger of Children’s Hospital, Los Angeles, California, may conduct gene transfer experiments on
18 subjects with neuroblastoma (≤ 21 years of age). Patients at high risk of relapse with minimal or no
detectable disease following myeloablative therapy and autologous bone marrow transplantation, or
patients with progressive or persistent disease despite conventional therapy will be serially immunized
with autologous or allogeneic neuroblastoma cells transduced to express γ interferon. Cells will be
transduced with the retroviral vector, pHuγ-IFN, encoding the human gene for γ interferon and lethally
irradiated prior to use as an immunogen. The objectives of the study are: (1) to determine the maximum
tolerable dose of transduced cells; (2) to determine the local, regional, and systemic toxicities of injected
cells; and (3) to determine the antitumor response in vivo as measured by standard clinical tests and
immunocytologic evaluation of marrow metastases. (Protocol #9403-068)
Appendix D-82. Dr. Kenneth L. Brigham of Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, may conduct
gene transfer experiments on 10 subjects (≤ 21 years of age) in two different patient protocols (5 for each
protocol). Both protocols will use the same DNA/liposome preparations to deliver a plasmid DNA
construct, pCMV4-AAT, encoding human alpha-1 antitrypsin gene driven by a cytomegalovirus promoter.
In patients scheduled for elective pulmonary resection, the DNA/liposome complexes will be instilled
through a fiber optic bronchoscope into a subsegment of the lung. Tissues of the lung will be obtained at
the time of surgery. Transgene expression will be assessed by immunohistochemistry, in situ
hybridization, and Western and Northern blot analyses. The effect of DNA/liposome complex
administration on the histological appearance of the lung will also be evaluated. In patients with alpha-1
antitrypsin deficiency, the DNA/liposome complexes will be instilled into the nostril. Transgene
expression will be determined in cells obtained by nasal lavage and nasal scraping, and the time course
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of transgene expression will be measured. The secretion of the alpha-1 antitrypsin protein in nasal fluid
will be determined. Histological appearance of nasal mucosa will also be examined. The study will
assess safety and feasibility of gene delivery to the human respiratory tract. (Protocol #9403-070)
Appendix D-83. Dr. H. Kim Lyerly of Duke University Medical Center, Durham, North Carolina, may
conduct gene transfer experiments on 20 subjects with refractory or recurrent metastatic breast cancer (≥
18 years of age). Autologous breast cancer cells will be transduced with the DNA/liposome complex,
pMP6-IL2, containing a plasmid DNA vector derived from adeno-associated virus (AAV) that expresses
the gene for human interleukin-2. Subjects will receive 4 subcutaneous injections of lethally irradiated
tumor cells transduced with the DNA/liposome complex prior to injection. The objective of this study is to:
(1) evaluate the safety and toxicity of the treatment, (2) determine the immunological effects, (3)
determine the duration of clinical responses, and (4) measure patient survival. (Protocol #9409-086)
Appendix D-84. Drs. Flossie Wong-Staal, Eric Poeschla, and David Looney of the University of
California at San Diego, La Jolla, California, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 6 subjects (≥ 18
and ≤ 65 years of age) infected with human immunodeficiency virus-1 (HIV-1). Autologous CD4(+) T
lymphocytes will be transduced ex vivo with the retroviral vector, pMJT, expressing a hairpin ribozyme
that cleaves the HIV-1 RNA in the 5' leader sequence. The transduced cells will be expanded and
reinfused into the patients. The objectives of the study are: (1) to evaluate safety of reinfusing the
transduced lymphocytes, (2) to compare (in vivo) the kinetics and survival of ribozyme-transduced cells
with that of cells transduced with a control vector, (3) to determine in vivo expression of the ribozyme
sequences in transduced lymphocytes, (4) to determine whether host immune responses directed against
the transduced cells will occur in vivo, and (5) to obtain preliminary data on the effects of ribozyme gene
therapy on in vivo HIV mRNA expression, viral burden and CD4(+) lymphocyte levels. (Protocol #9309057)
Appendix D-85. Dr. Friedrich Schuening of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle,
Washington, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 10 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with Type I
Gaucher's disease. The peripheral blood repopulating cells (mobilized by patient pretreatment with
recombinant granulocyte colony-stimulating factor) will be harvested and CD34(+) cells selected.
CD34(+) cells will be transduced ex vivo with the retroviral vector, LgGC, that encodes human
glucocerebrosidase cDNA. Following transduction, the transduced cells will be infused into the patient
without myeloablative treatment. The primary endpoint of this study is to examine the safety of infusing
CD34(+) cells transduced with the human glucocerebrosidase cDNA. Patients will be monitored for
persistence and expression of the glucocerebrosidase gene in hematopoietic cells. (Protocol #9312-061)
Appendix D-86. Dr. Terence R. Flotte of the Johns Hopkins Children's Center, Baltimore, Maryland, may
conduct gene transfer experiments on 16 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with mild cystic fibrosis (CF). An
adeno-associated virus (AAV) derived vector, encoding cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance
regulator (CFTR) gene, (tgAAVCF), will be administered to nasal (direct) and airway (bronchoscope)
epithelial cells. This is a dose escalation study involving 8 cohorts. Each subject will receive both
intranasal and bronchial administration of the adenoviral vector at 4 escalating doses. Nasal doses will
range between 1 x 106 and 1 x 109 pfu. Lung administration will range between 1 x 107 and 1 x 1010 pfu.
The primary goal of the study is to assess the safety of vector administration. Respiratory and nasal
epithelial cells will be evaluated for gene transfer, expression, and physiologic correction. (Protocol
#9409-083)
Appendix D-87. Drs. Jeffrey M. Isner and Kenneth Walsh of St. Elizabeth's Medical Center, Tufts
University, Boston, Massachusetts, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 12 subjects (≥ 40 years of
age) with peripheral artery disease (PAD). A plasmid DNA vector, phVEGF165, encoding the human
gene for vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) will be used to express VEGF to induce collateral
neovascularization. Percutaneous arterial gene transfer will be achieved using an angioplasty catheter
with a hydrogel coated balloon to deliver the plasmid DNA vector to the artery. The objectives of the
study are: (1) to determine the efficacy of arterial gene therapy to relieve rest pain and/or heal ischemic
ulcers of the lower extremities in patients with PAD; and (2) to document the safety of the phVEGF arterial
gene therapy for therapeutic angiogenesis. Subjects will undergo anatomic and physiologic examination
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to determine the extent of collateral artery development following phVEGF arterial gene therapy.
(Protocol #9409-088)
Appendix D-88A. Dr. Ronald G. Crystal of New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, New York, New
York, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 26 patients (≥ 15 years of age) with cystic fibrosis (CF).
A replication deficient recombinant adenovirus vector will be used to transduce epithelial cells of the large
bronchi with the E1/E3 deleted type 5 adenovirus vector, AdGVCFTR.10, which encodes the human cystic
fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) gene. The objective of this study is to define the
safety and pharmacodynamics of CFTR gene expression in airway epithelial cells following single
administration of
escalating doses to the vector. If single administration is determined to be safe, subjects will undergo
repeat administration to localized areas of the bronchi. (Protocol #9409-085)
Appendix D-88B. Drs. Eric J. Sorscher and James L. Logan of the University of Alabama, Birmingham,
Alabama, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 9 subjects (≥18 years of age) with cystic fibrosis
(CF). The normal human cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) gene will be
expressed by a plasmid DNA vector, pKCTR, driven by the simian virus-40 (SV40) early gene promoter.
The CFTR DNA construct will be delivered by cationic liposome-based gene transfer to nasal epithelial
cells. The objectives of the study are to: (1) evaluate the safety of lipid-mediated gene transfer to nasal
epithelial cells (including local inflammation and mucosal tissue); and (2) evaluate efficacy as determined
by correction of the chloride ion transport defect, and wild-type CFTR mRNA and protein expression.
(Protocol #9312-066)
Appendix D-89. Dr. Steven M. Albelda of the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 12 subjects with advanced mesothelioma. The
adenovirus vector encoding the Herpes simplex virus thymidine kinase (HSV-TK) gene, H5.020RSVTK,
will be administered through a chest tube to the pleural cavity. Tumor biopsies will be assayed for gene
transfer and expression. Subjects will be monitored for immunological responses to the adenovirus
vector. Ganciclovir will be administered intravenously 14 days following vector administration. The
primary objective of this Phase I study is to evaluate the safety of direct adenovirus vector gene delivery
to the pleural cavity of patients with malignant melanoma. (Protocol #9409-090)
Appendix D-90. Drs. Jeffrey Holt and Carlos B. Arteaga of the Vanderbilt University, Nashville,
Tennessee, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 10 female patients (over 18 years of age) with
metastatic breast cancer. Patient effusions from pleura or peritoneum will be drained and the fluid will be
replaced with supernatant containing the retroviral vectors, XM6:antimyc or XM6:antifos, which express cmyc and c-fos antisense sequences, respectively, under the control of a mouse mammary tumor virus
promoter. The objectives of this study are to: (1) assess uptake and expression of the vector sequences
in breast cancer cells present in pleural and peritoneal fluids, and determine if this expression is tumor
specific, (2) assess the safety of localized administration of antisense retroviruses, and (3) monitor
subjects for clinical evidence of antitumor response. (Protocol #9409-084)
Appendix D-91. Dr. Jack A. Roth of MD Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, Texas, may conduct gene
transfer experiments on 14 non-small cell lung cancer subjects (≥ 18 and ≤ 80 years of age) who have
failed conventional therapy and who have bronchial obstruction. LNSX-based retroviral vectors
containing the β-actin promoter will be used to express: (1) the antisense RNA of the K-ras oncogene
(LN-K-rasB), and (2) the wildtype p53 tumor suppressor gene (LNp53B). Tumor biopsies will be obtained
to characterized K-ras and p53 mutations. Relative to their specific mutation, subjects will undergo partial
endoscopic resection of the tumor bed followed by bronchoscopic administration of the appropriate
retrovirus construct. The objective of this study is to evaluate the safety and efficacy of intralesional
administration of LN-K-rasB and LNp53 retrovirus constructs. (Protocol #9403-031)
Appendix D-92. Drs. Robert E. Sobol and Ivor Royston of the San Diego Regional Cancer Center, San
Diego, California, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 12 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with
metastatic colon carcinoma. The autologous skin fibroblasts will be transduced with the retroviral vector,
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LNCX/IL-2, which encodes the gene for human interleukin-2 (IL-2). In this dose-escalation study,
subjects will receive subcutaneous injections of lethally irradiated autologous tumor cells. The objectives
of the study are to: (1) evaluate the safety of subcutaneous administration of LNCX/IL-2 transduced
fibroblasts, (2) determine in vivo antitumor activity, and (3) monitor cellular and humoral antitumor
responses. (Protocol #9312-060)
Appendix D-93. Dr. Michael Lotze of the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, may conduct
gene transfer experiments on 18 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with advanced melanoma, 6 with T-cell
lymphoma, breast cancer, or head and neck cancer. Subjects should have accessible cutaneous tumors,
and have failed standard therapy. Over 4 weeks, subjects will receive a total of 4 intratumoral injections
of autologous fibroblasts transduced with the retrovirus vector, TFG-hIL-12-Neo. This vector, which
consists of the murine MFG backbone, expresses both the p35 and p40 subunits of interleukin-12 (IL-12)
and the neoR selection marker. The objectives of the study are to: (1) define the local and systemic
toxicity associated with peritumoral injections of gene-modified fibroblasts, (2) examine the local and
systemic immunomodulatory effects of these injections, and (3) evaluate clinical antitumor efficacy.
(Protocol #9406-081)
Appendix D-94. Drs. Evan Hersh, Emmanuel Akporiaye, David Harris, Alison Stopeck, Evan Unger,
James Warneke, of the Arizona Cancer Center, Tucson, Arizona, may conduct gene transfer experiments
on 25 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with solid malignant tumors or lymphomas. A plasmid DNA/lipid
complex designated as VCL-1102 (IL-2 Plasmid DNA/DMRIE/DOPE) will be used to transduce the human
gene for interleukin-2 (IL-2). Patients with advanced cancer who have failed conventional therapy will
undergo a procedure in which VCL-1102 is injected directly into the tumor mass to induce tumor-specific
immunity. The objectives of the study are to: (1) determine safety and toxicity associated with escalating
doses of VCL-1102; (2) confirm IL-2 expression in target cells; (3) determine biological activity and
pharmacokinetics; and (4) determine whether IL-2 expression stimulates tumor regression in subjects with
metastatic malignancies. (Protocol #9412-095)
Appendix D-95. Drs. Richard Morgan and Robert Walker of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda,
Maryland, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 48 human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
seropositive subjects (≥ 18 years of age). This Phase I/II study involves identical twins (one HIV
seropositive and the other HIV seronegative). CD4(+) T cells will be enriched following apheresis of the
HIV seronegative twin, induced to polyclonal proliferation with anti-CD3 and recombinant IL-2, transduced
with either the LNL6/NeoR or G1Na/NeoR, and transduced with up to 2 additional retroviral vectors
(G1RevTdSN and/or GCRTdSN(TAR)) containing potentially therapeutic genes (antisense TAR and/or
transdominant Rev). These T cell populations will be expanded 10 to 1,000 fold in culture for 1 to 2
weeks and reinfused into the HIV seropositive twin. Subjects will receive up to 4 cycles of treatment
using identical or different combinations of control and anti-HIV retrovirus vectors. The relative survival of
these transduced T cell populations will be monitored by vector-specific polymerase chain reaction, while
the subjects' functional immune status is monitored by standard in vitro and in vivo assays. (Protocol
#9503-103)
Appendix D-96. Dr. Harry L. Malech of the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, may
conduct gene transfer experiments on 2 subjects ≥ 18 years of age (with or without concurrent serious
infection), and 3 subjects ≥ 18 years of age (with or without concurrent serious infection) or minors 13-17
years of age who have concurrent serious infection who have chronic granulomatous disease (CGD).
CGD is an inherited immune deficiency disorder in which blood neutrophils and monocytes fail to produce
antimicrobial oxidants (p47phox mutation) resulting in recurrent life-threatening infections. Subjects will
undergo CD34(+) mobilization with granulocyte colony stimulating factor (G-CSF). These CD34(+) cells
will be transduced with the retrovirus vector, MFG-S-p47phox, which encodes the gene for normal p47phox.
The objectives of this study are to: (1) determine the safety of administering MFG-S-p47phox transduced
CD34(+) cells, and (2) demonstrate increased functional oxidase activity in circulating neutrophils.
(Protocol #9503-104)
Appendix D-97. Drs. Chris Evans and Paul Robbins of the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 6 subjects (≥ 18 and ≤ 76 years of age) with
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rheumatoid arthritis. Rheumatoid arthritis is a chronic, progressive disease thought to be of autoimmune
origin. A gene encoding an interleukin-1 receptor antagonist protein (IRAP) will be delivered to the
rheumatoid metacarpal-phalangeal joints to determine the autoimmune reactions can be interrupted. The
vector construct, DFG-IRAP, is based on the MFG murine retrovirus vector backbone, and encodes the
human IRAP gene. Synovial fibroblasts will be generated from the rheumatoid arthritic joint tissue
obtained from patients who are scheduled to undergo surgery. The fibroblasts will be transduced with the
DFG-IRAP vector, and the transduced cells injected into the synovial space. The synovial fluid and joint
material will be collected 7 days later to determine the presence and location of the transduced synovial
fibroblasts and the level of IRAP in the joint fluid. (Protocol 9406-074)
Appendix D-98. Dr. R. Scott McIvor of the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, may
conduct gene transfer experiments on 2 children with purine nucleoside phosphorylase (PNP) deficiency.
PNP deficiency results in severe T-cell immunodeficiency, an autosomal recessive inherited disease
which is usually fatal in the first decade of life. Autologous peripheral blood lymphocytes will be cultured
in an artificial capillary cartridge in the presence of anti-CD3 monoclonal antibody and interleukin-2 and
transduced with the retroviral vector, LPNSN-2, encoding human PNP. Subjects will undergo bimonthly
intravenous administration of transduced T cells for a maximum of 1 year. The objectives of the study are
to determine: (1) the safety of intravenous administration of transduced T cells in children with PNP
deficiency, (2) the efficiency of PNP gene transfer and duration of gene expression in vivo, and (3) the
effect of PNP gene transfer on immune function. (Protocol #9506-110)
Appendix D-99. Drs. Nikhil C. Munshi and Bart Barlogie of the University of Arkansas School for Medical
Sciences, Little Rock, Arkansas, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 21 subjects (>18 and <65
years of age) with relapsed or persistent multiple myeloma who are undergoing T cell depleted allogeneic
bone marrow transplantation. Donor peripheral blood lymphocytes will be cultured in vitro with
interleukin-2 and anti-CD3 monoclonal antibody. T cell depleted lymphocytes will be transduced with the
retroviral construct, G1Tk1SvNa.7, which encodes the Herpes simplex virus thymidine kinase (HSV-TK)
gene. The transduced cells will be reinfused. In this dose escalation study, 3 subjects will undergo cellmediated gene transfer per cohort (maximum of 5 cohorts) until Grade III or IV Graft versus Host Disease
(GVHD) is observed. A maximum of 6 additional patients may be entered at that maximum tolerated
dose. The objectives of this study are to determine the: (1) safety of transduced donor cell infusions, (2)
effectiveness of donor cell infusions in decreasing the effects of severe GVHD, (3) effectiveness of donor
cell infusions in prolonging multiple myeloma remission, and (4) effectiveness of ganciclovir in eliminating
donor cells for the purpose of preventing the depletion of erythrocytes. (Protocol #9506-107)
Appendix D-100. Dr. Wayne A. Marasco of Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, may
conduct gene transfer experiments on 6 subjects (≥ 18 and ≤ 65 years of age) with human
immunodeficiency virus type-1 (HIV-1). Autologous lymphocytes from asymptomatic subjects will be
transduced ex vivo with a retroviral vector, LNCs105, encoding the sFv105 antibody specific for the HIV-1
envelope protein. An identical aliquot will be simultaneously transduced with a control retroviral vector
lacking the sFv105 cassette. Transduced cells will be reinfused into patients and the differential survival
of both populations of CD4+ lymphocytes compared. The objective of the study is to determine whether
the intracellular expression of a human single chain antibody against HIV-1 envelope glycoprotein gp160
that blocks gp160 processing and the production of infectious virions can safely prolong the survival of
CD4(+) lymphocytes in HIV-1-infected subjects. (Protocol #9506-111)
Appendix D-101. Dr. Henry Dorkin of the New England Medical Center, Boston, Massachusetts, and Dr.
Allen Lapey of Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts,
propose to conduct gene transfer experiments on 16 subjects (≥ 18 years of age). An E1/partial E4deleted, replication-deficient, type 2 adenovirus vector, AD2/CFTR-2, will be used to deliver the human
cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) gene by aerosol administration
(nebulization) to the lung of CF patients. Aerosol administration will be initiated only after initial safety
data has been obtained from the lobar administration protocol (#9409-091). This is a single
administration dose-escalation study in which subjects will receive between 8 x 106 and 2.5 x 1010 pfu.
Subjects will be assessed for evidence of adverse, systemic, immune, inflammatory, or respiratory effects
in response to AD2/CFTR-2. Subjects will be monitored for virus shedding and transgene expression.
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Health care workers present in the facility will be required to sign an Informed Consent document
regarding the possibility of virus transmission. (Protocol #9412-074)
Appendix D-102. Drs. Charles J. Link and Donald Moorman of the Human Gene Therapy Research
Institute, Des Moines, Iowa, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 24 female subjects (≥ 18 years of
age) with refractory or recurrent ovarian cancer. Subjects will undergo intraperitoneal delivery (via
Tenkhoff catheter) of the vector producing cells (VPC), PA317/LTKOSN.2. These VPC express the
Herpes simplex virus thymidine kinase (HSV-TK) gene which confers sensitivity to killing by the antiviral
drug, ganciclovir (GCV). The LTKOSN.2 retrovirus vector is based on the LXSN backbone. Two weeks
following intraperitoneal delivery of the VPC, subjects will receive 5 mg/kg intravenous GCV twice daily for
14 days. Subjects will receive between 1 x 105 and 1 x 108 VPC/kg in this dose escalation study.
Subjects will be evaluated by X-ray and peritoneoscopy of the abdomen for evidence of clinical response.
The objectives of this study are to determine the safety of intraperitoneal VPC administration. (Protocol
#9503-100)
Appendix D-103. Dr. David T. Curiel of the University of Alabama, Birmingham, Alabama, may conduct
gene transfer experiment of 15 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with metastatic colorectal cancer. Subjects
will receive intramuscular injection of the polynucleotide vaccine, pGT63, which is a plasmid DNA vector
expressing carcinoembryonic antigen (CEA) and hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg). The objectives of
the study are to: (1) characterize the immune response to CEA and HBsAg following a single
intramuscular injection and following 3 consecutive intramuscular injections, and (2) determine the safety
of intramuscular injection of the plasmid DNA vector at doses ranging between 0.1 to 1.0 milligrams
(single dose) and 0.9 to 3.0 milligrams (total multidose). (Protocol #9506-073)
Appendix D-104. Dr. Chester B. Whitley of the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, may
conduct gene transfer experiments on two adult subjects (18 years of age or older) with mild Hunter
syndrome (Mucopolysaccharidosis Type II). The autologous peripheral blood lymphocytes will be
transduced ex vivo with the retroviral vector, L2SN, encoding the human cDNA for iduronate-2-sulfatase
(IDS). The transduced lymphocytes will be reinfused into the patients on a monthly basis. The study will
determine the frequency of peripheral blood lymphocyte transduction and the half-life of the infused cells.
Evaluation of patients will include measurement of blood levels of IDS enzyme, assessment of metabolic
correction by urinary glycosaminoglycan levels, clinical response of the disease, and monitoring for
potential toxicity. This Phase I study is to demonstrate the safety of the L2SN-mediated gene therapy
and to provide a preliminary evaluation of clinical efficacy. (Protocol #9409-087)
Appendix D-105. Drs. James Economou, John Glaspy, and William McBride of the University of
California, Los Angeles, California, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 25 subjects (≥ 18 years of
age) with metastatic melanoma. The protocol is an open label, Phase I trial to evaluate the safety and
immunological effects of administering lethally irradiated allogeneic and autologous melanoma cells
transduced with the retroviral vector, IL-7/HyTK, which encodes the gene for human interleukin-7 (IL-7).
Subjects will receive 1 x 107 irradiated unmodified autologous tumor cells in combination with escalating
doses of IL-7/HyTK transduced allogeneic melanoma cells (M24 cell line). The number of M24 cells
administered will be adjusted based on the level of IL-7 expression. Subjects will receive 3 biweekly
subcutaneous injections of M24 cells expressing 10, 100, or 1000 nanograms of IL-7/hour in vivo. A final
cohort of 5 subjects will receive IL-7/HyTK transduced autologous cells. Subjects will be monitored for
antitumor activity by skin tests, biopsy analysis, tumor-specific antibody activity, and cytotoxic T
lymphocyte precursor evaluation. Non-immunologic parameters will also be monitored. (Protocol #9503101)
Appendix D-106. Dr. Jack A. Roth, MD Anderson Cancer Center, may conduct gene transfer
experiments on 42 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with refractory non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC).
Subjects will receive direct intratumoral injection of a replication-defective type 5 adenovirus vector,
AD5CMV-p53, to deliver the normal human p53 tumor suppressor gene. The E1 region of AD5CMV-p53
has been replaced with a p53 expression cassette containing the human cytomegalovirus promoter
(CMV). Subjects will be divided into 2 treatment groups: (1) 21 subjects will receive Ad5CMV-p53 alone,
and (2) 21 subjects will receive Ad5CMV-p53 in combination with cisplatin. Following vector
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administration, subjects will be isolated for 96 hours during which time, assays will be conducted to
demonstrate the lack of shedding of adenovirus vector. The objectives of this study are determine: (1)
the maximum tolerated dose of AD5CMV-p53, (2) qualitative and quantitative toxicity related to vector
administration, and (3) biologic activity.
Prior to administration, adenovirus vector stocks will be screened for p53 mutants using the SAOS
osteosarcoma cell assay that was submitted by Dr. Roth on June 23, 1995. This biologic assay
compares the activity of a standard stock of Adp53 vector to the activity of newly produced stocks. The
standard stock of Adp53 will be defined as mediating cell death in 100% of SAOS cells (human
osteosarcoma cell line with homozygous p53 deletion) at an MOI of 50:1 (titer > 5 x 1010) on day 5 of
culture. The sensitivity of the assay for detecting inactive (presumed mutant) Adp53 vector will be
determined by adding increasing amounts of Adluc (control adenovirus vector containing the luciferase
gene) to the Adp53 stock to determine the percentage of inactive vector required to decrease growth
inhibition of SAOS cells mediated by Adp53. The test lot of Adp53 will be tested for its ability to inhibit
SAOS in a 5 day assay. Significant loss of inhibitory activity compared with the standard would indicate
an unacceptable level of inactive (presumed mutant) vector. (Protocol #9406-079)
Appendix D-107A. Dr. Gary Clayman. M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, Texas, may conduct
gene transfer experiments on 21 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with refractory squamous cell carcinoma of
the head and neck. Subjects will receive direct intratumoral injection of a replication-defective type 5
adenovirus vector, AD5CMV-p53, to deliver the normal human p53 tumor suppressor gene. The E1
region of AD5CMV-p53 has been replaced with a p53 expression cassette containing the human
cytomegalovirus promoter (CMV). Subjects will be divided into 2 treatment groups: (1) those with nonresectable tumors, and (2) those with surgically accessible tumors. Subjects will receive multiple
injections of vector in each dose-escalation cohort. Following vector administration, subjects will be
isolated for 48 hours during which time, assays will be conducted to demonstrate the lack of shedding of
adenovirus vector. The objectives of the study are to determine: (1) the maximum tolerated dose of
AD5CMV-p53, (2) qualitative and quantitative toxicity related to vector administration, and (3) biologic
activity.
Prior to administration, adenovirus vector stocks will be screened for p53 mutants using the SAOS
osteosarcoma cell assay that was submitted by Dr. Roth on June 23, 1995. This biologic assay
compares the activity of a standard stock of Adp53 vector to the activity of newly produced stocks. The
standard stock of Adp53 will be defined as mediating cell death in 100% of SAOS cells (human
osteosarcoma cell line with homozygous p53 deletion) at an MOI of 50:1 (titer > 5x1010) on day 5 of
culture. The sensitivity of the assay for detecting inactive (presumed mutant) Adp53 vector will be
determined by adding increasing amounts of Adluc to the Adp53 stock to determine the percentage of
inactive vector required to decrease growth inhibition of SAOS cells mediated by Adp53. The test lot of
Adp53 will be tested for its ability to inhibit SAOS in a 5 day assay. Significant loss of inhibitory activity
compared with the standard would indicate an unacceptable level of inactive (presumed mutant) vector.
(Protocol #9412-096)
Appendix D-107B. Drs. Bernard A. Fox and Walter J. Urba of Earle A. Chiles Research Institute,
Providence Medical Center, Portland, Oregon, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 18 subjects (≥
18 years of age) with metastatic renal cell carcinoma or melanoma. Autologous tumor cells will be
surgically removed, transduced in vitro with the cationic liposome plasmid vector, VCL-1005, which
encodes human leukocyte antigen (HLA)-B7 and beta-2 microglobulin. Subjects will receive
subcutaneous injection of lethally irradiated transduced cells in one limb. The contralateral limb will be
injected with lethally irradiated untransduced tumor cells in combination with Bacille Calmette-Guerin
(BCG). Approximately 21 days following tumor cell injection, subjects will undergo lymphadenectomy for
subsequent in vitro expansion of anti-CD3 activated lymphocytes. Activated lymphocytes will be
adoptively transferred on approximately day 35 in combination with a 5-day course of interleukin-2 (IL-2).
On approximately day 45, subjects will receive a second cycle of IL-2. The objectives of this study are to
determine: (1) the safety of administering anti-CD3 activated antitumor effector T cells in draining lymph
nodes, and (2) whether HLA-B7/β-2 gene transfer augments the sensitization of anti-tumor effector Tcells in draining lymph nodes. (Protocol 9506-108)
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Appendix D-108. Dr. Mitchell S. Steiner, University of Tennessee, Memphis, Tennessee, and Dr. Jeffrey
T. Holt, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, Tennessee, may conduct gene transfer
experiments on 15 male subjects (35 to 75 years of age) with metastatic prostate cancer. Malignant cells
obtained from advanced prostate cancer subjects have been demonstrated to express high levels of the
protooncogene c-myc in vivo. The mouse mammary tumor virus (MMTV) long terminal repeat (LTR) is
expressed at high levels in prostate tissue. Following removal of malignant cells via biopsy, subjects will
receive a single transrectal ultrasound-guided intraprostate quadrant injection of the retrovirus vector,
XM6:MMTV-antisense c-myc, for 4 consecutive days at the site of the original biopsy. The objectives of
this Phase I study are to: (1) quantitatively assess the uptake and expression of XM6:MMTV-antisense cmyc by prostate cancer cells in vivo, (2) determine whether c-myc gene expression is prostate tumorspecific, (3) assess safety of intraprostate injection of XM6:MMTV-antisense c-myc, and (4) biologic
efficacy (antisense inhibition of tumor growth). (Protocol #9509-123)
Appendix D-109. Drs. Ronald G. Crystal, Edward Hershowitz, and Michael Lieberman, New York
Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, New York, New York, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 18
subjects (18 to 70 years of age) with metastatic colon carcinoma with liver metastases. In this Phase I
dose-escalation study, subjects will receive computed tomography (CT)-guided intratumoral injections of
the adenovirus vector, AdGVCD.10, into the same hepatic metastasis in 4 equal volumes (100 microliters),
each with a separate entry into the liver. This dosage schedule will be performed on Days 1 and 7. 5fluorocytosine (200 milligrams/ kilogram/24 hours) will be administered orally in 4 equal doses starting on
day 2 and continuing through the time of laparotomy. The objectives of this study are to: (1) determine
the dose-dependent toxicity of direct administration of AdGVCD.10 to hepatic metastases combined with
oral administration of 5-fluorocytosine, (2) quantitatively assess transfer and expression of the cytosine
deaminase gene in target cells, and (3) determine the biologic effects of direct ADGVCD.10 administration
to hepatic metastases. (Protocol #9509-125)
Appendix D-110. Drs. Andres Berchuck and H. Kim Lyerly of Duke University Medical Center, Durham,
North Carolina, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 18 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with refractory
metastatic ovarian cancer. Autologous tumor cells obtained from ascites or surgically removed tumor will
be transduced with the cationic liposome vector, PMP6A-IL2, that contains an adeno-associated virus
derived plasmid DNA, a cytomegalovirus (CMV) promoter, and interleukin-2 (IL-2) complementary DNA
(cDNA). In this dose-escalation study, subjects will undergo 4 cycles of intradermal injections (thigh or
abdomen) of ex vivo transduced, lethally irradiated tumor cells in an attempt to induce an antitumor
response. The objectives of the study are to evaluate: (1) the safety of intradermally injected transduced
cells, and (2) antitumor response following therapy. (Protocol #9506-110)
Appendix D-111. Drs. Stephen L. Eck and Jane B. Alavi of the University of Pennsylvania Medical
Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 18 subjects (>18 years of
age) with malignant glioma. The adenovirus vector encoding the Herpes simplex virus thymidine kinase
(HSV-TK) gene, H5.020RSVTK, will be injected by a stereotactic guided technique into brain tumors.
Afterwards, the patients will receive systemic ganciclovir (GCV) treatment. Patients eligible to undergo a
palliative debulking procedure will receive the same treatment followed by resection on day 7, and a
second dose of the vector intra-operatively. Brain tissues removed by resection will be analyzed for
adenovirus infection, transgene expression, and signs of inflammation. The size and metabolic activity of
tumors will be monitored by scanning with magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission
tomography. The objective of the study is to evaluate the overall safety of this treatment and to gain
insight into the parameters that may limit the general applicability of this approach. (Protocol #9409-089)
Appendix D-112. Drs. Robert Grossman and Savio Woo of the Baylor College of Medicine & Methodist
Hospital, Houston, Texas, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 20 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with
refractive central nervous system malignancies. Subjects will receive stereotaxic injections of a
replication-defective, type 5 E1/E3-deleted adenovirus vector, ADV/RSV-tk, to deliver the Herpes simplex
virus thymidine kinase (HSV-TK) gene to tumor cells. Expression of the HSV-TK gene is driven by a
Rous sarcoma virus long terminal repeat (RSV-LTR). Subjects will receive a single time-course of
intravenous ganciclovir (GCV) (14 consecutive days) following vector administration. Following
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demonstration of safety with the initial starting dose of 1 x 108 particles in 5 subjects, additional cohorts
will receive between 5 x 108 and 1.5 x 109 particles. Each cohort will be monitored for toxicity for one
month before administration of the next higher dose to subsequent cohorts. Subjects will be monitored
for evidence of clinical efficacy by magnetic resonance imaging and/or computer tomography scans. The
primary objective of this Phase I study is to determine the safety of vector administration. (Protocol
#9412-098)
Appendix D-113. Drs. Gabriel N. Hortobagyi, Gabriel Lopez-Berestein, and Mien-Chie Hung, of the
University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, Texas, may conduct gene transfer
experiments on a maximum of 24 adult patients (12 for each cancer) with metastatic breast or ovarian
carcinoma. Overexpression of the HER-2/neu oncogene occurs in 30% of ovarian and breast cancers,
and it is associated with enhanced metastatic potential, drug resistance, and poor survival. The E1A
gene of the adenovirus type 5 functions as a tumor suppressor gene when transfected into cancer cells
which overexpress the HER-2/neu oncogene. E1A expression induces down regulation of the level of the
HER-2/neu oncoprotein by a transcriptional control mechanism. A plasmid, pE1A, encoding the
adenovirus E1A gene with its own promoter will be administered as a DNA/lipid complex via the
intraperitoneal or intrapleural route. The objectives of the study are: (1) to determine E1A gene
transduction into malignant cells after the administration of E1A/lipid complex by intrapleural or
intraperitoneal administration, (2) to determine whether E1A gene therapy can down-regulate HER-2/neu
expression after intrapleural or intraperitoneal administration, (3) to determine the maximum biologically
active dose (MBAD), or the maximum tolerated dose (MTD) of E1A/lipid complex, (4) to determine the
toxicity and tolerance of E1A/lipid complex administered into the pleural or peritoneal space, and to
assess the reversibility of such toxicity, and (5) to evaluate tumor response. (Protocol #9512-137)
Appendix D-114. Drs. Keith L. Black and Habib Fakhrai of the University of California, Los Angeles,
California, may conduct gene transfer experiments on 12 subjects (≥ 18 years of age) with glioblastoma
multiform. An Epstein-Barr virus (EBV) based plasmid vector, pCEP-4/TGF- β2 antisense, encoding
antisense RNA will be used to inhibit TGF- β2 production. Tumor samples obtained from the patients at
the time of clinically indicated surgery will be grown in culture to establish a cell line for each patient. The
patients' tumor cells will be genetically altered with the pCEP-4/TGF-β2 vector to inhibit their secretion of
TGF-β. Following completion of the traditional post surgical radiation therapy, the first cohort of patients
will receive, at 3 week intervals, 4 injections of 5 x 106 irradiated gene modified autologous tumor cells.
Subsequently, in dose escalation studies, the second cohort will receive 1 x 107 cells, and the third
cohort, 2 x 107 cells. The results of this Phase I trial will be used to assess the safety of this form of gene
therapy and may provide preliminary data to evaluate the potential utility of TGF- β2 antisense gene
therapy in the management of gliomas. (Protocol #9512-138)
Appendix D-115. Dr. Ronald G. Crystal of New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, New York, New
York, may conduct gene transfer experiments on a total of 21 (with an option for an additional 5) normal
males and female subjects, age ≥ 18 years. Replication-deficient adenovirus (Ad) vector previously has
been used in a number of human gene therapy strategies to transfer genes in vivo for therapeutic
purposes. The purpose of this protocol is to characterize the local (skin), systemic (blood), and distant
compartment (lung) immunity in normal individuals after intradermal administration of a replication
deficient Ad5-based vector, named AdGVCD.10, carrying the gene coding for the E. coli enzyme, cytosine
deaminase (CD). Following intradermal administration of the vector to normal individuals, the skin, blood,
and lung immune responses to the Ad vector and CD transgene will be evaluated over time. This vector
has been safety administered intrahepatically ten times to five individuals with colon carcinoma. No
adverse effects in Protocol #9509-125 have been observed. The present protocol will yield insights into
normal human immune responses to both the Ad vector, as well as to a heterologous (i.e., non-human)
gene product (CD). Note: This study is designed to answer basic biological questions regarding
characterization of the immune responses to such vectors that have been previously documented.
(Protocol #9701-171)
Appendix D-116. Dr. Daniel Rockey at Oregon State University and Dr. Walter Stamm at the University
of Washington may conduct experiments to deliberately transfer a gene encoding tetracycline resistance
from Chlamydia suis (a swine pathogen) into C. trachomatis (a human pathogen). This approval is
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specific to Drs. Rockey and Stamm and research with these resistant organisms may only occur under
the conditions as specified by the NIH Director (72 FR 61661). This approval was effective as of
September 24, 2007.
Appendix D-117. Dr. David Walker at the University of Texas Medical Branch may conduct experiments
to deliberately introduce a gene encoding chloramphenicol resistance into Rickettsia conorii. This
approval is specific to Dr. Walker and research with these resistant organisms may only occur under the
conditions as specified by the NIH Director (73 FR 32719). This approval was effective as of April 7,
2008.
Appendix D-118. Dr. Harlan Caldwell at the Rocky Mountain Laboratories may conduct experiments to
deliberately introduce a gene encoding tetracycline resistance into Chlamydia trachomatis serovar L2.
This approval is specific to Dr. Caldwell and research with this resistant organism may only occur under
the conditions as specified by the NIH Director (76 FR 27653). This approval was effective as of April 26,
2010.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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CERTIFIED HOST-VECTOR SYSTEMS (See Appendix I, Biological Containment)

While many experiments using Escherichia coli K-12, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, and Bacillus subtilis are
currently exempt from the NIH Guidelines under Section III-F, Exempt Experiments, some derivatives of
these host-vector systems were previously classified as Host-Vector 1 Systems or Host-Vector 2
Systems. A listing of those systems follows:
Appendix E-I.

Bacillus subtilis

Appendix E-I-A. Bacillus subtilis Host-Vector 1 Systems
The following plasmids are accepted as the vector components of certified B. subtilis systems: pUB110,
pC194, pS194, pSA2100, pE194, pT127, pUB112, pC221, pC223, and pAB124. B. subtilis strains RUB
331 and BGSC 1S53 have been certified as the host component of Host-Vector 1 systems based on
these plasmids.
Appendix E-I-B. Bacillus subtilis Host-Vector 2 Systems
The asporogenic mutant derivative of Bacillus subtilis, ASB 298, with the following plasmids as the vector
component: pUB110, pC194, pS194, pSA2100, pE194, pT127, pUB112, pC221, pC223, and pAB124.
Appendix E-II. Saccharomyces cerevisiae
Appendix E-II-A.

Saccharomyces cerevisiae Host-Vector 2 Systems

The following sterile strains of Saccharomyces cerevisiae, all of which have the ste-VC9 mutation, SHY1,
SHY2, SHY3, and SHY4. The following plasmids are certified for use: YIp1, YEp2, YEp4, YIp5, YEp6,
YRp7, YEp20, YEp21, YEp24, YIp25, YIp26, YIp27, YIp28, YIp29, YIp30, YIp31, YIp32, and YIp33.
Appendix E-III. Escherichia coli
Appendix E-III-A.

Escherichia coli (EK2) Plasmid Systems

The Escherichia coli K-12 strain chi-1776. The following plasmids are certified for use: pSC101, pMB9,
pBR313, pBR322, pDH24, pBR325, pBR327, pGL101, and pHB1. The following Escherichia coli/S.
cerevisiae hybrid plasmids are certified as EK2 vectors when used in Escherichia coli chi-1776 or in the
sterile yeast strains, SHY1, SHY2, SHY3, and SHY4: YIpI, YEp2, YEp4, YIp5, YEp6, YRp7, YEp20,
YEp21, YEP24, YIp25, YIp26, YIp27, YIp28, YIp29, YIp30, YIp31, YIp32, and YIp33.
Appendix E-III-B.

Escherichia coli (EK2) Bacteriophage Systems

The following are certified EK2 systems based on bacteriophage lambda:
Vector
λgt WESλB'
λgt WESλB*
λgt ZJ virλB'
λgtALO·λB
Charon 3A
Charon 4A
Charon 16A
Charon 21A
Charon 23A
Charon 24A

Host
DP50supF
DP50supF
Escherichia coli K-12
DP50supF
DP50 or DP50supF
DP50 or DP50supF
DP50 or DP50supF
DP50supF
DP50 or DP50supF
DP50 or DP50supF
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Escherichia coli K-12 strains chi-2447 and chi-2281 are certified for use with lambda vectors that are
certified for use with strain DP50 or DP50supF provided that the su-strain not be used as a propagation
host.
Appendix E-IV. Neurospora crassa
Appendix E-IV-A.

Neurospora crassa Host-Vector 1 Systems

The following specified strains of Neurospora crassa which have been modified to prevent aerial
dispersion:
In1 (inositol-less) strains 37102, 37401, 46316, 64001, and 89601. Csp-1 strain UCLA37 and csp-2
strains FS 590, UCLA101 (these are conidial separation mutants).
Eas strain UCLA191 (an "easily wettable" mutant).
Appendix E-V. Streptomyces
Appendix E-V-A.

Streptomyces Host-Vector 1 Systems

The following Streptomyces species: Streptomyces coelicolor, S. lividans, S. parvulus, and S. griseus.
The following are accepted as vector components of certified Streptomyces Host-Vector 1 systems:
Streptomyces plasmids SCP2, SLP1.2, pIJ101, actinophage phi C31, and their derivatives.
Appendix E-VI. Pseudomonas putida
Appendix E-VI-A.

Pseudomonas putida Host-Vector 1 Systems

Pseudomonas putida strains KT2440 with plasmid vectors pKT262, pKT263, and pKT264.
**********************************************************************************************************************

Page 79 - NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules

(April 2019)

APPENDIX F. CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS FOR CLONING OF GENES CODING FOR THE
BIOSYNTHESIS OF MOLECULES TOXIC FOR VERTEBRATES
Appendix F-I.

General Information

Appendix F specifies the containment to be used for the deliberate cloning of genes coding for the
biosynthesis of molecules toxic for vertebrates. The cloning of genes coding for molecules toxic for
vertebrates that have an LD50 of < 100 nanograms per kilograms body weight (e.g., microbial toxins such
as the botulinum toxins, tetanus toxin, diphtheria toxin, Shigella dysenteriae neurotoxin) are covered
under Section III-B-1 (Experiments Involving the Cloning of Toxin Molecules with LD50 of Less than 100
Nanograms Per Kilogram Body Weight) and require Institutional Biosafety Committee and NIH OSP
approval before initiation. No specific restrictions shall apply to the cloning of genes if the protein
specified by the gene has an LD50 ≥ 100 micrograms per kilograms of body weight. Experiments
involving genes coding for toxin molecules with an LD50 of < 100 micrograms per kilograms and > 100
nanograms per kilograms body weight require Institutional Biosafety Committee approval and registration
with NIH OSP prior to initiating the experiments. A list of toxin molecules classified as to LD50 is available
from NIH OSP. Testing procedures for determining toxicity of toxin molecules not on the list are available
from the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by submitting a request for this
information to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on
the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). The results of such tests shall be forwarded to NIH OSP, which
will consult with ad hoc experts, prior to inclusion of the molecules on the list (see Section IV-C-1-b-(2)(c), Minor Actions).
Appendix F-II.

Cloning of Toxin Molecule Genes in Escherichia coli K-12

Appendix F-II-A. Cloning of genes coding for molecules toxic for vertebrates that have an LD50 of >100
nanograms per kilograms and <1000 nanograms per kilograms body weight (e.g., abrin, Clostridium
perfringens epsilon toxin) may proceed under Biosafety Level (BL) 2 + EK2 or BL3 + EK1 containment
conditions.
Appendix F-II-B. Cloning of genes for the biosynthesis of molecules toxic for vertebrates that have an
LD50 of >1 microgram per kilogram and <100 microgram per kilogram body weight may proceed under
BL1 + EK1 containment conditions (e.g., Staphylococcus aureus alpha toxin, Staphylococcus aureus beta
toxin, ricin, Pseudomonas aeruginosa exotoxin A, Bordetella pertussis toxin, the lethal factor of Bacillus
anthracis, the Pasteurella pestis murine toxins, the oxygen-labile hemolysins such as streptolysin O, and
certain neurotoxins present in snake venoms and other venoms).
Appendix F-II-C. Some enterotoxins are substantially more toxic when administered enterally than
parenterally. The following enterotoxins shall be subject to BL1 + EK1 containment conditions: cholera
toxin, the heat labile toxins of Escherichia coli, Klebsiella, and other related proteins that may be identified
by neutralization with an antiserum monospecific for cholera toxin, and the heat stable toxins of
Escherichia coli and of Yersinia enterocolitica.
Appendix F-III. Cloning of Toxic Molecule Genes in Organisms Other Than Escherichia coli K-12
Requests involving the cloning of genes coding for toxin molecules for vertebrates at an LD50 of <100
nanograms per kilogram body weight in host-vector systems other than Escherichia coli K-12 will be
evaluated by NIH OSP in consultation with ad hoc toxin experts (see Sections III-B-1, Experiments
Involving the Cloning of Toxin Molecules with LD50 of Less than 100 Nanograms Per Kilogram Body
Weight, and IV-C-1-b-(2)-(c), Minor Actions).
Appendix F-IV. Specific Approvals
An updated list of experiments involving the deliberate formation of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules containing genes coding for toxins lethal for vertebrates at an LD50 of <100 nanograms per
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kilogram body weight is available from the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health,
preferably by submitting a request for this information to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact
information is also available here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov).
***********************************************************************************************************************
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PHYSICAL CONTAINMENT

Appendix G specifies physical containment for standard laboratory experiments and defines Biosafety
Level 1 through Biosafety Level 4. For large-scale (over 10 liters) research or production, Appendix K
(Physical Containment for Large Scale Uses of Organisms Containing Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic
Acid Molecules) supersedes Appendix G. Appendix K defines Good Large Scale Practice through
Biosafety Level 3 - Large Scale. For certain work with plants, Appendix L (Physical and Biological
Containment for Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecule Research Involving Plants) supersedes
Appendix G. Appendix L defines Biosafety Levels 1 through 4 - Plants. For certain work with animals,
Appendix M (Physical and Biological Containment for Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecule
Research Involving Animals) supersedes Appendix G. Appendix M defines Biosafety Levels 1 through 4 Animals.
Appendix G-I.

Standard Practices and Training

The first principle of containment is strict adherence to good microbiological practices (see Appendices GIII-A through G-III-J, Footnotes and References of Appendix G). Consequently, all personnel directly or
indirectly involved in experiments using recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall receive
adequate instruction (see Sections IV-B-1-h, Responsibilities of the Institution--General Information, and
IV-B-7-d, Responsibilities of the Principal Investigator Prior to Initiating Research). At a minimum, these
instructions include training in aseptic techniques and in the biology of the organisms used in the
experiments so that the potential biohazards can be understood and appreciated.
Any research group working with agents that are known or potential biohazards shall have an emergency
plan that describes the procedures to be followed if an accident contaminates personnel or the
environment. The Principal Investigator shall ensure that everyone in the laboratory is familiar with both
the potential hazards of the work and the emergency plan (see Sections IV-B-7-d, Responsibilities of the
Principal Investigator Prior to Initiating Research and IV-B-7-e, Responsibilities of the Principal
Investigator During the Conduct of the Research). If a research group is working with a known pathogen
for which there is an effective vaccine, the vaccine should be made available to all workers. Serological
monitoring, when clearly appropriate, will be provided (see Section IV-B-1-f, Responsibilities of the
Institution--General Information).
The Laboratory Safety Monograph (see Appendix G-III-O, Footnotes and References of Appendix G) and
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (see Appendix G-III-A, Footnotes and
References of Appendix G) describe practices, equipment, and facilities in detail.
Appendix G-II. Physical Containment Levels
The objective of physical containment is to confine organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules and to reduce the potential for exposure of the laboratory worker, persons outside of the
laboratory, and the environment to organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules.
Physical containment is achieved through the use of laboratory practices, containment equipment, and
special laboratory design. Emphasis is placed on primary means of physical containment which are
provided by laboratory practices and containment equipment. Special laboratory design provides a
secondary means of protection against the accidental release of organisms outside the laboratory or to
the environment. Special laboratory design is used primarily in facilities in which experiments of
moderate to high potential hazard are performed.
Combinations of laboratory practices, containment equipment, and special laboratory design can be
made to achieve different levels of physical containment. Four levels of physical containment, which are
designated as BL1, BL2, BL3, and BL4 are described. It should be emphasized that the descriptions and
assignments of physical containment detailed below are based on existing approaches to containment of
pathogenic organisms (see Appendix G-III-A, Footnotes and References of Appendix G). The National
Cancer Institute describes three levels for research on oncogenic viruses which roughly correspond to our
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BL2, BL3, and BL4 levels (see Appendix G-III-C, Footnotes and References of Appendix G).
It is recognized that several different combinations of laboratory practices, containment equipment, and
special laboratory design may be appropriate for containment of specific research activities. The NIH
Guidelines, therefore, allow alternative selections of primary containment equipment within facilities that
have been designed to provide BL3 and BL4 levels of physical containment. The selection of alternative
methods of primary containment is dependent, however, on the level of biological containment provided
by the host-vector system used in the experiment. Consideration will be given to other combinations
which achieve an equivalent level of containment (see Sections IV-C-1-b-(1), Major Actions and IV-C-1-b(2), Minor Actions).
Appendix G-II-A.
Appendix G)

Biosafety Level 1 (BL1) (See Appendix G-III-M, Footnotes and References of

Appendix G-II-A-1.

Standard Microbiological Practices (BL1)

Appendix G-II-A-1-a. Access to the laboratory is limited or restricted at the discretion of the Principal
Investigator when experiments are in progress.
Appendix G-II-A-1-b. Work surfaces are decontaminated once a day and after any spill of viable
material.
Appendix G-II-A-1-c. All contaminated liquid or solid wastes are decontaminated before disposal.
Appendix G-II-A-1-d. Mechanical pipetting devices are used; mouth pipetting is prohibited.
Appendix G-II-A-1-e. Eating, drinking, smoking, and applying cosmetics are not permitted in the work
area. Food may be stored in cabinets or refrigerators designated and used for this purpose only.
Appendix G-II-A-1-f. Persons wash their hands: (i) after they handle materials involving organisms
containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules and animals, and (ii) before exiting the
laboratory.
Appendix G-II-A-1-g. All procedures are performed carefully to minimize the creation of aerosols.
Appendix G-II-A-1-h. In the interest of good personal hygiene, facilities (e.g., hand washing sink,
shower, changing room) and protective clothing (e.g., uniforms, laboratory coats) shall be provided that
are appropriate for the risk of exposure to viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules.
Appendix G-II-A-2.

Special Practices (BL1)

Appendix G-II-A-2-a. Contaminated materials that are to be decontaminated at a site away from the
laboratory are placed in a durable leak-proof container which is closed before being removed from the
laboratory.
Appendix G-II-A-2-b. An insect and rodent control program is in effect.
Appendix G-II-A-3.

Containment Equipment (BL1)

Appendix G-II-A-3-a. Special containment equipment is generally not required for manipulations of
agents assigned to BL1.
Appendix G-II-A-4.

Laboratory Facilities (BL1)

Appendix G-II-A-4-a. The laboratory is designed so that it can be easily cleaned.
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Appendix G-II-A-4-b. Bench tops are impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic
solvents, and moderate heat.
Appendix G-II-A-4-c. Laboratory furniture is sturdy. Spaces between benches, cabinets, and equipment
are accessible for cleaning.
Appendix G-II-A-4-d. Each laboratory contains a sink for hand washing.
Appendix G-II-A-4-e. If the laboratory has windows that open, they are fitted with fly screens.
Appendix G-II-B.
Appendix G)

Biosafety Level 2 (BL2) (See Appendix G-III-N, Footnotes and References of

Appendix G-II-B-1.

Standard Microbiological Practices (BL2)

Appendix G-II-B-1-a. Access to the laboratory is limited or restricted by the Principal Investigator when
work with organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules is in progress.
Appendix G-II-B-1-b. Work surfaces are decontaminated at least once a day and after any spill of viable
material.
Appendix G-II-B-1-c. All contaminated liquid or solid wastes are decontaminated before disposal.
Appendix G-II-B-1-d. Mechanical pipetting devices are used; mouth pipetting is prohibited.
Appendix G-II-B-1-e. Eating, drinking, smoking, and applying cosmetics are not permitted in the work
area. Food may be stored in cabinets or refrigerators designated and used for this purpose only.
Appendix G-II-B-1-f. Persons wash their hands: (i) after handling materials involving organisms
containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules and animals, and (ii) when exiting the
laboratory.
Appendix G-II-B-1-g. All procedures are performed carefully to minimize the creation of aerosols.
Appendix G-II-B-1-h. Experiments of lesser biohazard potential can be conducted concurrently in
carefully demarcated areas of the same laboratory.
Appendix G-II-B-2.

Special Practices (BL2)

Appendix G-II-B-2-a. Contaminated materials that are to be decontaminated at a site away from the
laboratory are placed in a durable leak-proof container which is closed before being removed from the
laboratory.
Appendix G-II-B-2-b. The Principal Investigator limits access to the laboratory. The Principal
Investigator has the final responsibility for assessing each circumstance and determining who may enter
or work in the laboratory.
Appendix G-II-B-2-c. The Principal Investigator establishes policies and procedures whereby only
persons who have been advised of the potential hazard and meet any specific entry requirements (e.g.,
immunization) may enter the laboratory or animal rooms.
Appendix G-II-B-2-d. When the organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules in
use in the laboratory require special provisions for entry (e.g., vaccination), a hazard warning sign
incorporating the universal biosafety symbol is posted on the access door to the laboratory work area.
The hazard warning sign identifies the agent, lists the name and telephone number of the Principal
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Investigator or other responsible person(s), and indicates the special requirement(s) for entering the
laboratory.
Appendix G-II-B-2-e. An insect and rodent control program is in effect.
Appendix G-II-B-2-f. Laboratory coats, gowns, smocks, or uniforms are worn while in the laboratory.
Before exiting the laboratory for non-laboratory areas (e.g., cafeteria, library, administrative offices), this
protective clothing is removed and left in the laboratory or covered with a clean coat not used in the
laboratory.
Appendix G-II-B-2-g. Animals not involved in the work being performed are not permitted in the
laboratory.
Appendix G-II-B-2-h. Special care is taken to avoid skin contamination with organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules; gloves should be worn when handling experimental
animals and when skin contact with the agent is unavoidable.
Appendix G-II-B-2-i. All wastes from laboratories and animal rooms are appropriately decontaminated
before disposal.
Appendix G-II-B-2-j. Hypodermic needles and syringes are used only for parenteral injection and
aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm bottles. Only needle-locking syringes or
disposable syringe-needle units (i.e., needle is integral to the syringe) are used for the injection or
aspiration of fluids containing organisms that contain recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules.
Extreme caution should be used when handling needles and syringes to avoid autoinoculation and the
generation of aerosols during use and disposal. Needles should not be bent, sheared, replaced in the
needle sheath or guard, or removed from the syringe following use. The needle and syringe should be
promptly placed in a puncture-resistant container and decontaminated, preferably autoclaved, before
discard or reuse.
Appendix G-II-B-2-k. Spills and accidents which result in overt exposures to organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules are immediately reported to the Institutional Biosafety
Committee and NIH OSP. Reports to NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy, National
Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is
also available here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). Medical evaluation, surveillance, and
treatment are provided as appropriate and written records are maintained.
Appendix G-II-B-2-l. When appropriate, considering the agent(s) handled, baseline serum samples for
laboratory and other at-risk personnel are collected and stored. Additional serum specimens may be
collected periodically depending on the agents handled or the function of the facility.
Appendix G-II-B-2-m. A biosafety manual is prepared or adopted. Personnel are advised of special
hazards and are required to read and follow instructions on practices and procedures.
Appendix G-II-B-3.

Containment Equipment (BL2)

Appendix G-II-B-3-a. Biological safety cabinets (Class I or II) (see Appendix G-III-L, Footnotes and
References of Appendix G) or other appropriate personal protective or physical containment devices are
used whenever:
Appendix G-II-B-3-a-(1). Procedures with a high potential for creating aerosols are conducted (see
Appendix G-III-O, Footnotes and References of Appendix G). These may include centrifuging, grinding,
blending, vigorous shaking or mixing, sonic disruption, opening containers of materials whose internal
pressures may be different from ambient pressures, intranasal inoculation of animals, and harvesting
infected tissues from animals or eggs.
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Appendix G-II-B-3-a-(2). High concentrations or large volumes of organisms containing recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecules are used. Such materials may be centrifuged in the open laboratory if
sealed beads or centrifuge safety cups are used and if they are opened only in a biological safety cabinet.
Appendix G-II-B-4.

Laboratory Facilities (BL2)

Appendix G-II-B-4-a. The laboratory is designed so that it can be easily cleaned.
Appendix G-II-B-4-b. Bench tops are impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic
solvents, and moderate heat.
Appendix G-II-B-4-c. Laboratory furniture is sturdy and spaces between benches, cabinets, and
equipment are accessible for cleaning.
Appendix G-II-B-4-d. Each laboratory contains a sink for hand washing.
Appendix G-II-B-4-e. If the laboratory has windows that open, they are fitted with fly screens.
Appendix G-II-B-4-f. An autoclave for decontaminating laboratory wastes is available.
Appendix G-II-C.
Appendix G)

Biosafety Level 3 (BL3) (See Appendix G-III-P, Footnotes and References of

Appendix G-II-C-1.

Standard Microbiological Practices (BL3)

Appendix G-II-C-1-a. Work surfaces are decontaminated at least once a day and after any spill of viable
material.
Appendix G-II-C-1-b. All contaminated liquid or solid wastes are decontaminated before disposal.
Appendix G-II-C-1-c. Mechanical pipetting devices are used; mouth pipetting is prohibited.
Appendix G-II-C-1-d. Eating, drinking, smoking, storing food, and applying cosmetics are not permitted
in the work area.
Appendix G-II-C-1-e. Persons wash their hands: (i) after handling materials involving organisms
containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules, and handling animals, and (ii) when exiting
the laboratory.
Appendix G-II-C-1-f. All procedures are performed carefully to minimize the creation of aerosols.
Appendix G-II-C-1-g. Persons under 16 years of age shall not enter the laboratory.
Appendix G-II-C-1-h. If experiments involving other organisms which require lower levels of containment
are to be conducted in the same laboratory concurrently with experiments requiring BL3 level physical
containment, they shall be conducted in accordance with all BL3 level laboratory practices.
Appendix G-II-C-2.

Special Practices (BL3)

Appendix G-II-C-2-a. Laboratory doors are kept closed when experiments are in progress.
Appendix G-II-C-2-b. Contaminated materials that are to be decontaminated at a site away from the
laboratory are placed in a durable leak-proof container which is closed before being removed from the
laboratory.
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Appendix G-II-C-2-c. The Principal Investigator controls access to the laboratory and restricts access to
persons whose presence is required for program or support purposes. The Principal Investigator has the
final responsibility for assessing each circumstance and determining who may enter or work in the
laboratory.
Appendix G-II-C-2-d. The Principal Investigator establishes policies and procedures whereby only
persons who have been advised of the potential biohazard, who meet any specific entry requirements
(e.g., immunization), and who comply with all entry and exit procedures entering the laboratory or animal
rooms.
Appendix G-II-C-2-e. When organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules or
experimental animals are present in the laboratory or containment module, a hazard warning sign
incorporating the universal biosafety symbol is posted on all laboratory and animal room access doors.
The hazard warning sign identifies the agent, lists the name and telephone number of the Principal
Investigator or other responsible person(s), and indicates any special requirements for entering the
laboratory such as the need for immunizations, respirators, or other personal protective measures.
Appendix G-II-C-2-f. All activities involving organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules are conducted in biological safety cabinets or other physical containment devices within the
containment module. No work in open vessels is conducted on the open bench.
Appendix G-II-C-2-g. The work surfaces of biological safety cabinets and other containment equipment
are decontaminated when work with organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules is finished. Plastic-backed paper toweling used on non-perforated work surfaces within
biological safety cabinets facilitates clean-up.
Appendix G-II-C-2-h. An insect and rodent program is in effect.
Appendix G-II-C-2-i. Laboratory clothing that protects street clothing (e.g., solid front or wrap-around
gowns, scrub suits, coveralls) is worn in the laboratory. Laboratory clothing is not worn outside the
laboratory, and it is decontaminated prior to laundering or disposal.
Appendix G-II-C-2-j. Special care is taken to avoid skin contamination with contaminated materials;
gloves should be worn when handling infected animals and when skin contact with infectious materials is
unavoidable.
Appendix G-II-C-2-k. Molded surgical masks or respirators are worn in rooms containing experimental
animals.
Appendix G-II-C-2-l. Animals and plants not related to the work being conducted are not permitted in the
laboratory.
Appendix G-II-C-2-m. Laboratory animals held in a BL3 area shall be housed in partial-containment
caging systems, such as Horsfall units (see Appendix G-III-K, Footnotes and References of Appendix G),
open cages placed in ventilated enclosures, solid-wall and -bottom cages covered by filter bonnets or
solid-wall and -bottom cages placed on holding racks equipped with ultraviolet in radiation lamps and
reflectors.
Note: Conventional caging systems may be used provided that all personnel wear appropriate personal
protective devices. These protective devices shall include at a minimum wrap-around gowns, head
covers, gloves, shoe covers, and respirators. All personnel shall shower on exit from areas where these
devices are required.
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Appendix G-II-C-2-n. All wastes from laboratories and animal rooms are appropriately decontaminated
before disposal. For research involving mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus, liquid effluents
should be chemically disinfected or heat-treated, or collected and processed in a central effluent
decontamination system. Decontamination of shower and toilet effluents is not required, provided
appropriate practices and procedures are in place for primary containment of mammaliantransmissible HPAI H5N1 virus. Animal tissues, carcasses, and bedding originating from the animal
room must be decontaminated by an effective and validated method (e.g., use of an autoclave)
preferably before leaving the containment barrier. If waste must be transported, special practices
should be developed for transport of infectious materials to designated alternate location(s) within the
facility.
Appendix G-II-C-2-o. Vacuum lines are protected with high efficiency particulate air/HEPA filters and
liquid disinfectant traps.
Appendix G-II-C-2-p. Hypodermic needles and syringes are used only for parenteral injection and
aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm bottles. Only needle locking syringes or
disposable syringe-needle units (i.e., needle is integral to the syringe) are used for the injection or
aspiration of fluids containing organisms that contain recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules.
Extreme caution should be used when handling needles and syringes to avoid autoinoculation and the
generation of aerosols during use and disposal. Needles should not be bent, sheared, replaced in the
needle sheath or guard, or removed from the syringe following use. The needle and syringe should be
promptly placed in a puncture-resistant container and decontaminated, preferably by autoclaving, before
discard or reuse.
Appendix G-II-C-2-q. Spills and accidents which result in overt or potential exposures to organisms
containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules are immediately reported to the Biological
Safety Officer, Institutional Biosafety Committee, and NIH OSP. Reports to NIH OSP shall be sent to the
Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to:
NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP website
(www.osp.od.nih.gov). Appropriate medical evaluation, surveillance, and treatment are provided and
written records are maintained.
Appendix G-II-C-2-r. Baseline serum samples for all laboratory and other at-risk personnel should be
collected and stored in accordance with institutional policy and at least for the time period in which the
personnel continues to work with the agent at biosafety level 3 containment. Such samples must be
collected and stored for laboratory and other at-risk personnel who will work with mammaliantransmissible HPAI H5N1 virus. Additional serum specimens may be collected periodically depending on
the agents handled or the function of the laboratory.
Appendix G-II-C-2-s. A biosafety manual is prepared or adopted. Personnel are advised of special
hazards and are required to read and follow the instructions on practices and procedures.
Appendix G-II-C-2-t.

Alternative Selection of Containment Equipment (BL3)

Experimental procedures involving a host-vector system that provides a one-step higher level of biological
containment than that specified may be conducted in the BL3 laboratory using containment equipment
specified for the BL2 level of physical containment. Experimental procedures involving a host-vector
system that provides a one-step lower level of biological containment than that specified may be
conducted in the BL3 laboratory using containment equipment specified for the BL4 level of physical
containment. Alternative combination of containment safeguards are shown in Appendix G-Table 1,
Possible Alternate Combinations of Physical and Biological Containment Safeguards.
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Containment Equipment (BL3)

Appendix G-II-C-3-a. Biological safety cabinets (Class I, II, or III) (see Appendix G-III-L, Footnotes and
References of Appendix G) or other appropriate combinations of personal protective or physical
containment devices (e.g., special protective clothing, masks, gloves, respirators, centrifuge safety cups,
sealed centrifuge rotors, and containment caging for animals) are used for all activities with organisms
containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules which pose a threat of aerosol exposure.
These include: manipulation of cultures and of those clinical or environmental materials which may be a
source of aerosols; the aerosol challenge of experimental animals; the harvesting of infected tissues or
fluids from experimental animals and embryonate eggs; and the necropsy of experimental animals.
Appendix G-II-C-4.

Laboratory Facilities (BL3)

Appendix G-II-C-4-a. The laboratory is separated from areas which are open to unrestricted traffic flow
within the building. Passage through two sets of doors is the basic requirement for entry into the
laboratory from access corridors or other contiguous areas. Physical separation of the high containment
laboratory from access corridors or other laboratories or activities may be provided by a double-door
clothes change room (showers may be included), airlock, or other access facility which requires passage
through two sets of doors before entering the laboratory.
Appendix G-II-C-4-b. The interior surfaces of walls, floors, and ceilings are water resistant so that they
can be easily cleaned. Penetrations in these surfaces are sealed or capable of being sealed to facilitate
decontaminating the area.
Appendix G-II-C-4-c. Bench tops are impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic
solvents, and moderate heat.
Appendix G-II-C-4-d. Laboratory furniture is sturdy and spaces between benches, cabinets, and
equipment are accessible for cleaning.
Appendix G-II-C-4-e. Each laboratory contains a sink for hand washing. The sink is foot, elbow, or
automatically operated and is located near the laboratory exit door.
Appendix G-II-C-4-f. Windows in the laboratory are closed and sealed.
Appendix G-II-C-4-g. Access doors to the laboratory or containment module are self-closing.
Appendix G-II-C-4-h. An autoclave for decontaminating laboratory wastes is available preferably within
the laboratory.
Appendix G-II-C-4-i. A ducted exhaust air ventilation system is provided. This system creates
directional airflow that draws air into the laboratory from uncontaminated spaces surrounding the
laboratory. The exhaust air is not recirculated to any other area of the building, is discharged to the
outside, and is dispersed away from the occupied areas and air intakes. Personnel shall verify that the
direction of the airflow (into the laboratory) is proper. The exhaust air from the laboratory room may be
discharged to the outside without being filtered or otherwise treated unless research is being conducted
with mammaliantransmissible HPAI H5N1 virus. For research with mammalian-transmissible HPAI
H5N1 virus, exhaust air must be HEPA filtered and there must be sealed ductwork from the
containment barrier to the filter. In addition, the air handling system shall be designed such that
under failure conditions, the airflow will not be reversed and periodic verification, with annual
verification of the HEPA filters, shall be performed. Finally, backup power shall be available for critical
controls and instrumentation necessary to maintain containment.
Appendix G-II-C-4-j. The high efficiency particulate air/HEPA filtered exhaust air from Class I or Class II
biological safety cabinets is discharged directly to the outside or through the building exhaust system.
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Exhaust air from Class I or II biological safety cabinets may be recirculated within the laboratory if the
cabinet is tested and certified at least every twelve months. If the HEPA-filtered exhaust air from Class I
or II biological safety cabinets is to be discharged to the outside through the building exhaust air system,
it is connected to this system in a manner (e.g., thimble unit connection (see Appendix G-III-L, Footnotes
and References of Appendix G)) that avoids any interference with the air balance of the cabinets or
building exhaust system.
Appendix G-II-C-5.
Biosafety Level 3 Enhanced for Research Involving Risk Group 3 Influenza
Viruses. (See Appendices G-II-C-2-n, G-II-C-2-r, and G-II-C-4-i for additional guidance for facilities,
waste handling, and serum collection for research involving mammaliantransmissible HPAI H5N1
virus.
Appendix G-II-C-5-a. Containment, Practices, and Training for Research with Risk Group 3
Influenza Viruses (BL3 Enhanced).
Appendix G-II-C-5-a-(1). In addition to standard BL3 practices, the following additional personal
protective equipment and practices shall be used: (1) Powered Air-purifying Respirators (PAPR) are
worn. (2) Street clothes are changed to protective suit (e.g., wrap-back disposable gown, olefin protective
suit). (3) Double gloves (disposable) are worn. For research with mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1
viruses, protective sleeves shall be worn over the gown while working in a biosafety cabinet. (4)
Appropriate shoe coverings are worn (e.g., double disposable shoe coverings, single disposable shoe
coverings if worn with footwear dedicated to BL3 enhanced laboratory use, or impervious boots or shoes
of rubber or other suitable material that can be decontaminated). (5) Showers prior to exiting the
laboratory should be considered depending on risk assessment of research activities, with the exception
that showers prior to exiting the laboratory are required for all research with mammalian-transmissible
HPAI H5N1 virus, including care of animals infected with mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus.
(6) For research with mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus, prior to leaving containment,
personal protective equipment shall be sprayed or wiped down with a disinfectant that has activity
against influenza viruses. (7) In order to promote adherence to proper practices, including proper
removal of personal protective equipment, and reporting of any loss of containment or exposures, at
least two individuals should be in the laboratory at all times when research with mammaliantransmissible HPAI H5N1 virus involves experimental procedures with animals or sharps, or when
procedures are being conducted whereby the generation of aerosols is reasonably anticipated.
Removal of personal protective equipment should be observed.
Appendix G-II-C-5-a-(2). As proper training of laboratory workers is an essential component of biosafety,
retraining and periodic reassessments (at least annually) in BL3 enhanced practices, especially the
proper use of respiratory equipment, such as PAPRs, and clothing changes are required. For research
with mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus, laboratory workers shall be required to sign a
document acknowledging their understanding of and intent to adhere to biosafety, biosecurity, and
occupational health requirements. This document shall include a statement that the laboratory worker
agrees to report any exposures or accidents, including those by other individuals in the lab.
Appendix G-II-C-5-a-(3). Reporting of all spills and accidents, even if relatively minor, is required as
described in Appendix G-II-C-2-q.
Appendix G-II-C-5-a-(4). To avoid inadvertent cross contamination of 1918 H1N1, HPAI H5N1 or human
H2N2 (1957-1968): (1) Containment facilities and practices appropriate for highest Risk Group virus shall
be used at all times with lower Risk Group viruses, when studied in the same laboratory room. (2) Tissue
cultures with these viruses shall be conducted at separate times (temporal spacing) in the same room.
(3) Separate reagents shall be used to minimize risk of cross contamination. (4) A laboratory worker shall
not perform concurrent influenza virus experiments that carry the risk of unintended reassortment among
1918 H1N1, human H2N2 (1957-1968), HPAI H5N1 and other human influenza viruses. (5) Two or more
laboratory workers shall not perform within the same work area simultaneous influenza virus experiments
that carry the risk of unintended segment reassortment between 1918 H1N1, or HPAI H5N1, or human
H2N2 (1957-1968) and other human influenza viruses. (6) Between experiments good biosafety
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decontamination practices (e.g., surface and biosafety cabinet surface decontamination according to
standard BL3 procedures) shall be used and there shall be a thirty minute wait period after
decontamination before equipment is used for experiments with any other influenza A viruses. (7)
Between experiments, in addition to decontamination of the work area, clothing changes and PAPR
disinfection shall be performed prior to handling a different influenza virus in the same work area.
(Shower-out capability may be required by USDA/APHIS for certain experiments with HPAI H5N1.)
Appendix G-II-C-5-a-(5). Continued susceptibility of the reassortant influenza viruses containing genes
and/or segments from 1918 H1N1, HPAI H5N1, and human H2N2 (1957-1968) to antiviral agents shall be
established by sequence analysis or suitable biological assays. After manipulation of genes that
influence sensitivity to antiviral agents, susceptibility to these agents shall be reconfirmed. If susceptibility
to neuraminidase inhibitors or other effective antiviral agents is lost as a result of genetic modification
or serial passage of a mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus, then any research with this antiviral
agent resistant virus shall be stopped and research shall only proceed after review by the NIH (as
outlined in Section III-A-l-a) or the appropriate federal regulatory agency.
Appendix G-II-C-5-b. Containment for Animal Research.
Guidance provided in Appendix G-II-C and Appendix M-II-C is applicable with the following emphasis on
standard BL3 or BL3-N containment or additional enhancements.
Appendix G-II-C-5-b-(1). Research with small animals shall be conducted in a class II biosafety cabinet.
Small animals such as rodents (e.g. mice, hamsters, rats, guinea pigs) can be housed within a negative
pressure BL3 animal suite using high-density individually vented caging (IVC) systems that independently
supply high efficiency particulate air/HEPA-filtered and directional air circulation. Other animals (e.g.
rabbits, ferrets) that are of a size or have growth or caging requirements that preclude the use of highdensity IVC systems are to be housed in negative pressure bioisolators.
Appendix G-II-C-5-b-(2). Large animals such as non-human primates shall be housed in primary barrier
environments according to BL3-N containment requirements (see Appendix M-II-C).
Appendix G-II-C-5-b-(3). Specialized training and proven competency in all assigned practices and
procedures shall be required for laboratory staff, including staff involved in animal care.
Appendix G-II-C-5-b-(4). For HPAI H5N1 research, the NIH Guidelines defer to USDA/APHIS
recommendations for biocontainment practices for loose housed animals.
Appendix G-II-C-5-c. Occupational Health
A detailed occupational health plan shall be developed in advance of working with these agents in
consultation, as needed, with individuals with the appropriate clinical expertise. In addition, the
appropriate public health authority shall be consulted (e.g. local public health officials) on the plan and a
mock drill of this plan shall be undertaken periodically. The plan shall include a description of the
incident reporting system in place for incidents, which include any loss of containment, spills,
accidents, or potential exposures. The plan must specify that all incidents must be reported
immediately to the appropriate institutional authorities, and no later than 24 hours to the appropriate
public health authorities (e.g., the USDA, the CDC, NIH, local and state health authorities).
Appendix G-II-C-5-c-(1). Laboratory workers shall be provided with medical cards which include, at a
minimum, the following information: characterization of the influenza virus to which they have been
potentially exposed, and 24-hour contact numbers for the Principal Investigator and institution’s
occupational health care provider(s).
Appendix G-II-C-5-c-(2). A detailed occupational health plan shall include: (1) Unless there is a medical
contraindication to vaccination (e.g. severe egg allergy) annual seasonal influenza vaccination as
prerequisite for research to reduce risk of influenza like illness that would require isolation and testing to
rule out infection with experimental viruses and raise the risk for possible co-infection with circulating
influenza strains. (2) Virus specific vaccination, if available, should be offered and if a licensed HPAI
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H5N1 vaccine is available, and there are no medical contraindications, laboratory workers performing
research with mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus should be vaccinated. A post-vaccination
serum sample shall be collected, assessed for immune response, and stored in accordance with
institutional policy, at least for the time in which the laboratory worker continues to conduct HPAI
H5N1 virus research. (3) Reporting of all respiratory symptoms and/or fever (i.e. influenza-like illnesses).
For research involving mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1 virus, laboratory workers shall be actively
monitored for influenza-like illness (i.e., fever and respiratory symptoms). (4) 24-hour access to a
medical facility that is prepared to implement appropriate respiratory isolation to prevent transmission and
is able to provide appropriate antiviral agents. Real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction
(RT-PCR) assays should be used for virus detection and to discriminate these viruses from currently
circulating human influenza viruses. For exposures to viruses containing genes from 1918 H1N1 or the
HA gene from human H2N2 (1957-1968), specimens shall be sent to the CDC for testing (RT-PCR and
confirmatory sequencing).
Appendix G-II-C-5-c-(3). In preparing to perform research with 1918 H1N1, human H2N2 (1957-1968), or
HPAI H5N1, Principal Investigators should develop a clear plan specifying who will be contacted in the
event of a potential exposure (during and after work hours) to conduct a risk assessment and make
decisions as to the required response, including the need for and extent of isolation of the exposed
worker. After any kind of potential exposure, a rapid risk assessment shall be performed by the Principal
Investigator, health and biosafety officials and subsequent actions should depend on the appraised level
of risk of respiratory infection for the individual and potential for transmission to others. A laboratory
worker performing research with either an influenza virus containing the HA gene from human H2N2 or
an influenza virus containing genes and/or segments from 1918 H1N1 or mammalian-transmissible HPAI
H5N1 viruses, shall be informed in advance that, in the case of a known laboratory exposure with a high
risk for infection, e.g., involving the upper or lower respiratory tract or mucous membranes, the laboratory
worker will need to be isolated in a predetermined facility, rather than home isolation, until infection can
be ruled out by testing (e.g., negative RT-PCR for 1918 H1N1 or human H2N2 (1957-1968), or HPAI
H5N1) of appropriately timed specimens. Laboratory workers with a known laboratory exposure with
high risk for infection during research with HPAI H5N1 virus strains that are not transmissible among
mammals should be prepared to self-isolate (for example at home) until infection can be ruled out by
testing (e.g., negative RT-PCR for HPAI H5N1) of appropriately timed specimens. The action taken for
other types of exposures should be based on the risk assessment. In addition, based on the risk
assessment: (1) treatment with appropriate antiviral agents shall be initiated, and (2) the appropriate
public health authorities shall be notified.
Appendix G-II-C-5-c-(4). Influenza-like illness. If an individual has entered (within ten days) a
laboratory conducting research with influenza viruses containing the human H2N2 HA gene or any
gene from the 1918 H1N1 or HPAI H5N1 viruses, or housing animals exposed to such viruses, and the
individual demonstrates symptoms and/or signs of influenza infection (e.g., fever/chills, cough, myalgias,
headache), then he/she shall report by phone to the supervisor/Principal Investigator and other
individuals identified in the occupational health plan. If needed, the person with influenza-like illness
shall be transported, under the appropriate isolation conditions, to a healthcare facility that can provide
adequate respiratory isolation, appropriate medical therapy, and testing to determine whether the
infection is due to a recombinant or synthetic influenza virus. The appropriate public health authorities
shall be informed whenever a suspected case is isolated.
Appendix G-II-C-5-c-(5). For 1918 H1N1 research, the use of antiviral agents (e.g., oseltamivir) for preexposure prophylaxis shall be discussed with laboratory workers in advance including a discussion of the
data on the safety of long term exposure to these agents and their ability to reduce the risk of clinical
disease and the limits of the data regarding protection of close contacts and the community.
Appendix G-II-C-5-c-(6). Antiviral agents for postexposure prophylaxis shall be provided only after
medical evaluation. Home supplies shall not be provided in advance for research with 1918 H1N1,
mammaliantransmissible HPAI H5N1 or influenza viruses containing the HA gene from human H2N2.
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Appendix G-II-D-1-a. Work surfaces are decontaminated at least once a day and immediately after any
spill of viable material.
Appendix G-II-D-1-b. Only mechanical pipetting devices are used.
Appendix G-II-D-1-c. Eating, drinking, smoking, storing food, and applying cosmetics are not permitted
in the laboratory.
Appendix G-II-D-1-d. All procedures are performed carefully to minimize the creation of aerosols.
Appendix G-II-D-2.

Special Practices (BL4)

Appendix G-II-D-2-a. Biological materials to be removed from the Class III cabinets or from the
maximum containment laboratory in a viable or intact state are transferred to a non-breakable, sealed
primary container and then enclosed in a non-breakable, sealed secondary container which is removed
from the facility through a disinfectant dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or an airlock designed for this
purpose.
Appendix G-II-D-2-b. No materials, except for biological materials that are to remain in a viable or intact
state, are removed from the maximum containment laboratory unless they have been autoclaved or
decontaminated before exiting the facility. Equipment or material which might be damaged by high
temperatures or steam is decontaminated by gaseous or vapor methods in an airlock or chamber
designed for this purpose.
Appendix G-II-D-2-c. Only persons whose presence in the facility or individual laboratory rooms is
required for program or support purposes are authorized to enter. The supervisor has the final
responsibility for assessing each circumstance and determining who may enter or work in the laboratory.
Access to the facility is limited by means of secure, locked doors; accessibility is managed by the
Principal Investigator, Biological Safety Officer, or other person responsible for the physical security of the
facility. Before entering, persons are advised of the potential biohazards and instructed as to appropriate
safeguards for ensuring their safety. Authorized persons comply with the instructions and all other
applicable entry and exit procedures. A logbook signed by all personnel indicates the date and time of
each entry and exit. Practical and effective protocols for emergency situations are established.
Appendix G-II-D-2-d. Personnel enter and exit the facility only through the clothing change and shower
rooms. Personnel shower each time they exit the facility. Personnel use the air locks to enter or exit the
laboratory only in an emergency.
Appendix G-II-D-2-e. Street clothing is removed in the outer clothing change room and kept there.
Complete laboratory clothing (may be disposable), including undergarments, pants and shirts or jump
suits, shoes, and gloves, is provided and used by all personnel entering the facility. Head covers are
provided for personnel who do not wash their hair during the exit shower. When exiting the laboratory
and before proceeding into the shower area, personnel remove their laboratory clothing and store it in a
locker or hamper in the inner change room. Protective clothing shall be decontaminated prior to
laundering or disposal.
Appendix G-II-D-2-f. When materials that contain organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules or experimental animals are present in the laboratory or animal rooms, a hazard warning
sign incorporating the universal biosafety symbol is posted on all access doors. The sign identifies the
agent, lists the name of the Principal Investigator or other responsible person(s), and indicates any
special requirements for entering the area (e.g., the need for immunizations or respirators).
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Appendix G-II-D-2-g. Supplies and materials needed in the facility are brought in by way of the doubledoored autoclave, fumigation chamber, or airlock which is appropriately decontaminated between each
use. After securing the outer doors, personnel within the facility retrieve the materials by opening the
interior doors or the autoclave, fumigation chamber, or airlock. These doors are secured after materials
are brought into the facility.
Appendix G-II-D-2-h. An insect and rodent control program is in effect.
Appendix G-II-D-2-i. Materials (e.g., plants, animals, and clothing) not related to the experiment being
conducted are not permitted in the facility.
Appendix G-II-D-2-j. Hypodermic needles and syringes are used only for parenteral injection and
aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm bottles. Only needle-locking syringes or
disposable syringe-needle units (i.e., needle is integral part of unit) are used for the injection or aspiration
of fluids containing organisms that contain recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules. Needles
should not be bent, sheared, replaced in the needle sheath or guard, or removed from the syringe
following use. The needle and syringe should be placed in a puncture-resistant container and
decontaminated, preferably by autoclaving before discard or reuse. Whenever possible, cannulas are
used instead of sharp needles (e.g., gavage).
Appendix G-II-D-2-k. A system is set up for reporting laboratory accidents, exposures, employee
absenteeism, and for the medical surveillance of potential laboratory-associated illnesses. Spills and
accidents which result in overt exposures to organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules are immediately reported to the Biological Safety Officer, Institutional Biosafety Committee,
and NIH OSP. Reports to the NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of
Health, preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also
available here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). Written records are prepared and
maintained. An essential adjunct to such a reporting-surveillance system is the availability of a facility for
quarantine, isolation, and medical care of personnel with potential or known laboratory associated
illnesses.
Appendix G-II-D-2-l.

Containment for Animal Research

Appendix G-II-D-2-l-(1). Laboratory animals involved in experiments requiring BL4 level physical
containment shall be housed either in cages contained in Class III cabinets or in partial containment
caging systems, such as Horsfall units (see Appendix G-III-K, Footnotes and References of Appendix G),
open cages placed in ventilated enclosures, or solid-wall and -bottom cages placed on holding racks
equipped with ultraviolet irradiation lamps and reflectors that are located in a specially designed area in
which all personnel are required to wear one-piece positive pressure suits.
Appendix G-II-D-2-l-(2). Non-human primates (NHP) may be housed (1) under the containment
conditions described in Appendix G-II-D-2-l-(1) above, or (2) in open cages within a dedicated animal
holding room that serves as the primary barrier and in which all personnel are required to wear one-piece
positive pressure suits. A room serving as a primary barrier must be air-tight and capable of being
decontaminated using fumigation.
If NHPs are to be contained in a dedicated animal holding room serving as the primary barrier, the
following conditions shall be met:
(i) Access to the animal holding room from service corridors outside of the BL4 containment space shall
require passage through two sets of doors, and the inner most door must be an air pressure resistant
(APR) door;
(ii) For any animal holding room considered to be a primary barrier, APR door(s) providing direct ingress
from the exterior service corridor shall be fitted with appropriate and redundant lock-out mechanisms to
prevent access when the animal holding room is contaminated and in use. There should be more than
one mechanism to ensure that this primary barrier door cannot be opened when the animal room is
contaminated and the APR door shall not serve as an emergency exit from the BL4 laboratory. The APR
door shall be appropriately tested to demonstrate that in the closed, locked-out mode, the door provides
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an air-tight barrier proven by pressure decay testing or other equivalent method;
(iii) Any door(s) allowing access into a corridor from which there is direct ingress to an animal holding
room must be fitted with either (1) an APR door or (2) a non-APR door, provided directional airflow is
maintained from the laboratory corridor space into the animal room. For the purpose of fumigation, animal
rooms equipped with non-APR doors opening into the adjacent interior corridors shall be considered one
space (i.e., areas between air-tight doors shall be fumigated together);
(iv) Any door(s) used for access to the service corridor (the secondary barrier) shall be self-closing and of
solid construction, designed not to corrode, split or warp;
(v) Access to the service corridor inside the secondary barrier shall be restricted and strictly controlled
when animal rooms are in use. Whenever possible, the secondary barrier door(s) should be fitted with
safety interlock switches designed to prevent it from opening when an animal holding room door (the
primary barrier) is opened following room decontamination; if interlock devices cannot be used, specific
administrative procedures shall be implemented to control access to the service corridor;
(vi) The service corridor shall maintain a negative pressure (inward directional airflow) relative to adjoining
traffic corridors;
(vii) Prior to fumigation of the animal holding room, cages should be removed for autoclaving or chemical
decontamination;
(viii) Caging should be chosen to reduce the amount of animal detritus that can be thrown out of the cage
and onto the floor of the animal holding room;
(ix) The flow of personnel, material and equipment should be directed in order to minimize the spread of
contamination from the animal holding room into adjacent areas of the laboratory;
(x) Following animal room decontamination, safeguards involving the use of personal protective
equipment and appropriate administrative controls shall be implemented for the safe retrieval of biological
indicators in order to prevent the spread of infectious agents in the event of a decontamination failure.
Appendix G-II-D-2-m. Alternative Selection of Containment Equipment (BL4)
Experimental procedures involving a host-vector system that provides a one-step higher level of biological
containment than that specified may be conducted in the BL4 facility using containment equipment
requirements specified for the BL3 level of physical containment. Alternative combinations of
containment safeguards are shown in Appendix G-Table 1, Possible Alternate Combinations of Physical
and Biological Containment Safeguards.
Appendix G-II-D-3.

Containment Equipment (BL4)

Appendix G-II-D-3-a. All procedures within the facility with agents assigned to Biosafety Level 4 are
conducted in the Class III biological safety cabinet or in Class I or II biological safety cabinets used in
conjunction with one-piece positive pressure personnel suits ventilated by a life-support system.
Appendix G-II-D-4.

Laboratory Facilities (BL4)

Appendix G-II-D-4-a. The maximum containment facility consists of either a separate building or a
clearly demarcated and isolated zone within a building. Outer and inner change rooms separated by a
shower are provided for personnel entering and exiting the facility. A double-doored autoclave,
fumigation chamber, or ventilated airlock is provided for passage of those materials, supplies, or
equipment which are not brought into the facility through the change room.
Appendix G-II-D-4-b. Walls, floors, and ceilings of the facility are constructed to form a sealed internal
shell which facilitates fumigation and is animal and insect proof. The internal surfaces of this shell are
resistant to liquids and chemicals, thus facilitating cleaning and decontamination of the area. All
penetrations in these structures and surfaces are sealed. Any drains in the floors contain traps filled with
a chemical disinfectant of demonstrated efficacy against the target agent, and they are connected directly
to the liquid waste decontamination system. Sewer and other ventilation lines contain high efficiency
particulate air/HEPA filters.
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Appendix G-II-D-4-c. Internal facility appurtenances, such as light fixtures, air ducts, and utility pipes,
are arranged to minimize the horizontal surface area on which dust can settle.
Appendix G-II-D-4-d. Bench tops have seamless surfaces which are impervious to water and resistant
to acids, alkalis, organic solvents, and moderate heat.
Appendix G-II-D-4-e. Laboratory furniture is simple and of sturdy construction; and spaces between
benches, cabinets, and equipment are accessible for cleaning.
Appendix G-II-D-4-f. A foot, elbow, or automatically operated hand washing sink is provided near the
door of each laboratory room in the facility.
Appendix G-II-D-4-g. If there is a central vacuum system, it does not serve areas outside the facility. Inline high efficiency particulate air/HEPA filters are placed as near as practicable to each use point or
service cock. Filters are installed to permit in-place decontamination and replacement. Other liquid and
gas services to the facility are protected by devices that prevent back-flow.
Appendix G-II-D-4-h. If water fountains are provided, they are foot operated and are located in the
facility corridors outside the laboratory. The water service to the fountain is not connected to the backflow protected distribution system supplying water to the laboratory areas.
Appendix G-II-D-4-i. Access doors to the laboratory are self-closing and locking.
Appendix G-II-D-4-j. Any windows are breakage resistant.
Appendix G-II-D-4-k. A double-door autoclave is provided for decontaminating materials passing out of
the facility. The autoclave door which opens to the area external to the facility is sealed to the outer wall
and automatically controlled so that the outside door can only be opened after the autoclave "sterilization"
cycle has been completed.
Appendix G-II-D-4-l. A pass-through dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or an equivalent decontamination
method is provided so that materials and equipment that cannot be decontaminated in the autoclave can
be safely removed from the facility.
Appendix G-II-D-4-m. Liquid effluent from laboratory sinks, biological safety cabinets, floors, and
autoclave chambers are decontaminated by heat treatment before being released from the maximum
containment facility. Liquid wastes from shower rooms and toilets may be decontaminated with chemical
disinfectants or by heat in the liquid waste decontamination system. The procedure used for heat
decontamination of liquid wastes is evaluated mechanically and biologically by using a recording
thermometer and an indicator microorganism with a defined heat susceptibility pattern. If liquid wastes
from the shower room are decontaminated with chemical disinfectants, the chemical used is of
demonstrated efficacy against the target or indicator microorganisms.
Appendix G-II-D-4-n. An individual supply and exhaust air ventilation system is provided. The system
maintains pressure differentials and directional airflow as required to assure flows inward from areas
outside of the facility toward areas of highest potential risk within the facility. Manometers are used to
sense pressure differentials between adjacent areas maintained at different pressure levels. If a system
malfunctions, the manometers sound an alarm. The supply and exhaust airflow is interlocked to assure
inward (or zero) airflow at all times.
Appendix G-II-D-4-o. The exhaust air from the facility is filtered through high efficiency particulate
air/HEPA filters and discharged to the outside so that it is dispersed away from occupied buildings and air
intakes. Within the facility, the filters are located as near the laboratories as practicable in order to reduce
the length of potentially contaminated air ducts. The filter chambers are designed to allow in situ
decontamination before filters are removed and to facilitate certification testing after they are replaced.
Coarse filters and HEPA filters are provided to treat air supplied to the facility in order to increase the
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lifetime of the exhaust HEPA filters and to protect the supply air system should air pressures become
unbalanced in the laboratory.
Appendix G-II-D-4-p. The treated exhaust air from Class I and II biological safety cabinets may be
discharged into the laboratory room environment or the outside through the facility air exhaust system. If
exhaust air from Class I or II biological safety cabinets is discharged into the laboratory the cabinets are
tested and certified at minimum on a yearly basis. More frequent testing and certification, based on the
amount of use or other safety factors, shall be left to the discretion of the IBC. The exhaust air from Class
III biological safety cabinets is discharged, without recirculation through two sets of high efficiency
particulate air/HEPA filters in series, via the facility exhaust air system. If the treated exhaust air from any
of these cabinets is discharged to the outside through the facility exhaust air system, it is connected to
this system in a manner (e.g., thimble unit connection (see Appendix G-III-L, Footnotes and References
of Appendix G)) that avoids any interference with the air balance of the cabinets or the facility exhaust air
system.
Appendix G-II-D-4-q. A specially designed suit area may be provided in the facility. Personnel who
enter this area shall wear a one-piece positive pressure suit that is ventilated by a life-support system.
The life-support system includes alarms and emergency backup breathing air tanks. Entry to this area is
through an airlock fitted with airtight doors. A chemical shower is provided to decontaminate the surface
of the suit before the worker exits the area. The exhaust air from the suit area is filtered by two sets of
high efficiency particulate air/HEPA filters installed in series. A duplicate filtration unit, exhaust fan, and
an automatically starting emergency power source are provided. The air pressure within the suit area is
greater than that of any adjacent area. Emergency lighting and communication systems are provided. All
penetrations into the internal shell of the suit are sealed. A double-doored autoclave is provided for
decontaminating waste materials to be removed from the suit areas.
Appendix G - Table 1. Possible Alternate Combinations Of Physical And Biological Containment
Safeguards

Classification
of Physical &
Biological
Containment

Alternate Physical Containment

Alternate
Biological
Containment

Laboratory
Facilities

Laboratory
Practices

Laboratory
Equipment

BL3/HV2

BL3
BL3

BL3
BL3

BL3
BL4

HV2
HV1

BL3/HV1

BL3
BL3

BL3
BL3

BL3
BL2

HV1
HV2

BL4/HV1

BL4
BL4

BL4
BL4

BL4
BL3

HV1
HV2

BL - Biosafety Level
HV - Host-Vector System

Appendix G-III. Footnotes and References of Appendix G
Appendix G-III-A. Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th edition, 2007, DHHS,
Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, and National
Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland.
Appendix G-III-B. Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 3rd edition, May 1993, U.S.
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DHHS, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, and NIH,
Bethesda, Maryland.
Appendix G-III-C. National Cancer Institute Safety Standards for Research Involving Oncogenic Viruses,
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Publication No. (NIH) 75-790, October 1974.
Appendix G-III-D. National Institutes of Health Biohazards Safety Guide, U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, NIH, U.S. Government Printing Office, Stock No. 174000383, 1974.
Appendix G-III-E. A. Hellman, M. N. Oxman, and R. Pollack (eds.), Biohazards in Biological Research,
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory 1973.
Appendix G-III-F. N. V. Steere (ed.), Handbook of Laboratory Safety, 2nd edition, The Chemical Rubber
Co., Cleveland, Ohio, 1971.
Appendix G-III-G. Bodily, J. L, "General Administration of the Laboratory," H. L. Bodily, E. L. Updyke,
and J. O. Mason (eds.), Diagnostic Procedures for Bacterial, Mycotic, and Parasitic Infections, American
Public Health Association, New York, 1970, pp. 11-28.
Appendix G-III-H. Darlow, H. M. (1969). "Safety in the Microbiological Laboratory," in J. R. Norris and D.
W. Robbins (eds.), Methods in Microbiology, Academic Press, Inc., New York, pp. 169-204.
Appendix G-III-I. The Prevention of Laboratory Acquired Infection, C. H. Collins, E. G. Hartley, and R.
Pilsworth, Public Health Laboratory Service, Monograph Series No. 6, 1974.
Appendix G-III-J. Chatigny, M. A., "Protection Against Infection in the Microbiological Laboratory:
Devices and Procedures," in W. W. Umbreit (ed.), Advances in Applied Microbiology, Academic Press,
New York, New York, 1961, 3:131-192.
Appendix G-III-K. Horsfall, F. L. Jr., and J. H. Baner, Individual Isolation of Infected Animals in a Single
Room, J. Bact., 1940, 40, 569-580.
Appendix G-III-L. Biological safety cabinets referred to in this section are classified as Class I, Class II,
or Class III cabinets. A Class I is a ventilated cabinet for personnel protection having an inward flow of air
away from the operator. The exhaust air from this cabinet is filtered through a high efficiency particulate
air/HEPA filter. This cabinet is used in three operational modes: (i) with a full-width open front, (ii) with an
installed front closure panel (having four 6-inch diameter openings) without gloves, and (iii) with an
installed front closure panel equipped with arm-length rubber gloves. The face velocity of the inward flow
of air through the full-width open front is 75 feet per minute or greater. A Class II cabinet is a ventilated
cabinet for personnel and product protection having an open front with inward air flow for personnel
protection, and HEPA filtered mass recirculated air flow for product protection. The cabinet exhaust air is
filtered through a HEPA filter. The face velocity of the inward flow of air through the full-width open front
is 75 feet per minute or greater. Design and performance specifications for Class II cabinets have been
adopted by the National Sanitation Foundation, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A Class III cabinet is a closed-front
ventilated cabinet of gas tight construction which provides the highest level of personnel protection of all
biosafety safety cabinets. The interior of the cabinet is protected from contaminants exterior to the
cabinet. The cabinet is fitted with arm-length rubber gloves and is operated under a negative pressure of
at least 0.5 inches water gauge. All supply air is filtered through HEPA filters. Exhaust air is filtered
through two HEPA filters or one HEPA filter and incinerator before being discharged to the outside
environment. National Sanitation Foundation Standard 49. 1976. Class II (Laminar Flow) Biohazard
Cabinetry, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Appendix G-III-M. Biosafety Level 1 is suitable for work involving agents of unknown or minimal potential
hazard to laboratory personnel and the environment. The laboratory is not separated from the general
traffic patterns in the building. Work is generally conducted on open bench tops. Special containment
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equipment is not required or generally used. Laboratory personnel have specific training in the
procedures conducted in the laboratory and are supervised by a scientist with general training in
microbiology or a related science (see Appendix G-III-A, Footnotes and References of Appendix G).
Appendix G-III-N. Biosafety Level 2 is similar to Level 1 and is suitable for work involving agents of
moderate potential hazard to personnel and the environment. It differs in that: (1) laboratory personnel
have specific training in handling pathogenic agents and are directed by competent scientists; (2) access
to the laboratory is limited when work is being conducted; and (3) certain procedures in which infectious
aerosols are created are conducted in biological safety cabinets or other physical containment equipment
(see Appendix G-III-A, Footnotes and References of Appendix G).
Appendix G-III-O. Office of Research Safety, National Cancer Institute, and the Special Committee of
Safety and Health Experts, Laboratory Safety Monograph: A Supplement to the NIH Guidelines for
Recombinant DNA Research, NIH, Bethesda, Maryland 1978.
Appendix G-III-P. Biosafety Level 3 is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, or production
facilities in which work is conducted with indigenous or exotic agents which may cause serious or
potentially lethal disease as a result of exposure by the inhalation route. Laboratory personnel have
specific training in handling pathogenic and potentially lethal agents and are supervised by competent
scientists who are experienced in working with these agents. All procedures involving the manipulation of
infectious material are conducted within biological safety cabinets or other physical containment devices
or by personnel wearing appropriate personal protective clothing and devices. The laboratory has special
engineering and design features. It is recognized, however, that many existing facilities may not have all
the facility safeguards recommended for BL3 (e.g., access zone, sealed penetrations, and directional
airflow, etc.). In these circumstances, acceptable safety may be achieved for routine or repetitive
operations (e.g., diagnostic procedures involving the propagation of an agent for identification, typing, and
susceptibility testing) in laboratories where facility features satisfy BL2 recommendations provided the
recommended "Standard Microbiological Practices," "Special Practices," and "Containment Equipment"
for BL3 are rigorously followed. The decision to implement this modification of BL3 recommendations
should be made only by the Principal Investigator.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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SHIPMENT

Recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules contained in an organism or in a viral genome shall be
shipped under the applicable regulations of the U.S. Postal Service (39 Code of Federal Regulations, Part
3); the Public Health Service (42 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72); the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (9 Code of Federal Regulations, Subchapters D and E; 7 CFR, Part 340); and/or the U.S.
Department of Transportation (49 Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 171-179).
Note. A host-vector system may be proposed for certification by the NIH Director in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Appendix I-II, Certification of Host-Vector Systems. In order to ensure protection
for proprietary data, any public notice regarding a host-vector system which is designated by the
institution as proprietary under Section IV-D, Voluntary Compliance, will be issued only after consultation
with the institution as to the content of the notice (see Section IV-D-3, Certification of Host-Vector
Systems - Voluntary Compliance).
Appendix H-I. Host organisms or viruses will be shipped as etiologic agents, regardless of whether they
contain recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules, if they are regulated as human pathogens by the
Public Health Service (42 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72) or as animal pathogens or plant pests
under the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (Titles 9 and 7
Code of Federal Regulations, respectively).
Appendix H-II. Host organisms and viruses will be shipped as etiologic agents if they contain
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules when: (i) the recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecule includes the complete genome of a host organism or virus regulated as a human or animal
pathogen or a plant pest; or (ii) the recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule codes for a toxin or
other factor directly involved in eliciting human, animal, or plant disease or inhibiting plant growth, and is
carried on an expression vector or within the host chromosome and/or when the host organism contains a
conjugation proficient plasmid or a generalized transducing phage; or (iii) the recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecule comes from a host organism or virus regulated as a human or animal pathogen or
as a plant pest and has not been adequately characterized to demonstrate that it does not code for a
factor involved in eliciting human, animal, or plant disease.
Appendix H-III. Footnotes and References of Appendix H
For further information on shipping etiologic agents contact: (i) The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, ATTN: Biohazards Control Office, 1600 Clifton Road, Atlanta, Georgia 30333, (404) 6393883, FTS 236-3883; (ii) The U.S. Department of Transportation, ATTN: Office of Hazardous Materials
Transportation, 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 366-4545; or (iii) U.S. Department of
Agriculture, ATTN: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services, National
Center for Import-Export, Products Program, 4700 River Road, Unit 40, Riverdale, Maryland 20737.
Phone: (301) 734-8499; Fax: (301) 734-8226.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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APPENDIX I.

BIOLOGICAL CONTAINMENT (See Appendix E, Certified Host-Vector Systems)

Appendix I-I.

Levels of Biological Containment

In consideration of biological containment, the vector (plasmid, organelle, or virus) for the recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecule and the host (bacterial, plant, or animal cell) in which the vector is
propagated in the laboratory will be considered together. Any combination of vector and host which is to
provide biological containment shall be chosen or constructed so that the following types of "escape" are
minimized: (i) survival of the vector in its host outside the laboratory, and (ii) transmission of the vector
from the propagation host to other non-laboratory hosts. The following levels of biological containment
(host-vector systems) for prokaryotes are established. Appendices I-I-A through I-II-B describe levels of
biological containment (host-vector systems) for prokaryotes. Specific criteria will depend on the
organisms to be used.
Appendix I-I-A. Host-Vector 1 Systems
Host-Vector 1 systems provide a moderate level of containment. Specific Host-Vector 1 systems are:
Appendix I-I-A-1.

Escherichia coli K-12 Host-Vector 1 Systems (EK1)

The host is always Escherichia coli K-12 or a derivative thereof, and the vectors include non-conjugative
plasmids (e.g., pSC101, Co1E1, or derivatives thereof (see Appendices I-III-A through G, Footnotes and
References of Appendix I) and variants of bacteriophage, such as lambda (see Appendices I-III-H through
O, Footnotes and References of Appendix I). The Escherichia coli K-12 hosts shall not contain
conjugation-proficient plasmids, whether autonomous or integrated, or generalized transducing phages.
Appendix I-I-A-2.

Other Host-Vector 1 Systems

At a minimum, hosts and vectors shall be comparable in containment to Escherichia coli K-12 with a nonconjugative plasmid or bacteriophage vector. Appendix I-II, Certification of Host-Vector Systems,
describes the data to be considered and mechanism for approval of Host-Vector 1 systems.
Appendix I-I-B. Host-Vector 2 Systems (EK2)
Host-Vector 2 Systems provide a high level of biological containment as demonstrated by data from
suitable tests performed in the laboratory. Escape of the recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule
either via survival of the organisms or via transmission of the recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecule to other organisms should be < 1/108 under specified conditions. Specific Host-Vector 2
systems are:
Appendix I-I-B-1. For Escherichia coli K-12 Host-Vector 2 systems (EK2) in which the vector is a
plasmid, no more than 1/108 host cells shall perpetuate a cloned DNA fragment under the specified nonpermissive laboratory conditions designed to represent the natural environment, either by survival of the
original host or as a consequence of transmission of the cloned DNA fragment.
Appendix I-I-B-2. For Escherichia coli K-12 Host-Vector 2 systems (EK2) in which the vector is a phage,
no more than 1/108 phage particles shall perpetuate a cloned DNA fragment under the specified nonpermissive laboratory conditions designed to represent the natural environment, either as a prophage (in
the inserted or plasmid form) in the laboratory host used for phage propagation, or survival in natural
environments and transferring a cloned DNA fragment to other hosts (or their resident prophages).
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Certification of Host-Vector Systems

Appendix I-II-A. Responsibility
Host-Vector 1 systems (other than Escherichia coli K-12) and Host-Vector 2 systems may not be
designated as such until they have been certified by the NIH Director. Requests for certification of hostvector systems may be submitted to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably
by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the
OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). Proposed host-vector systems will be reviewed based on the
construction, properties, and testing of the proposed host-vector system by ad hoc experts. The NIH
Director is responsible for certification of host-vector systems. Minor modifications to existing host-vector
systems (i.e., those that are of minimal or no consequence to the properties relevant to containment) may
be certified by the NIH Director (see Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(f), Minor Actions). Once a host-vector system
has been certified by the NIH Director, a notice of certification will be sent by NIH OSP to the applicant
and to the Institutional Biosafety Committee Chairs. A list of all currently certified host-vector systems is
available from the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by submitting a
request for this information to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available
here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). The NIH Director may rescind the certification of a
host-vector system (see Section IV-C-1-b-(2)-(g), Minor Actions). If certification is rescinded, NIH will
instruct investigators to transfer cloned DNA into a different system or use the clones at a higher level of
physical containment level, unless NIH determines that the already constructed clones incorporate
adequate biological containment. Certification of a host-vector system does not extend to modifications
of either the host or vector component of that system. Such modified systems shall be independently
certified by the NIH Director. If modifications are minor, it may only be necessary for the investigator to
submit data showing that the modifications have either improved or not impaired the major phenotypic
traits on which the containment of the system depends. Substantial modifications to a certified hostvector system requires submission of complete testing data.
Appendix I-II-B. Data to be Submitted for Certification
Appendix I-II-B-1.

Host-Vector 1 Systems Other than Escherichia coli K-12

The following types of data shall be submitted, modified as appropriate for the particular system under
consideration: (i) a description of the organism and vector; the strain's natural habitat and growth
requirements; its physiological properties, particularly those related to its reproduction, survival, and the
mechanisms by which it exchanges genetic information; the range of organisms with which this organism
normally exchanges genetic information and the type of information exchanged; and any relevant
information about its pathogenicity or toxicity; (ii) a description of the history of the particular strains and
vectors to be used, including data on any mutations which render this organism less able to survive or
transmit genetic information; and (iii) a general description of the range of experiments contemplated with
emphasis on the need for developing such an Host-Vector 1 system.
Appendix I-II-B-2.

Host-Vector 2 Systems

Investigators planning to request Host-Vector 2 systems certification may obtain instructions from NIH
OSP concerning data to be submitted (see Appendices I-III-N and O, Footnotes and References of
Appendix I). In general, the following types of data are required: (i) description of construction steps with
indication of source, properties, and manner of introduction of genetic traits; (ii) quantitative data on the
stability of genetic traits that contribute to the containment of the system; (iii) data on the survival of the
host-vector system under non-permissive laboratory conditions designed to represent the relevant natural
environment; (iv) data on transmissibility of the vector and/or a cloned DNA fragment under both
permissive and non-permissive conditions; (v) data on all other properties of the system which affect
containment and utility, including information on yields of phage or plasmid molecules, ease of DNA
isolation, and ease of transfection or transformation; and (vi) in some cases, the investigator may be
asked to submit data on survival and vector transmissibility from experiments in which the host-vector is
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fed to laboratory animals or one or more human subjects. Such in vivo data may be required to confirm
the validity of predicting in vivo survival on the basis of in vitro experiments. Data shall be submitted to
the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to:
NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP website
(www.osp.od.nih.gov). Investigators are encouraged to publish their data on the construction, properties,
and testing of proposed Host Vector 2 systems prior to consideration of the system by NIH. Specific
instructions concerning the submission of data for proposed Escherichia coli K-12 Host-Vector 2 system
(EK2) involving either plasmids or bacteriophage in Escherichia coli K-12, are available from the Office of
Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by submitting a request for this information to:
NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP website
(www.osp.od.nih.gov).
Appendix I-III.

Footnotes and References of Appendix I

Appendix I-III-A. Hersfield, V., H. W. Boyer, C. Yanofsky, M. A. Lovett, and D. R. Helinski, Plasmid
Co1E1 as a Molecular Vehicle for Cloning and Amplification of DNA. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci., 1974, 71, pp.
3455-3459.
Appendix I-III-B. Wensink, P. C., D. J. Finnegan, J. E. Donelson, and D. S. Hogness, A System for
Mapping DNA Sequences in the Chromosomes of Drosophila Melanogaster. Cell, 1974, 3, pp. 315-335.
Appendix I-III-C. Tanaka, T., and B. Weisblum, Construction of a Colicin El-R Factor Composite Plasmid
in Vitro: Means for Amplification of Deoxyribonucleic Acid. J. Bacteriol., 1975, 121, pp. 354-362.
Appendix I-III-D. Armstrong, K. A., V. Hershfield, and D. R. Helinski, Gene Cloning and Containment
Properties of Plasmid Col E1 and Its Derivatives, Science, 1977, 196, pp. 172-174.
Appendix I-III-E. Bolivar, F., R. L. Rodriguez, M. C. Betlack, and H. W. Boyer, Construction and
Characterization of New Cloning Vehicles: I. Ampicillin-Resistant Derivative of PMB9, Gene, 1977, 2, pp.
75-93.
Appendix I-III-F. Cohen, S. N., A. C. W. Chang, H. Boyer, and R. Helling. Construction of Biologically
Functional Bacterial Plasmids in Vitro. Proc. Natl. Acad, Sci., 1973, 70, pp. 3240-3244.
Appendix I-III-G. Bolivar, F., R. L. Rodriguez, R. J. Greene, M. C.Batlack, H. L. Reyneker, H. W. Boyer,
J. H. Cross, and S. Falkow, 1977, Construction and Characterization of New Cloning Vehicles II. A MultiPurpose Cloning System, Gene, 1977, 2, pp. 95-113.
Appendix I-III-H. Thomas, M., J. R. Cameron, and R. W. Davis (1974). Viable Molecular Hybrids of
Bacteriophage Lambda and Eukaryotic DNA. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci., 1974, 71, pp. 4579-4583.
Appendix I-III-I. Murray, N. E., and K. Murray, Manipulation of Restriction Targets in Phage Lambda to
Form Receptor Chromosomes for DNA Fragments. Nature, 1974, 51, pp. 476-481.
Appendix I-III-J. Ramback, A., and P. Tiollais (1974). Bacteriophage Having EcoRI Endonuclease Sites
Only in the Non-Essential Region of the Genome. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci., 1974, 71, pp. 3927-3820.
Appendix I-III-K. Blattner, F. R., B. G. Williams, A. E. Bleche, K. Denniston-Thompson, H. E. Faber, L.
A. Furlong, D. J. Gunwald, D. O. Kiefer, D. D. Moore, J. W. Shumm, E. L. Sheldon, and O. Smithies,
Charon Phages: Safer Derivatives of Bacteriophage Lambda for DNA Cloning, Science 1977, 196, pp.
163-169.
Appendix I-III-L. Donoghue, D. J., and P. A. Sharp, An Improved Lambda Vector: Construction of Model
Recombinants Coding for Kanamycin Resistance, Gene, 1977, 1, pp. 209-227.
Appendix I-III-M. Leder, P., D. Tiemeier and L. Enquist (1977), EK2 Derivatives of Bacteriophage
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Lambda Useful in the Cloning of DNA from Higher Organisms: The λgt WES System, Science, 1977,
196, pp. 175-177.
Appendix I-III-N. Skalka, A., Current Status of Coliphage AEK2 Vectors, Gene, 1978, 3, pp. 29-35.
Appendix I-III-O. Szybalski, W., A. Skalka, S. Gottesman, A. Campbell, and D. Botstein, Standardized
Laboratory Tests for EK2 Certification, Gene, 1978, 3, pp. 36-38.
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BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH SUBCOMMITTEE

The National Science and Technology Council's Committee on Fundamental Science determined that a
subcommittee should be continued to identify and coordinate Federal research efforts, identify research
needs, stimulating international cooperation, and assess national and international policy issues
concerning biotechnology sciences. The primary emphasis will be on scientific issues to increase the
overall effectiveness and productivity of the Federal investment in biotechnology sciences, especially
regarding issues which cut across agency boundaries. This subcommittee is called the Biotechnology
Research Subcommittee.
Membership of the Biotechnology Research Subcommittee will include Federal agencies that support
biotechnology research. Agencies represented are: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of
Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services,
Department of Interior, Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency for International Development, Environmental Protection Agency, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, and National Science Foundation. The Biotechnology Research Subcommittee will
function in an advisory capacity to the Committee on Fundamental Science, the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, and the Executive Office of the President. The Biotechnology Research
Subcommittee will review the scientific aspects of proposed regulations and guidelines as they are
developed.
The primary responsibilities of the Biotechnology Research Subcommittee are to: (i) describe and review
current Federal efforts in biotechnology research; (ii) identify and define the priority areas for future
Federal biotechnology research, including areas needing greater emphasis, describing the role of each
agency in those areas, and delineate where interagency cooperation would enhance progress in the
biotechnology sciences, with an emphasis on integrated research efforts, where appropriate; (iii) assess
major international efforts in the biotechnology sciences and develop mechanisms for international
collaboration. For example, activities of the U.S.-European Community Task Force on Biotechnology
have been coordinated through the Biotechnology Research Subcommittee; (iv) identify and review
national and international policy issues (such as public education) associated with biotechnology; and (v)
provide reviews, analyses, and recommendations to the Chairs of the Committee on Fundamental
Science on scientific issues related to regulations and the applications of biotechnology research and
biotechnology policies and issues.
In 1990, the Biotechnology Research Subcommittee replaced the Biotechnology Sciences Coordinating
Committee. Both the Biotechnology Research Subcommittee and the Biotechnology Sciences
Coordinating Committee previously functioned under the Federal Coordinating Council on Science,
Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET). While regulatory issues became the primary focus of the
Biotechnology Sciences Coordinating Committee, the Biotechnology Research Subcommittee focuses on
scientific issues, although it will still provide scientific support for regulatory responsibilities.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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APPENDIX K. PHYSICAL CONTAINMENT FOR LARGE SCALE USES OF ORGANISMS
CONTAINING RECOMBINANT OR SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES
Appendix K specifies physical containment guidelines for large-scale (greater than 10 liters of culture)
research or production involving viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules. It shall apply to large-scale research or production activities as specified in Section III-D-6,
Experiments Involving More than 10 Liters of Culture. It is important to note that this appendix addresses
only the biological hazard associated with organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules. Other hazards accompanying the large-scale cultivation of such organisms (e.g., toxic
properties of products; physical, mechanical, and chemical aspects of downstream processing) are not
addressed and shall be considered separately, albeit in conjunction with this appendix.
All provisions shall apply to large-scale research or production activities with the following modifications:
(i) Appendix K shall supersede Appendix G, Physical Containment, when quantities in excess of 10 liters
of culture are involved in research or production. Appendix K-II applies to Good Large Scale Practice; (ii)
the institution shall appoint a Biological Safety Officer if it engages in large-scale research or production
activities involving viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules. The
duties of the Biological Safety Officer shall include those specified in Section IV-B-3, Biological Safety
Officer; (iii) the institution shall establish and maintain a health surveillance program for personnel
engaged in large-scale research or production activities involving viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules which require Biosafety Level (BL) 3 containment at the
laboratory scale. The program shall include: pre assignment and periodic physical and medical
examinations; collection, maintenance, and analysis of serum specimens for monitoring serologic
changes that may result from the employee's work experience; and provisions for the investigation of any
serious, unusual, or extended illnesses of employees to determine possible occupational origin.
Appendix K-I.

Selection of Physical Containment Levels

The selection of the physical containment level required for recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecule research or production involving more than 10 liters of culture is based on the containment
guidelines established in Section III, Experiments Covered by the NIH Guidelines. For purposes of largescale research or production, four physical containment levels are established. The four levels set
containment conditions at those appropriate for the degree of hazard to health or the environment posed
by the organism, judged by experience with similar organisms unmodified by recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecule techniques and consistent with Good Large Scale Practice. The four biosafety
levels of large-scale physical containment are referred to as Good Large Scale Practice, BL1-Large
Scale, BL2-Large Scale, and BL3-Large Scale. Good Large Scale Practice is recommended for largescale research or production involving viable, non-pathogenic, and non-toxigenic recombinant or synthetic
strains derived from host organisms that have an extended history of safe large-scale use. Good Large
Scale Practice is recommended for organisms such as those included in Appendix C, Exemptions under
Section III-F-8, which have built-in environmental limitations that permit optimum growth in the large-scale
setting but limited survival without adverse consequences in the environment. BL1-Large Scale is
recommended for large-scale research or production of viable organisms containing recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecules that require BL1 containment at the laboratory scale and that do not
qualify for Good Large Scale Practice. BL2-Large Scale is recommended for large-scale research or
production of viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules that require
BL2 containment at the laboratory scale. BL3-Large Scale is recommended for large-scale research or
production of viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules that require
BL3 containment at the laboratory scale. No provisions are made for large-scale research or production
of viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules that require BL4
containment at the laboratory scale. If necessary, these requirements will be established by NIH on an
individual basis.
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Appendix K-II. Good Large Scale Practice (GLSP)
Appendix K-II-A. Institutional codes of practice shall be formulated and implemented to assure adequate
control of health and safety matters.
Appendix K-II-B. Written instructions and training of personnel shall be provided to assure that cultures
of viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules are handled prudently
and that the work place is kept clean and orderly.
Appendix K-II-C. In the interest of good personal hygiene, facilities (e.g., hand washing sink, shower,
changing room) and protective clothing (e.g., uniforms, laboratory coats) shall be provided that are
appropriate for the risk of exposure to viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules. Eating, drinking, smoking, applying cosmetics, and mouth pipetting shall be prohibited in the
work area.
Appendix K-II-D. Cultures of viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules shall be handled in facilities intended to safeguard health during work with microorganisms that
do not require containment.
Appendix K-II-E. Discharges containing viable recombinant or synthetic organisms shall be handled in
accordance with applicable governmental environmental regulations.
Appendix K-II-F. Addition of materials to a system, sample collection, transfer of culture fluids
within/between systems, and processing of culture fluids shall be conducted in a manner that maintains
employee's exposure to viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules at a
level that does not adversely affect the health and safety of employees.
Appendix K-II-G. The facility's emergency response plan shall include provisions for handling spills.
Appendix K-III. Biosafety Level 1 (BL1) - Large Scale
Appendix K-III-A. Spills and accidents which result in overt exposures to organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules are immediately reported to the Laboratory Director.
Medical evaluation, surveillance, and treatment are provided as appropriate and written records are
maintained.
Appendix K-III-B. Cultures of viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules shall be handled in a closed system (e.g., closed vessel used for the propagation and growth
of cultures) or other primary containment equipment (e.g., biological safety cabinet containing a centrifuge
used to process culture fluids) which is designed to reduce the potential for escape of viable organisms.
Volumes less than 10 liters may be handled outside of a closed system or other primary containment
equipment provided all physical containment requirements specified in Appendix G-II-A, Physical
Containment Levels--Biosafety Level 1, are met.
Appendix K-III-C. Culture fluids (except as allowed in Appendix K-III-D) shall not be removed from a
closed system or other primary containment equipment unless the viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules have been inactivated by a validated inactivation
procedure. A validated inactivation procedure is one which has been demonstrated to be effective using
the organism that will serve as the host for propagating the recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules. Culture fluids that contain viable organisms or viral vectors intended as final product may be
removed from the primary containment equipment by way of closed systems for sample analysis, further
processing or final fill.
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Appendix K-III-D. Sample collection from a closed system, the addition of materials to a closed system,
and the transfer of culture fluids from one closed system to another shall be conducted in a manner which
minimizes the release of aerosols or contamination of exposed surfaces.
Appendix K-III-E. Exhaust gases removed from a closed system or other primary containment
equipment shall be treated by filters which have efficiencies equivalent to high efficiency particulate
air/HEPA filters or by other equivalent procedures (e.g., incineration) to minimize the release of viable
organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules to the environment.
Appendix K-III-F. A closed system or other primary containment equipment that has contained viable
organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall not be opened for
maintenance or other purposes unless it has been sterilized by a validated sterilization procedure except
when the culture fluids contain viable organisms or vectors intended as final product as described in
Appendix K-III-C above. A validated sterilization procedure is one which has been demonstrated to be
effective using the organism that will serve as the host for propagating the recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecules.
Appendix K-III-G. Emergency plans required by Sections IV-B-2-b-(6), Institutional Biosafety Committee,
and IV-B-3-c-(3), Biological Safety Officer, shall include methods and procedures for handling large
losses of culture on an emergency basis.
Appendix K-IV. Biosafety Level 2 (BL2) - Large Scale
Appendix K-IV-A. Spills and accidents which result in overt exposures to organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules are immediately reported to the Biological Safety Officer,
Institutional Biosafety Committee, NIH OSP, and other appropriate authorities (if applicable). Reports to
NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail
to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP
website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). Medical evaluation, surveillance, and treatment are provided as
appropriate and written records are maintained.
Appendix K-IV-B. Cultures of viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules shall be handled in a closed system (e.g., closed vessel used for the propagation and growth
of cultures) or other primary containment equipment (e.g., Class III biological safety cabinet containing a
centrifuge used to process culture fluids) which is designed to prevent the escape of viable organisms.
Volumes less than 10 liters may be handled outside of a closed system or other primary containment
equipment provided all physical containment requirements specified in Appendix G-II-B, Physical
Containment Levels--Biosafety Level 2, are met.
Appendix K-IV-C. Culture fluids (except as allowed in Appendix K-IV-D) shall not be removed from a
closed system or other primary containment equipment unless the viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules have been inactivated by a validated inactivation
procedure. A validated inactivation procedure is one which has been demonstrated to be effective using
the organism that will serve as the host for propagating the recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules. Culture fluids that contain viable organisms or viral vectors intended as final product may be
removed from the primary containment equipment by way of closed systems for sample analysis, further
processing or final fill.
Appendix K-IV-D. Sample collection from a closed system, the addition of materials to a closed system,
and the transfer of cultures fluids from one closed system to another shall be conducted in a manner
which prevents the release of aerosols or contamination of exposed surfaces.
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Appendix K-IV-E. Exhaust gases removed from a closed system or other primary containment
equipment shall be treated by filters which have efficiencies equivalent to high efficiency particulate
air/HEPA filters or by other equivalent procedures (e.g., incineration) to prevent the release of viable
organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules to the environment.
Appendix K-IV-F. A closed system or other primary containment equipment that has contained viable
organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall not be opened for
maintenance or other purposes unless it has been sterilized by a validated sterilization procedure except
when the culture fluids contain viable organisms or vectors intended as final product as described in
Appendix K-IV-C above. A validated sterilization procedure is one which has been demonstrated to be
effective using the organisms that will serve as the host for propagating the recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecules.
Appendix K-IV-G. Rotating seals and other mechanical devices directly associated with a closed system
used for the propagation and growth of viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules shall be designed to prevent leakage or shall be fully enclosed in ventilated housings that are
exhausted through filters which have efficiencies equivalent to high efficiency particulate air/HEPA filters
or through other equivalent treatment devices.
Appendix K-IV-H. A closed system used for the propagation and growth of viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules and other primary containment equipment used to
contain operations involving viable organisms containing sensing devices that monitor the integrity of
containment during operations.
Appendix K-IV-I. A closed system used for the propagation and growth of viable organisms containing
the recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be tested for integrity of the containment
features using the organism that will serve as the host for propagating recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules. Testing shall be accomplished prior to the introduction of viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules and following modification or replacement of essential
containment features. Procedures and methods used in the testing shall be appropriate for the
equipment design and for recovery and demonstration of the test organism. Records of tests and results
shall be maintained on file.
Appendix K-IV-J. A closed system used for the propagation and growth of viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be permanently identified. This identification shall
be used in all records reflecting testing, operation, and maintenance and in all documentation relating to
use of this equipment for research or production activities involving viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules.
Appendix K-IV-K. The universal biosafety sign shall be posted on each closed system and primary
containment equipment when used to contain viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecules.
Appendix K-IV-L. Emergency plans required by Sections IV-B-2-b-(6), Institutional Biosafety Committee,
and IV-B-3-c-(3), Biological Safety Officer, shall include methods and procedures for handling large
losses of culture on an emergency basis.
Appendix K-V. Biosafety Level 3 (BL3) - Large Scale
Appendix K-V-A. Spills and accidents which result in overt exposures to organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules are immediately reported to the Biological Safety Officer,
Institutional Biosafety Committee, NIH OSP, and other appropriate authorities (if applicable). Reports to
NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail
to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP
website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). Medical evaluation, surveillance, and treatment are provided as
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appropriate and written records are maintained.
Appendix K-V-B. Cultures of viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules shall be handled in a closed system (e.g., closed vessels used for the propagation and growth
of cultures) or other primary containment equipment (e.g., Class III biological safety cabinet containing a
centrifuge used to process culture fluids) which is designed to prevent the escape of viable organisms.
Volumes less than 10 liters may be handled outside of a closed system provided all physical containment
requirements specified in Appendix G-II-C, Physical Containment Levels--Biosafety Level 3, are met.
Appendix K-V-C. Culture fluids (except as allowed in Appendix K-V-D) shall not be removed from a
closed system or other primary containment equipment unless the viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules have been inactivated by a validated inactivation
procedure. A validated inactivation procedure is one which has been demonstrated to be effective using
the organisms that will serve as the host for propagating the recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules. Culture fluids that contain viable organisms or viral vectors intended as final product may be
removed from the primary containment equipment by way of closed systems for sample analysis, further
processing or final fill.
Appendix K-V-D. Sample collection from a closed system, the addition of materials to a closed system,
and the transfer of culture fluids from one closed system to another shall be conducted in a manner which
prevents the release of aerosols or contamination of exposed surfaces.
Appendix K-V-E. Exhaust gases removed from a closed system or other primary containment
equipment shall be treated by filters which have efficiencies equivalent to high efficiency particulate
air/HEPA filters or by other equivalent procedures (e.g., incineration) to prevent the release of viable
organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules to the environment.
Appendix K-V-F. A closed system or other primary containment equipment that has contained viable
organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall not be opened for
maintenance or other purposes unless it has been sterilized by a validated sterilization procedure except
when the culture fluids contain viable organisms or vectors intended as final product as described in
Appendix K-V-C above. A validated sterilization procedure is one which has been demonstrated to be
effective using the organisms that will serve as the host for propagating the recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecules.
Appendix K-V-G. A closed system used for the propagation and growth of viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be operated so that the space above the culture
level will be maintained at a pressure as low as possible, consistent with equipment design, in order to
maintain the integrity of containment features.
Appendix K-V-H. Rotating seals and other mechanical devices directly associated with a closed system
used to contain viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be
designed to prevent leakage or shall be fully enclosed in ventilated housings that are exhausted through
filters which have efficiencies equivalent to high efficiency particulate air/HEPA filters or through other
equivalent treatment devices.
Appendix K-V-I. A closed system used for the propagation and growth of viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules and other primary containment equipment used to
contain operations involving viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules
shall include monitoring or sensing devices that monitor the integrity of containment during operations.
Appendix K-V-J. A closed system used for the propagation and growth of viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be tested for integrity of the containment features
using the organisms that will serve as the host for propagating the recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules. Testing shall be accomplished prior to the introduction of viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules and following modification or replacement of essential
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containment features. Procedures and methods used in the testing shall be appropriate for the
equipment design and for recovery and demonstration of the test organism. Records of tests and results
shall be maintained on file.
Appendix K-V-K. A closed system used for the propagation and growth of viable organisms containing
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be permanently identified. This identification shall
be used in all records reflecting testing, operation, maintenance, and use of this equipment for research
production activities involving viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecules.
Appendix K-V-L. The universal biosafety sign shall be posted on each closed system and primary
containment equipment when used to contain viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecules.
Appendix K-V-M. Emergency plans required by Sections IV-B-2-b-(6), Institutional Biosafety Committee,
and IV-B-3-c-(3), Biological Safety Officer, shall include methods and procedures for handling large
losses of culture on an emergency basis.
Appendix K-V-N. Closed systems and other primary containment equipment used in handling cultures of
viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be located within a
controlled area which meets the following requirements:
Appendix K-V-N-1. The controlled area shall have a separate entry area. The entry area shall be a
double-doored space such as an air lock, anteroom, or change room that separates the controlled area
from the balance of the facility.
Appendix K-V-N-2. The surfaces of walls, ceilings, and floors in the controlled area shall be such as to
permit ready cleaning and decontamination.
Appendix K-V-N-3. Penetrations into the controlled area shall be sealed to permit liquid or vapor phase
space decontamination.
Appendix K-V-N-4. All utilities and service or process piping and wiring entering the controlled area shall
be protected against contamination.
Appendix K-V-N-5. Hand washing facilities equipped with foot, elbow, or automatically operated valves
shall be located at each major work area and near each primary exit.
Appendix K-V-N-6. A shower facility shall be provided. This facility shall be located in close proximity to
the controlled area.
Appendix K-V-N-7. The controlled area shall be designed to preclude release of culture fluids outside
the controlled area in the event of an accidental spill or release from the closed systems or other primary
containment equipment.
Appendix K-V-N-8. The controlled area shall have a ventilation system that is capable of controlling air
movement. The movement of air shall be from areas of lower contamination potential to areas of higher
contamination potential. If the ventilation system provides positive pressure supply air, the system shall
operate in a manner that prevents the reversal of the direction of air movement or shall be equipped with
an alarm that would be actuated in the event that reversal in the direction of air movement were to occur.
The exhaust air from the controlled area shall not be recirculated to other areas of the facility. The
exhaust air from the controlled area may not be discharged to the outdoors without being high efficiency
particulate air/HEPA filtered, subjected to thermal oxidation, or otherwise treated to prevent the release of
viable organisms.
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Appendix K-V-O. The following personnel and operational practices shall be required:
Appendix K-V-O-1. Personnel entry into the controlled area shall be through the entry area specified in
Appendix K-V-N-1.
Appendix K-V-O-2. Persons entering the controlled area shall exchange or cover their personal clothing
with work garments such as jump suits, laboratory coats, pants and shirts, head cover, and shoes or shoe
covers. On exit from the controlled area the work clothing may be stored in a locker separate from that
used for personal clothing or discarded for laundering. Clothing shall be decontaminated before
laundering.
Appendix K-V-O-3. Entry into the controlled area during periods when work is in progress shall be
restricted to those persons required to meet program or support needs. Prior to entry, all persons shall
be informed of the operating practices, emergency procedures, and the nature of the work conducted.
Appendix K-V-O-4. Persons under 18 years of age shall not be permitted to enter the controlled area.
Appendix K-V-O-5. The universal biosafety sign shall be posted on entry doors to the controlled area
and all internal doors when any work involving the organism is in progress. This includes periods when
decontamination procedures are in progress. The sign posted on the entry doors to the controlled area
shall include a statement of agents in use and personnel authorized to enter the controlled area.
Appendix K-V-O-6. The controlled area shall be kept neat and clean.
Appendix K-V-O-7. Eating, drinking, smoking, and storage of food are prohibited in the controlled area.
Appendix K-V-O-8. Animals and plants shall be excluded from the controlled area.
Appendix K-V-O-9. An effective insect and rodent control program shall be maintained.
Appendix K-V-O-10. Access doors to the controlled area shall be kept closed, except as necessary for
access, while work is in progress. Service doors leading directly outdoors shall be sealed and locked
while work is in progress.
Appendix K-V-O-11. Persons shall wash their hands when exiting the controlled area.
Appendix K-V-O-12. Persons working in the controlled area shall be trained in emergency procedures.
Appendix K-V-O-13. Equipment and materials required for the management of accidents involving
viable organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be available in the
controlled area.
Appendix K-V-O-14. The controlled area shall be decontaminated in accordance with established
procedures following spills or other accidental release of viable organisms containing recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecules.

Page 112 - NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules

(April 2019)

Appendix K - Table 1.
Comparison of Good Large Scale Practice (GLSP) and Biosafety Level
(BL) - Large Scale (LS) Practice (See Appendix K-VI-A, Footnotes Of Appendix K)
CRITERION
[See Appendix K-VI-B, Footnotes of Appendix K]

GLSP

BL1-LS

BL2-LS

BL3-LS

1.

Formulate and implement institutional codes of practice for
safety of personnel and adequate control of hygiene and
safety measures.

K-II-A

G-I

2.

Provide adequate written instructions and training of
personnel to keep work place clean and tidy and to keep
exposure to biological, chemical or physical agents at a
level that does not adversely affect health and safety of
employees.

K-II-B

G-I

3.

Provide changing and hand washing facilities as well as
protective clothing, appropriate to the risk, to be worn
during work.

K-II-C

G-II-A-1-h

G-II-B-2-f

G-II-C-2-i

4.

Prohibit eating, drinking, smoking, mouth pipetting, and
applying cosmetics in the work place.

K-II-C

G-II-A-1-d
G-II-A-1-e

G-II-B-1-d
G-II-B-1-e

G-II-C-1-c
G-II-C-1-d

5.

Internal accident reporting.

K-II-G

K-III-A

K-IV-A

K-V-A

6.

Medical surveillance.

NR

NR

7.

Viable organisms should be handled in a system that
physically separates the process from the external
environment (closed system or other primary
containment).

NR

K-III-B

K-IV-B

K-V-B

8.

Culture fluids not removed from a system until organisms
are inactivated.

NR

K-III-C

K-IV-C

K-V-C

9.

Inactivation of waste solutions and materials with respect
to their biohazard potential.

K-II-E

K-III-C

K-IV-C

K-V-C

10.

Control of aerosols by engineering or procedural controls
to prevent or minimize release of organisms during
sampling from a system, addition of materials to a system,
transfer of cultivated cells, and removal of material,
products, and effluent from a system.

Minimize
Procedure
K-II-F

Minimize
Engineer
K-III-B
K-III-D

Prevent
Engineer
K-IV-B
K-IV-D

Prevent
Engineer
K-V-B
K-V-D

11.

Treatment of exhaust gases from a closed system to
minimize or prevent release of viable organisms.

NR

Minimize
K-III-E

Prevent
K-IV-E

Prevent
K-V-E

12.

Closed system that has contained viable organisms not to
be opened until sterilized by a validated procedure.

NR

K-III-F

K-IV-F

K-V-F

13.

Closed system to be maintained at as a low pressure as
possible to maintain integrity of containment features.

NR

NR

NR

K-V-G

14.

Rotating seals and other penetrations into closed system
designed to prevent or minimize leakage.

NR

NR

Prevent
K-IV-G

Prevent
K-V-H

15.

Closed system shall incorporate monitoring or sensing
devices to monitor the integrity of containment.

NR

NR

K-IV-H

K-V-I

16.

Validated integrity testing of closed containment system.

NR

NR

K-IV-I

K-V-J

17.

Closed system to be permanently identified for record
keeping purposes.

NR

NR

K-IV-J

K-V-K
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GLSP

BL1-LS

BL2-LS

BL3-LS

18.

Universal biosafety sign to be posted on each closed
system.

NR

NR

K-IV-K

K-V-L

19.

Emergency plans required for handling large losses of
cultures.

K-II-G

K-III-G

K-IV-L

K-V-M

20.

Access to the work place.

NR

G-II-A-1-a

G-II-B-1-a

K-V-N

21.

Requirements for controlled access area.

NR

NR

NR

K-V-N&O
NR = not required

Appendix K-VI. Footnotes of Appendix K
Appendix K-VI-A. This table is derived from the text in Appendices G (Physical Containment) and K and
is not to be used in lieu of Appendices G and K.
Appendix K-VI-B. The criteria in this grid address only the biological hazards associated with organisms
containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid. Other hazards accompanying the large-scale cultivation
of such organisms (e.g., toxic properties of products; physical, mechanical, and chemical aspects of
downstream processing) are not addressed and shall be considered separately, albeit in conjunction with
this grid.
Appendix K-VII. Definitions to Accompany Containment Grid and Appendix K
Appendix K-VII-A. Accidental Release. An accidental release is the unintentional discharge of a
microbiological agent (i.e., microorganism or virus) or eukaryotic cell due to a failure in the containment
system.
Appendix K-VII-B. Biological Barrier. A biological barrier is an impediment (naturally occurring or
introduced) to the infectivity and/or survival of a microbiological agent or eukaryotic cell once it has been
released into the environment.
Appendix K-VII-C. Closed System. A closed system is one in which by its design and proper operation,
prevents release of a microbiological agent or eukaryotic cell contained therein.
Appendix K-VII-D. Containment. Containment is the confinement of a microbiological agent or
eukaryotic cell that is being cultured, stored, manipulated, transported, or destroyed in order to prevent or
limit its contact with people and/or the environment. Methods used to achieve this include: physical and
biological barriers and inactivation using physical or chemical means.
Appendix K-VII-E. De minimis Release. De minimis release is the release of: (i) viable microbiological
agents or eukaryotic cells that does not result in the establishment of disease in healthy people, plants, or
animals; or (ii) in uncontrolled proliferation of any microbiological agents or eukaryotic cells.
Appendix K-VII-F. Disinfection. Disinfection is a process by which viable microbiological agents or
eukaryotic cells are reduced to a level unlikely to produce disease in healthy people, plants, or animals.
Appendix K-VII-G. Good Large Scale Practice Organism. For an organism to qualify for Good Large
Scale Practice consideration, it must meet the following criteria [Reference: Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations, 1987, p. 34-35]: (i) the host
organism should be non-pathogenic, should not contain adventitious agents and should have an
extended history of safe large-scale use or have built-in environmental limitations that permit optimum
growth in the large-scale setting but limited survival without adverse consequences in the environment;
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(ii) the recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-engineered organism should be non-pathogenic,
should be as safe in the large-scale setting as the host organism, and without adverse consequences in
the environment; and (iii) the vector/insert should be well characterized and free from known harmful
sequences; should be limited in size as much as possible to the DNA required to perform the intended
function; should not increase the stability of the construct in the environment unless that is a requirement
of the intended function; should be poorly mobilizable; and should not transfer any resistance markers to
microorganisms unknown to acquire them naturally if such acquisition could compromise the use of a
drug to control disease agents in human or veterinary medicine or agriculture.
Appendix K-VII-H. Inactivation. Inactivation is any process that destroys the ability of a specific
microbiological agent or eukaryotic cell to self-replicate.
Appendix K-VII-I. Incidental Release. An incidental release is the discharge of a microbiological agent
or eukaryotic cell from a containment system that is expected when the system is appropriately designed
and properly operated and maintained.
Appendix K-VII-J. Minimization. Minimization is the design and operation of containment systems in
order that any incidental release is a de minimis release.
Appendix K-VII-K. Pathogen. A pathogen is any microbiological agent or eukaryotic cell containing
sufficient genetic information, which upon expression of such information, is capable of producing disease
in healthy people, plants, or animals.
Appendix K-VII-L. Physical Barrier. A physical barrier is considered any equipment, facilities, or
devices (e.g., fermentors, factories, filters, thermal oxidizers) which are designed to achieve containment.
Appendix K-VII-M. Release. Release is the discharge of a microbiological agent or eukaryotic cell from
a containment system. Discharges can be incidental or accidental. Incidental releases are de minimis in
nature; accidental releases may be de minimis in nature.
***********************************************************************************************************************
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APPENDIX L. PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL CONTAINMENT FOR RECOMBINANT OR
SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULE RESEARCH INVOLVING PLANTS
Appendix L specifies physical and biological containment conditions and practices suitable to the
greenhouse conduct of experiments involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-containing
plants, plant-associated microorganisms, and small animals. All provisions of the NIH Guidelines apply to
plant research activities with the following modifications:
Appendix L shall supersede Appendix G (Physical Containment) when the research plants are of a size,
number, or have growth requirements that preclude the use of containment conditions described in
Appendix G. The plants covered in Appendix L include but are not limited to mosses, liverworts,
macroscopic algae, and vascular plants including terrestrial crops, forest, and ornamental species.
Plant-associated microorganisms include viroids, virusoids, viruses, bacteria, fungi, protozoans, certain
small algae, and microorganisms that have a benign or beneficial association with plants, such as certain
Rhizobium species and microorganisms known to cause plant diseases. The appendix applies to
microorganisms which are being modified with the objective of fostering an association with plants.
Plant-associated small animals include those arthropods that: (i) are in obligate association with plants,
(ii) are plant pests, (iii) are plant pollinators, or (iv) transmit plant disease agents, as well as other small
animals such as nematodes for which tests of biological properties necessitate the use of plants.
Microorganisms associated with such small animals (e.g., pathogens or symbionts) are included.
The Institutional Biosafety Committee shall include at least one individual with expertise in plant, plant
pathogen, or plant pest containment principles when experiments utilizing Appendix L require prior
approval by the Institutional Biosafety Committee.
Appendix L-I.

General Plant Biosafety Levels

Appendix L-I-A. The principal purpose of plant containment is to avoid the unintentional transmission of
a recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-containing plant genome, including nuclear or organelle
hereditary material or release of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-derived organisms
associated with plants.
Appendix L-I-B. The containment principles are based on the recognition that the organisms that are
used pose no health threat to humans or higher animals (unless deliberately modified for that purpose),
and that the containment conditions minimize the possibility of an unanticipated deleterious effect on
organisms and ecosystems outside of the experimental facility, e.g., the inadvertent spread of a serious
pathogen from a greenhouse to a local agricultural crop or the unintentional introduction and
establishment of an organism in a new ecosystem.
Appendix L-I-C. Four biosafety levels, referred to as Biosafety Level (BL) 1 - Plants (P), BL2-P, BL3-P,
and BL4-P, are established in Appendix L-II, Physical Containment Levels. The selection of containment
levels required for research involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules in plants or
associated with plants is specified in Appendix L-III, Biological Containment Practices. These biosafety
levels are described in Appendix L-II, Physical Containment Levels. This appendix describes greenhouse
practices and special greenhouse facilities for physical containment.
Appendix L-I-D. BL1-P through BL4-P are designed to provide differential levels of biosafety for plants in
the absence or presence of other experimental organisms that contain recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules. These biosafety levels, in conjunction with biological containment conditions described in
Appendix L-III, Biological Containment Practices, provide flexible approaches to ensure the safe conduct
of research.
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Appendix L-I-E. For experiments in which plants are grown at the BL1 through BL4 laboratory settings,
containment practices shall be followed as described in Appendix G, Physical Containment. These
containment practices include the use of plant tissue culture rooms, growth chambers within laboratory
facilities, or experiments performed on open benches. Additional biological containment practices should
be added by the Greenhouse Director or Institutional Biosafety Committee as necessary (see Appendix LIII, Biological Containment Practices), if botanical reproductive structures are produced that have the
potential of being released.
Appendix L-II.

Physical Containment Levels

Appendix L-II-A.

Biosafety Level 1 - Plants (BL1-P)

Appendix L-II-A-1.

Standard Practices (BL1-P)

Appendix L-II-A-1-a.

Greenhouse Access (BL1-P)

Appendix L-II-A-1-a-(1). Access to the greenhouse shall be limited or restricted, at the discretion of the
Greenhouse Director, when experiments are in progress.
Appendix L-II-A-1-a-(2). Prior to entering the greenhouse, personnel shall be required to read and follow
instructions on BL1-P greenhouse practices and procedures. All procedures shall be performed in
accordance with accepted greenhouse practices that are appropriate to the experimental organism.
Appendix L-II-A-1-b.

Records (BL1-P)

Appendix L-II-A-1-b-(1). A record shall be kept of experiments currently in progress in the greenhouse
facility.
Appendix L-II-A-1-c.

Decontamination and Inactivation (BL1-P)

Appendix L-II-A-1-c-(1). Experimental organisms shall be rendered biologically inactive by appropriate
methods before disposal outside of the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-A-1-d.

Control of Undesired Species and Motile Macroorganisms (BL1-P)

Appendix L-II-A-1-d-(1). A program shall be implemented to control undesired species (e.g., weed,
rodent, or arthropod pests and pathogens), by methods appropriate to the organisms and in accordance
with applicable state and Federal laws.
Appendix L-II-A-1-d-(2). Arthropods and other motile macroorganisms shall be housed in appropriate
cages. If macroorganisms (e.g., flying arthropods or nematodes) are released within the greenhouse,
precautions shall be taken to minimize escape from the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-A-1-e.

Concurrent Experiments Conducted in the Greenhouse (BL1-P)

Appendix L-II-A-1-e-(1). Experiments involving other organisms that require a containment level lower
than BL1-P may be conducted in the greenhouse concurrently with experiments that require BL1-P
containment, provided that all work is conducted in accordance with BL1-P greenhouse practices.
Appendix L-II-A-2.

Facilities (BL1-P)

Appendix L-II-A-2-a.

Definitions (BL1-P)

Appendix L-II-A-2-a-(1). The term "greenhouse" refers to a structure with walls, a roof, and a floor
designed and used principally for growing plants in a controlled and protected environment. The walls
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and roof are usually constructed of transparent or translucent material to allow passage of sunlight for
plant growth.
Appendix L-II-A-2-a-(2). The term "greenhouse facility" includes the actual greenhouse rooms or
compartments for growing plants, including all immediately contiguous hallways and head-house areas,
and is considered part of the confinement area.
Appendix L-II-A-2-b.

Greenhouse Design (BL1-P)

Appendix L-II-A-2-b-(1). The greenhouse floor may be composed of gravel or other porous material. At
a minimum, impervious (e.g., concrete) walkways are recommended.
Appendix L-II-A-2-b-(2). Windows and other openings in the walls and roof of the greenhouse facility
may be open for ventilation as needed for proper operation and do not require any special barrier to
contain or exclude pollen, microorganisms, or small flying animals (e.g., arthropods and birds); however,
screens are recommended.
Appendix L-II-B.

Biosafety Level 2 - Plants (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-1.

Standard Practices (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-1-a.

Greenhouse Access (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-1-a-(1). Access to the greenhouse shall be limited or restricted, at the discretion of the
Greenhouse Director, to individuals directly involved with the experiments when they are in progress.
Appendix L-II-B-1-a-(2). Personnel shall be required to read and follow instructions on BL2-P practices
and procedures. All procedures shall be conducted in accordance with accepted greenhouse practices
that are appropriate to the experimental organisms.
Appendix L-II-B-1-b.

Records (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-1-b-(1). A record shall be kept of experimental plants, microorganisms, or small animals
that are brought into or removed from the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-B-1-b-(2). A record shall be kept of experiments currently in progress in the greenhouse
facility.
Appendix L-II-B-1-b-(3). The Principal Investigator shall report any greenhouse accident involving the
inadvertent release or spill of microorganisms to the Greenhouse Director, Institutional Biosafety
Committee, NIH OSP and other appropriate authorities immediately (if applicable). Reports to the NIH
OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to:
NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP website
(www.osp.od.nih.gov). Documentation of any such accident shall be prepared and maintained.
Appendix L-II-B-1-c.

Decontamination and Inactivation (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-1-c-(1). Experimental organisms shall be rendered biologically inactive by appropriate
methods before disposal outside of the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-B-1-c-(2). Decontamination of run-off water is not necessarily required. If part of the
greenhouse is composed of gravel or similar material, appropriate treatments should be made periodically
to eliminate, or render inactive, any organisms potentially entrapped by the gravel.
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Control of Undesired Species and Motile Macroorganisms (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-1-d-(1). A program shall be implemented to control undesired species (e.g., weed,
rodent, or arthropod pests and pathogens) by methods appropriate to the organisms and in accordance
with applicable state and Federal laws.
Appendix L-II-B-1-d-(2). Arthropods and other motile macroorganisms shall be housed in appropriate
cages. If macroorganisms (e.g., flying arthropods or nematodes) are released within the greenhouse,
precautions shall be taken to minimize escape from the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-B-1-e.

Concurrent Experiments Conducted in the Greenhouse (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-1-e-(1). Experiments involving other organisms that require a containment level lower
than BL2-P may be conducted in the greenhouse concurrently with experiments that require BL2-P
containment provided that all work is conducted in accordance with BL2-P greenhouse practices.
Appendix L-II-B-1-f.

Signs (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-1-f-(1). A sign shall be posted indicating that a restricted experiment is in progress. The
sign shall indicate the following: (i) the name of the responsible individual, (ii) the plants in use, and (iii)
any special requirements for using the area.
Appendix L-II-B-1-f-(2). If organisms are used that have a recognized potential for causing serious
detrimental impacts on managed or natural ecosystems, their presence shall be indicated on a sign
posted on the greenhouse access doors.
Appendix L-II-B-1-f-(3). If there is a risk to human health, a sign shall be posted incorporating the
universal biosafety symbol.
Appendix L-II-B-1-g.

Transfer of Materials (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-1-g-(1). Materials containing experimental microorganisms, which are brought into or
removed from the greenhouse facility in a viable or intact state, shall be transferred in a closed
non-breakable container.
Appendix L-II-B-1-h.

Greenhouse Practices Manual (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-1-h-(1). A greenhouse practices manual shall be prepared or adopted. This manual
shall: (i) advise personnel of the potential consequences if such practices are not followed, and (ii)
outline contingency plans to be implemented in the event of the unintentional release of organisms.
Appendix L-II-B-2.

Facilities (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-2-a.

Definitions (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-2-a-(1). The term "greenhouse" refers to a structure with walls, a roof, and a floor
designed and used principally for growing plants in a controlled and protected environment. The walls
and roof are usually constructed of transparent or translucent material to allow passage of sunlight for
plant growth.
Appendix L-II-B-2-a-(2). The term "greenhouse facility" includes the actual greenhouse rooms or
compartments for growing plants, including all immediately contiguous hallways and head-house areas
and is considered part of the confinement area.
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Greenhouse Design (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-2-b-(1). A greenhouse floor composed of an impervious material. Concrete is
recommended, but gravel or other porous material under benches is acceptable unless propagules of
experimental organisms are readily disseminated through soil. Soil beds are acceptable unless
propagules of experimental organisms are readily disseminated through soil.
Appendix L-II-B-2-b-(2). Windows and other openings in the walls and roof of the greenhouse facility
may be open for ventilation as needed for proper operation and do not require any special barrier to
exclude pollen or microorganisms; however, screens are required to exclude small flying animals (e.g.,
arthropods and birds).
Appendix L-II-B-2-c.

Autoclaves (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-2-c-(1). An autoclave shall be available for the treatment of contaminated greenhouse
materials.
Appendix L-II-B-2-d.

Supply and Exhaust Air Ventilation Systems (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-2-d-(1). If intake fans are used, measures shall be taken to minimize the ingress of
arthropods. Louvers or fans shall be constructed such that they can only be opened when the fan is in
operation.
Appendix L-II-B-2-e.

Other (BL2-P)

Appendix L-II-B-2-e-(1). BL2-P greenhouse containment requirements may be satisfied by using a
growth chamber or growth room within a building provided that the external physical structure limits
access and escape of microorganisms and macroorganisms in a manner that satisfies the intent of the
foregoing clauses.
Appendix L-II-C.

Biosafety Level 3 - Plants (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1.

Standard Practices (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-a.

Greenhouse Access (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-a-(1). Authorized entry into the greenhouse shall be restricted to individuals who are
required for program or support purposes. The Greenhouse Director shall be responsible for assessing
each circumstance and determining those individuals who are authorized to enter the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-C-1-a-(2). Prior to entering the greenhouse, personnel shall be required to read and follow
instructions on BL3-P practices and procedures. All procedures shall be conducted in accordance with
accepted greenhouse practices that are appropriate to the experimental organisms.
Appendix L-II-C-1-b.

Records (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-b-(1). A record shall be kept of experimental plants, microorganisms, or small animals
that are brought into or removed from the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-C-1-b-(2). A record shall be kept of experiments currently in progress in the greenhouse
facility.
Appendix L-II-C-1-b-(3). The Principal Investigator shall report any greenhouse accident involving the
inadvertent release or spill of microorganisms to the Biological Safety Officer, Greenhouse Director,
Institutional Biosafety Committee, NIH OSP, and other appropriate authorities immediately (if applicable).
Reports to the NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health,
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preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here
and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). Documentation of any such accident shall be prepared
and maintained.
Appendix L-II-C-1-c.

Decontamination and Inactivation (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-c-(1). All experimental materials shall be sterilized in an autoclave or rendered
biologically inactive by appropriate methods before disposal, except those that are to remain in a viable or
intact state for experimental purposes; including water that comes in contact with experimental
microorganisms or with material exposed to such microorganisms, and contaminated equipment and
supplies.
Appendix L-II-C-1-d.

Control of Undesired Species and Motile Macroorganisms (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-d-(1). A program shall be implemented to control undesired species (e.g., weed,
rodent, or arthropod pests and pathogens) by methods appropriate to the organisms and in accordance
with applicable state and Federal laws.
Appendix L-II-C-1-d-(2). Arthropods and other motile macroorganisms shall be housed in appropriate
cages. When appropriate to the organism, experiments shall be conducted within cages designed to
contain the motile organisms.
Appendix L-II-C-1-e.

Concurrent Experiments Conducted in the Greenhouse (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-e-(1). Experiments involving organisms that require a containment level lower than
BL3-P may be conducted in the greenhouse concurrently with experiments that require BL3-P
containment provided that all work is conducted in accordance with BL3-P greenhouse practices.
Appendix L-II-C-1-f.

Signs (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-f-(1). A sign shall be posted indicating that a restricted experiment is in progress. The
sign shall indicate the following: (i) the name of the responsible individual, (ii) the plants in use, and (iii)
any special requirements for using the area.
Appendix L-II-C-1-f-(2). If organisms are used that have a recognized potential for causing serious
detrimental impacts on managed or natural ecosystems, their presence should be indicated on a sign
posted on the greenhouse access doors.
Appendix L-II-C-1-f-(3). If there is a risk to human health, a sign shall be posted incorporating the
universal biosafety symbol.
Appendix L-II-C-1-g.

Transfer of Materials (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-g-(1). Experimental materials that are brought into or removed from the greenhouse
facility in a viable or intact state shall be transferred to a non-breakable sealed secondary container. At
the time of transfer, if the same plant species, host, or vector are present within the effective
dissemination distance of propagules of the experimental organism, the surface of the secondary
container shall be decontaminated. Decontamination may be accomplished by passage through a
chemical disinfectant or fumigation chamber or by an alternative procedure that has demonstrated
effective inactivation of the experimental organism.
Appendix L-II-C-1-h.

Greenhouse Practices Manual (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-h-(1). A greenhouse practices manual shall be prepared or adopted. This manual
shall: (i) advise personnel of the potential consequences if such practices are not followed, and (ii)
outline contingency plans to be implemented in the event of the unintentional release of organisms with
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recognized potential for serious detrimental impact.
Appendix L-II-C-1-i.

Protective Clothing (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-i-(1). Disposable clothing (e.g., solid front or wrap-around gowns, scrub suits, or other
appropriate clothing) shall be worn in the greenhouse if deemed necessary by the Greenhouse Director
because of potential dissemination of the experimental microorganisms.
Appendix L-II-C-1-i-(2). Protective clothing shall be removed before exiting the greenhouse and
decontaminated prior to laundering or disposal.
Appendix L-II-C-1-j.

Other (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-1-j-(1). Personnel are required to thoroughly wash their hands upon exiting the
greenhouse.
Appendix L-II-C-1-j-(2). All procedures shall be performed carefully to minimize the creation of aerosols
and excessive splashing of potting material/soil during watering, transplanting, and all experimental
manipulations.
Appendix L-II-C-2.

Facilities (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-2-a.

Definitions (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-2-a-(1). The term "greenhouse" refers to a structure with walls, roof, and floor designed
and used principally for growing plants in a controlled and protected environment. The walls and roof are
usually constructed of transparent or translucent material to allow passage of sunlight for plant growth.
Appendix L-II-C-2-a-(2). The term "greenhouse facility" includes the actual greenhouse rooms or
compartments for growing plants, including all immediately contiguous hallways and head-house areas,
and is considered part of the confinement area. The need to maintain negative pressure should be
considered when constructing or renovating the greenhouse.
Appendix L-II-C-2-b.

Greenhouse Design (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-2-b-(1). The greenhouse floor shall be composed of concrete or other impervious
material with provision for collection and decontamination of liquid run-off.
Appendix L-II-C-2-b-(2). Windows shall be closed and sealed. All glazing shall be resistant to breakage
(e.g., double-pane tempered glass or equivalent).
Appendix L-II-C-2-b-(3). The greenhouse shall be a closed self-contained structure with a continuous
covering that is separated from areas that are open to unrestricted traffic flow. The minimum requirement
for greenhouse entry shall be passage through two sets of self-closing locking doors.
Appendix L-II-C-2-b-(4). The greenhouse facility shall be surrounded by a security fence or protected by
equivalent security measures.
Appendix L-II-C-2-b-(5). Internal walls, ceilings, and floors shall be resistant to penetration by liquids
and chemicals to facilitate cleaning and decontamination of the area. All penetrations into these
structures and surfaces (e.g., plumbing and utilities) shall be sealed.
Appendix L-II-C-2-b-(6). Bench tops and other work surfaces should have seamless surfaces that are
impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic solvents, and moderate heat.
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Appendix L-II-C-2-b-(7). The greenhouse contains a foot, elbow, or automatically operated sink, which is
located near the exit door for hand washing.
Appendix L-II-C-2-c.

Autoclaves (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-2-c-(1). An autoclave shall be available for decontaminating materials within the
greenhouse facility. A double-door autoclave is recommended (not required) for the decontamination of
materials passing out of the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-C-2-d.

Supply and Exhaust Air Ventilation Systems (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-2-d-(1). An individual supply and exhaust air ventilation system shall be provided. The
system maintains pressure differentials and directional airflow, as required, to assure inward (or zero)
airflow from areas outside of the greenhouse.
Appendix L-II-C-2-d-(2). The exhaust air from the greenhouse facility shall be filtered through high
efficiency particulate air-HEPA filters and discharged to the outside. The filter chambers shall be
designed to allow in situ decontamination before filters are removed and to facilitate certification testing
after they are replaced. Air filters shall be 80-85% average efficiency by the American Society of Heating,
Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) Standard 52-68 test method using atmosphere
dust. Air supply fans shall be equipped with a back-flow damper that closes when the air supply fan is off.
Alternatively, a HEPA filter may be used on the air supply system instead of the filters and damper. The
supply and exhaust airflow shall be interlocked to assure inward (or zero) airflow at all times.
Appendix L-II-C-2-e.

Other (BL3-P)

Appendix L-II-C-2-e-(1). BL3-P greenhouse containment requirements may be satisfied using a growth
chamber or growth room within a building provided that the location, access, airflow patterns, and
provisions for decontamination of experimental materials and supplies meet the intent of the foregoing
clauses.
Appendix L-II-C-2-e-(2). Vacuum lines shall be protected with high efficiency particulate air/HEPA or
equivalent filters and liquid disinfectant traps.
Appendix L-II-D.

Biosafety Level 4 - Plants (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1.

Standard Practices (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1-a.

Greenhouse Access (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1-a-(1). Authorized entry into the greenhouse shall be restricted to individuals who are
required for program or support purposes. The Greenhouse Director shall be responsible for assessing
each circumstance and determining those individuals who are authorized to enter the greenhouse facility
or work in the greenhouse during experiments.
Appendix L-II-D-1-a-(2). Access shall be managed by the Greenhouse Director, Biological Safety
Officer, or other individual responsible for physical security of the greenhouse facility; and access limited
by means of secure, locked doors.
Appendix L-II-D-1-a-(3). Prior to entering, individuals shall be advised of the potential environmental
hazards and instructed on appropriate safeguards for ensuring environmental safety. Individuals
authorized to enter the greenhouse facility shall comply with the instructions and all other applicable
entry/exit procedures.
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Appendix L-II-D-1-a-(4). Personnel shall enter and exit the greenhouse facility only through the clothing
change and shower rooms and shall shower each time they exit the greenhouse facility. Personnel shall
use the airlocks to enter or exit the laboratory only in an emergency. In the event of an emergency, every
reasonable effort should be made to prevent the possible transport of viable propagules from
containment.
Appendix L-II-D-1-a-(5). Prior to entering the greenhouse, personnel shall be required to read and follow
instructions on BL4-P practices and procedures.
Appendix L-II-D-1-b.

Records (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1-b-(1). A record shall be kept of all experimental materials brought into or removed
from the greenhouse.
Appendix L-II-D-1-b-(2). A record shall be kept of experiments currently in progress in the greenhouse
facility.
Appendix L-II-D-1-b-(3). A record shall be kept of all personnel entering and exiting the greenhouse
facility, including the date and time of each entry.
Appendix L-II-D-1-b-(4). The Principal Investigator shall report any greenhouse accident involving the
inadvertent release or spill of microorganisms to the Biological Safety Officer, Greenhouse Director,
Institutional Biosafety Committee, NIH OSP, and other appropriate authorities immediately (if applicable).
Reports to the NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health,
preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here
and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). Documentation of any such accident shall be prepared
and maintained.
Appendix L-II-D-1-c.

Decontamination and Inactivation (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1-c-(1). All materials, except for those that are to remain in a viable or intact state for
experimental purposes, shall be autoclaved prior to removal from the maximum containment greenhouse.
Equipment or material that could be damaged by high temperatures or steam shall be decontaminated by
alternative methods (e.g., gas or vapor sterilization) in an airlock or chamber designed for this purpose.
Appendix L-II-D-1-c-(2). Water that comes in contact with experimental microorganisms or with material
exposed to such microorganisms (e.g., run-off from watering plants) shall be collected and
decontaminated before disposal.
Appendix L-II-D-1-c-(3). Standard microbiological procedures shall be followed for decontamination of
equipment and materials. Spray or liquid waste or rinse water from containers used to apply the
experimental microorganisms shall be decontaminated before disposal.
Appendix L-II-D-1-d.

Control of Undesired Species and Motile Macroorganisms (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1-d-(1). A chemical control program shall be implemented to eliminate undesired pests
and pathogens in accordance with applicable state and Federal laws.
Appendix L-II-D-1-d-(2). Arthropods and other motile macroorganisms used in conjunction with
experiments requiring BL4-P level physical containment shall be housed in appropriate cages. When
appropriate to the organism, experiments shall be conducted within cages designed to contain the motile
organisms.
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Concurrent Experiments Conducted in the Greenhouse (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1-e-(1). Experiments involving organisms that require a containment level lower than
BL4-P may be conducted in the greenhouse concurrently with experiments that require BL4-P
containment provided that all work is conducted in accordance with BL4-P greenhouse practices. When
the experimental microorganisms in use require a containment level lower than BL4-P, greenhouse
practices reflect the level of containment required by the highest containment level microorganisms being
tested.
Appendix L-II-D-1-f.

Signs (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1-f-(1). A sign shall be posted indicating that a restricted experiment is in progress. The
sign shall indicate the following: (i) the name of the responsible individual, (ii) the plants in use, and (iii)
any special requirements for using the area.
Appendix L-II-D-1-f-(2). If organisms are used that have a recognized potential for causing serious
detrimental impacts on managed or natural ecosystems, their presence shall be indicated by a sign
posted on the greenhouse access doors.
Appendix L-II-D-1-f-(3). If there is a risk to human health, a sign shall be posted incorporating the
universal biosafety symbol.
Appendix L-II-D-1-g.

Transfer of Materials (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1-g-(1). Experimental materials that are brought into or removed from the greenhouse
in a viable or intact state shall be transferred to a non-breakable, sealed, primary container then enclosed
in a non-breakable, sealed secondary container. These containers shall be removed from the
greenhouse facility through a chemical disinfectant, fumigation chamber, or an airlock designed for this
purpose.
Appendix L-II-D-1-g-(2). Supplies and materials shall be brought into the greenhouse facility through a
double-door autoclave, fumigation chamber, or airlock that is appropriately decontaminated between each
use. After securing the outer doors, personnel within the greenhouse facility shall retrieve the materials
by opening the interior door of the autoclave, fumigation chamber, or airlock. These doors shall be
secured after the materials are brought into the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-D-1-h.

Greenhouse Practices Manual (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1-h-(1). A greenhouse practices manual shall be prepared or adopted. This manual
shall include contingency plans to be implemented in the event of the unintentional release of
experimental organisms.
Appendix L-II-D-1-i.

Protective Clothing (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-1-i-(1). Street clothing shall be removed in the outer clothing change room. Complete
laboratory clothing (may be disposable) including undergarments, pants, and shirts, jump suits, shoes,
and hats shall be provided and worn by all personnel entering the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-D-1-i-(2). Personnel shall remove laboratory clothing when exiting the greenhouse facility
and before entering the shower area. This clothing shall be stored in a locker or hamper in the inner
change room.
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Appendix L-II-D-1-i-(3). All laboratory clothing shall be autoclaved before laundering.
Appendix L-II-D-2.

Facilities (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-2-a.

Greenhouse Design (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-2-a-(1). The maximum containment greenhouse facility shall consist of a separate
building or a clearly demarcated and isolated area within a building. The need to maintain negative
pressure should be considered when constructing or renovating the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-D-2-a-(2). Outer and inner change rooms, separated by a shower, shall be provided for
personnel entering and exiting the greenhouse facility.
Appendix L-II-D-2-a-(3). Windows shall be closed and sealed. All glazing shall be resistant to breakage
(e.g., double-pane tempered glass or equivalent).
Appendix L-II-D-2-a-(4). Access doors to the greenhouse shall be self-closing and locking.
Appendix L-II-D-2-a-(5). The greenhouse facility shall be surrounded by a security fence or protected by
equivalent security measures.
Appendix L-II-D-2-a-(6). The walls, floors, and ceilings of the greenhouse shall be constructed to form a
sealed internal shell that facilitates fumigation and is animal and arthropod-proof. These internal surfaces
shall be resistant to penetration and degradation by liquids and chemicals to facilitate cleaning and
decontamination of the area. All penetrations into these structures and surfaces (e.g., plumbing and
utilities) shall be sealed.
Appendix L-II-D-2-a-(7). Bench tops and other work surfaces shall have seamless surfaces impervious
to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic solvents, and moderate heat.
Appendix L-II-D-2-a-(8). A double-door autoclave, fumigation chamber, or ventilated airlock shall be
provided for passage of all materials, supplies, or equipment that are not brought into the greenhouse
facility through the change room.
Appendix L-II-D-2-b.

Autoclaves (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-2-b-(1). A double-door autoclave shall be provided for the decontamination of materials
removed from the greenhouse facility. The autoclave door, which opens to the area external to the
greenhouse facility, shall be sealed to the outer wall and automatically controlled so that it can only be
opened upon completion of the sterilization cycle.
Appendix L-II-D-2-c.

Supply and Exhaust Air Ventilation Systems (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-2-c-(1). An individual supply and exhaust air ventilation system shall be provided. The
system shall maintain pressure differentials and directional airflow as required to assure inward (or zero)
airflow from areas outside of the greenhouse. Differential pressure transducers shall be used to sense
pressure levels. If a system malfunctions, the transducers shall sound an alarm. A backup source of
power should be considered. The supply and exhaust airflow shall be interlocked to assure inward (or
zero) airflow at all times. The integrity of the greenhouse shall have an air leak rate (decay rate) not to
exceed 7 percent per minute (logarithm of pressure against time) over a 20-minute period at 2 inches of
water gauge pressure. Nominally, this is 0.05 inches of water gauge pressure loss in 1 minute at 2
inches water gauge pressure.
Appendix L-II-D-2-c-(2). Exhaust air from the greenhouse facility shall be filtered through high efficiency
particulate air/HEPA filters and discharged to the outside and dispersed away from occupied buildings
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and air intakes. Filter chambers shall be designed to allow in situ decontamination before filters are
removed and to facilitate certification testing after they are replaced. HEPA filters shall be provided to
treat air supplied to the greenhouse facility. HEPA filters shall be certified annually.
Appendix L-II-D-2-d.

Other (BL4-P)

Appendix L-II-D-2-d-(1). Sewer vents and other ventilation lines contain high efficiency particulate
air/HEPA filters. HEPA filters shall be certified annually.
Appendix L-II-D-2-d-(2). A pass-through dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or an equivalent method of
decontamination shall be provided to ensure decontamination of materials and equipment that cannot be
decontaminated in the autoclave.
Appendix L-II-D-2-d-(3). Liquid effluent from sinks, floors, and autoclave chambers shall be
decontaminated by heat or chemical treatment before being released from the maximum containment
greenhouse facility. Liquid wastes from shower rooms and toilets may be decontaminated by heat or
chemical treatment. Autoclave and chemical decontamination of liquid wastes shall be evaluated by
appropriate standard procedures for autoclaved wastes. Decontamination shall be evaluated
mechanically and biologically using a recording thermometer and an indicator microorganism with a
defined heat susceptibility pattern. If liquid wastes are decontaminated with chemical disinfectants, the
chemicals used must have demonstrated efficacy against the target or indicator microorganisms.
Appendix L-II-D-2-d-(4). If there is a central vacuum system, it shall not serve areas outside of the
greenhouse facility. In-line high efficiency particulate air/HEPA filters shall be placed as near as
practicable to each use point or vacuum service cock. Other liquid and gas services to the greenhouse
facility shall be protected by devices that prevent back-flow. HEPA filters shall be certified annually.
Appendix L-III. Biological Containment Practices
Appropriate selection of the following biological containment practices may be used to meet the
containment requirements for a given organism. The present list is not exhaustive; there may be other
ways of preventing effective dissemination that could possibly lead to the establishment of the organism
or its genetic material in the environment resulting in deleterious consequences to managed or natural
ecosystems.
Appendix L-III-A.

Biological Containment Practices (Plants)

Appendix L-III-A-1. Effective dissemination of plants by pollen or seed can be prevented by one or more
of the following procedures: (i) cover the reproductive structures to prevent pollen dissemination at
flowering and seed dissemination at maturity; (ii) remove reproductive structures by employing male
sterile strains, or harvest the plant material prior to the reproductive stage; (iii) ensure that experimental
plants flower at a time of year when cross-fertile plants are not flowering within the normal pollen
dispersal range of the experimental plant; or (iv) ensure that cross-fertile plants are not growing within the
known pollen dispersal range of the experimental plant.
Appendix L-III-B.

Biological Containment Practices (Microorganisms)

Appendix L-III-B-1. Effective dissemination of microorganisms beyond the confines of the greenhouse
can be prevented by one or more of the following procedures: (i) confine all operations to injections of
microorganisms or other biological procedures (including genetic manipulation) that limit replication or
reproduction of viruses and microorganisms or sequences derived from microorganisms, and confine
these injections to internal plant parts or adherent plant surfaces; (ii) ensure that organisms, which can
serve as hosts or promote the transmission of the virus or microorganism, are not present within the
farthest distance that the airborne virus or microorganism may be expected to be effectively
disseminated; (iii) conduct experiments at a time of year when plants that can serve as hosts are either
not growing or are not susceptible to productive infection; (iv) use viruses and other microorganisms or
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their genomes that have known arthropod or animal vectors, in the absence of such vectors; (v) use
microorganisms that have an obligate association with the plant; or (vi) use microorganisms that are
genetically disabled to minimize survival outside of the research facility and whose natural mode of
transmission requires injury of the target organism, or assures that inadvertent release is unlikely to
initiate productive infection of organisms outside of the experimental facility.
Appendix L-III-C.

Biological Containment Practices (Macroorganisms)

Appendix L-III-C-1. Effective dissemination of arthropods and other small animals can be prevented by
using one or more of the following procedures: (i) use non-flying, flight-impaired, or sterile arthropods; (ii)
use non-motile or sterile strains of small animals; (iii) conduct experiments at a time of year that precludes
the survival of escaping organisms; (iv) use animals that have an obligate association with a plant that is
not present within the dispersal range of the organism; or (v) prevent the escape of organisms present in
run-off water by chemical treatment or evaporation of run-off water.
***********************************************************************************************************************

This Page is Intentionally Blank

Page 128 - NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules

(April 2019)

APPENDIX M. PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL CONTAINMENT FOR RECOMBINANT OR
SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULE RESEARCH INVOLVING ANIMALS
Appendix M specifies containment and confinement practices for research involving whole animals, both
those in which the animal's genome has been altered by stable introduction of recombinant or synthetic
nucleic acid molecules, or DNA derived therefrom, into the germ-line (transgenic animals) and
experiments involving viable recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-modified microorganisms
tested on whole animals. The appendix applies to animal research activities with the following
modifications:
Appendix M shall supersede Appendix G (Physical Containment) when research animals are of a size or
have growth requirements that preclude the use of containment for laboratory animals. Some animals
may require other types of containment (see Appendix M-III-D, Footnotes and References for Appendix
M). The animals covered in Appendix M are those species normally categorized as animals including but
not limited to cattle, swine, sheep, goats, horses, and poultry.
The Institutional Biosafety Committee shall include at least one scientist with expertise in animal
containment principles when experiments utilizing Appendix M require Institutional Biosafety Committee
prior approval.
The institution shall establish and maintain a health surveillance program for personnel engaged in animal
research involving viable recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-containing microorganisms that
require Biosafety Level (BL) 3 or greater containment in the laboratory.
Appendix M-I.

General Considerations

Appendix M-I-A.Containment Levels
The containment levels required for research involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules
associated with or in animals is based on classification of experiments in Section III, Experiments
Covered by the NIH Guidelines. For the purpose of animal research, four levels of containment are
established. These are referred to as BL1-Animals (N), BL2-N, BL3-N, and BL4-N and are described in
the following appendices of Appendix M. The descriptions include: (i) standard practices for physical and
biological containment, and (ii) animal facilities.
Appendix M-I-B.Disposal of Animals (BL1-N through BL4-N)
Appendix M-I-B-1. When an animal covered by Appendix M containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules or a recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule-derived organism is euthanized or
dies, the carcass shall be disposed of to avoid its use as food for human beings or animals unless food
use is specifically authorized by an appropriate Federal agency.
Appendix M-I-B-2. A permanent record shall be maintained of the experimental use and disposal of
each animal or group of animals.
Appendix M-II. Physical and Biological Containment Levels
Appendix M-II-A.

Biosafety Level 1 - Animals (BL1-N)

Appendix M-II-A-1.

Standard Practices (BL1-N)

Appendix M-II-A-1-a.

Animal Facility Access (BL1-N)

Appendix M-II-A-1-a-(1). The containment area shall be locked.
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Appendix M-II-A-1-a-(2). Access to the containment area shall be limited or restricted when
experimental animals are being held.
Appendix M-II-A-1-a-(3). The containment area shall be patrolled or monitored at frequent intervals.
Appendix M-II-A-1-b.

Other (BL1-N)

Appendix M-II-A-1-b-(1). All genetically engineered neonates shall be permanently marked within 72
hours after birth, if their size permits. If their size does not permit marking, their containers should be
marked. In addition, transgenic animals should contain distinct and biochemically assayable DNA
sequences that allow identification of transgenic animals from among non-transgenic animals.
Appendix M-II-A-1-b-(2) A double barrier shall be provided to separate male and female animals unless
reproductive studies are part of the experiment or other measures are taken to avoid reproductive
transmission. Reproductive incapacitation may be used.
Appendix M-II-A-1-b-(3). The containment area shall be in accordance with state and Federal laws and
animal care requirements.
Appendix M-II-A-2.

Animal Facilities (BL1-N)

Appendix M-II-A-2-a. Animals shall be confined to securely fenced areas or be in enclosed structures
(animal rooms) to minimize the possibility of theft or unintentional release.
Appendix M-II-B.
Biosafety Level 2 - Animals (BL2-N) (See Appendix M-III-A, Footnotes and
References for Appendix M)
Appendix M-II-B-1.

Standard Practices (BL2-N)

Appendix M-II-B-1-a.

Animal Facility Access (BL2-N)

Appendix M-II-B-1-a-(1). The containment area shall be locked.
Appendix M-II-B-1-a-(2). The containment area shall be patrolled or monitored at frequent intervals.
Appendix M-II-B-1-a-(3). The containment building shall be controlled and have a locking access.
Appendix M-II-B-1-a-(4). The Animal Facility Director shall establish policies and procedures whereby
only persons who have been advised of the potential hazard and who meet any specific entry
requirements (e.g., vaccination) may enter the laboratory or animal rooms.
Appendix M-II-B-1-a-(5). Animals of the same or different species, which are not involved in the work
being performed, shall not be permitted in the animal area.
Appendix M-II-B-1-b.

Decontamination and Inactivation (BL2-N)

Appendix M-II-B-1-b-(1). Contaminated materials that are decontaminated at a site away from the
laboratory shall be placed in a closed durable leak-proof container prior to removal from the laboratory.
Appendix M-II-B-1-b-(2). Needles and syringes shall be promptly placed in a puncture-resistant
container and decontaminated, preferably by autoclaving, before discard or reuse.
Appendix M-II-B-1-c.

Signs (BL2-N)

Appendix M-II-B-1-c-(1). When the animal research requires special provisions for entry (e.g.,
vaccination), a warning sign incorporating the universal biosafety symbol shall be posted on all access
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doors to the animal work area. The sign shall indicate: (i) the agent, (ii) the animal species, (iii) the name
and telephone number of the Animal Facility Director or other responsible individual, and (iv) any special
requirements for entering the laboratory.
Appendix M-II-B-1-d.

Protective Clothing (BL2-N)

Appendix M-II-B-1-d-(1). Laboratory coats, gowns, smocks, or uniforms shall be worn while in the
animal area or attached laboratory. Before entering non-laboratory areas (e.g., cafeteria, library,
administrative offices), protective clothing shall be removed and kept in the work entrance area.
Appendix M-II-B-1-d-(2). Special care shall be taken to avoid skin contamination with microorganisms
containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules. Impervious and/or protective gloves shall be
worn when handling experimental animals and when skin contact with an infectious agent is unavoidable.
Appendix M-II-B-1-e.

Records (BL2-N)

Appendix M-II-B-1-e-(1). Any incident involving spills and accidents that result in environmental release
or exposures of animals or laboratory workers to organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules shall be reported immediately to the Animal Facility Director, Institutional Biosafety
Committee, NIH OSP, and other appropriate authorities (if applicable). Reports to the NIH OSP shall be
sent to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to:
NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP website
(www.osp.od.nih.gov). Medical evaluation, surveillance, and treatment shall be provided as appropriate
and written records maintained. If necessary, the area shall be appropriately decontaminated.
Appendix M-II-B-1-e-(2). When appropriate and giving consideration to the agent handled, baseline
serum samples shall be collected and stored for animal care and other at-risk personnel. Additional
serum specimens may be collected periodically depending on the agent handled and the function of the
animal facility.
Appendix M-II-B-1-f.

Transfer of Materials (BL2-N)

Appendix M-II-B-1-f-(1). Biological materials removed from the animal containment area in a viable or
intact state shall be transferred to a non-breakable sealed primary container and then enclosed in a nonbreakable sealed secondary container. All containers, primary and secondary, shall be disinfected before
removal from the animal facility. Advance approval for transfer of material shall be obtained from the
Animal Facility Director. Packages containing viable agents may only be opened in a facility having an
equivalent or higher level of physical containment unless the agent is biologically inactivated or incapable
of reproduction.
Appendix M-II-B-1-g.

Other (BL2-N)

Appendix M-II-B-1-g-(1). All genetically engineered neonates shall be permanently marked within 72
hours after birth, if their size permits. If their size does not permit marking, their containers should be
marked. In addition, transgenic animals should contain distinct and biochemically assayable DNA
sequences that allow identification of transgenic animals from among non-transgenic animals.
Appendix M-II-B-1-g-(2). Needles and syringes shall be used only for parenteral injection and aspiration
of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm bottles. Only needle-locking syringes or disposable
syringe-needle units (i.e., needle is integral to the syringe) shall be used for the injection or aspiration of
fluids containing organisms that contain recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules. Extreme
caution shall be used when handling needles and syringes to avoid autoinoculation and the generation of
aerosols during use and disposal. Following use, needles shall not be bent, sheared, replaced in the
needle sheath or guard, or removed from the syringe. Needles and syringes shall be promptly placed in a
puncture-resistant container and decontaminated, preferably by autoclaving, before discard or reuse.
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Appendix M-II-B-1-g-(3). Appropriate steps should be taken to prevent horizontal transmission or
exposure of laboratory personnel. If the agent used as a vector is known to be transmitted by a particular
route (e.g., arthropods), special attention should be given to preventing spread by that route. In the
absence of specific knowledge of a particular route of transmission, all potential means of horizontal
transmission (e.g., arthropods, contaminated bedding, or animal waste, etc.) should be prevented.
Appendix M-II-B-1-g-(4). Eating, drinking, smoking, and applying cosmetics shall not be permitted in the
work area.
Appendix M-II-B-1-g-(5). Individuals who handle materials and animals containing recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be required to wash their hands before exiting the containment
area.
Appendix M-II-B-1-g-(6). A double barrier shall be provided to separate male and female animals unless
reproductive studies are part of the experiment or other measures are taken to avoid reproductive
transmission. Reproductive incapacitation may be used.
Appendix M-II-B-1-g-(7). The containment area shall be in accordance with state and Federal laws and
animal care requirements.
Appendix M-II-B-1-g-(8). A biosafety manual shall be prepared or adopted. Personnel shall be advised
of special hazards and required to read and follow instructions on practices and procedures.
Appendix M-II-B-2.

Animal Facilities (BL2-N)

Appendix M-II-B-2-a. Animals shall be contained within an enclosed structure (animal room or
equivalent) to minimize the possibility of theft or unintentional release and to avoid arthropod access. The
special provision to avoid the entry or escape of arthropods from the animal areas may be waived if the
agent in use is not known to be transmitted by arthropods.
Appendix M-II-B-2-b. Surfaces shall be impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, organic
solvents, and moderate heat.
Appendix M-II-B-2-c. The animal containment area shall be designed so that it can be easily cleaned.
Appendix M-II-B-2-d. Windows that open shall be fitted with fly screens.
Appendix M-II-B-2-e. An autoclave shall be available for decontamination of laboratory wastes.
Appendix M-II-B-2-f. If arthropods are used in the experiment or the agent under study can be
transmitted by an arthropod, interior work areas shall be appropriately screened (52 mesh). All perimeter
joints and openings shall be sealed and additional arthropod control mechanisms used to minimize
arthropod entry and propagation, including appropriate screening of access doors or the equivalent.
Appendix M-II-C.
Biosafety Level 3 - Animals (BL3-N) (See Appendix M-III-B, Footnotes and
References for Appendix M)
Appendix M-II-C-1.

Standard Practices (BL3-N)

Appendix M-II-C-1-a.

Animal Facility Access (BL3-N)

Appendix M-II-C-1-a-(1). The containment area shall be locked.
Appendix M-II-C-1-a-(2). The containment area shall be patrolled or monitored at frequent intervals.
Appendix M-II-C-1-a-(3). The containment building shall be controlled and have a locking access.
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Appendix M-II-C-1-a-(4). The Animal Facility Director shall establish policies and procedures whereby
only persons who have been advised of the potential hazard and who meet any specific entry
requirements (e.g., vaccination) shall enter the laboratory or animal rooms.
Appendix M-II-C-1-a-(5). Animal room doors, gates, or other closures shall be kept closed when
experiments are in progress.
Appendix M-II-C-1-b.

Decontamination and Inactivation (BL3-N)

Appendix M-II-C-1-b-(1). The work surfaces of containment equipment shall be decontaminated when
work with organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules is finished. Where
feasible, plastic-backed paper toweling shall be used on nonporous work surfaces to facilitate clean-up.
Appendix M-II-C-1-b-(2). All animals shall be euthanized at the end of their experimental usefulness and
the carcasses decontaminated before disposal in an approved manner.
Appendix M-II-C-1-b-(3). Needles and syringes shall be promptly placed in a puncture-resistant
container and decontaminated, preferably by autoclaving, before discard or reuse.
Appendix M-II-C-1-b-(4). Special safety testing, decontamination procedures, and Institutional Biosafety
Committee approval shall be required to transfer agents or tissue/organ specimens from a BL3-N animal
facility to a facility with a lower containment classification.
Appendix M-II-C-1-b-(5). Liquid effluent from containment equipment, sinks, biological safety cabinets,
animal rooms, primary barriers, floor drains, and sterilizers shall be decontaminated by heat treatment
before being released into the sanitary system. The procedure used for heat decontamination of liquid
wastes shall be monitored with a recording thermometer. The effectiveness of the heat decontamination
process system shall be revalidated at minimum on a yearly basis with an indicator organism. More
frequent validation, based on the amount of use or other safety factors, shall be left to the discretion of
the IBC.
Appendix M-II-C-1-c.

Signs (BL3-N)

Appendix M-II-C-1-c-(1). When the animal research requires special provisions for entry (e.g.,
vaccination), a warning sign incorporating the universal biosafety symbol shall be posted on all access
doors to the animal work area. The sign shall indicate: (i) the agent, (ii) the animal species, (iii) the name
and telephone number of the Animal Facility Director or other responsible individual, and (iv) any special
requirements for entering the laboratory.
Appendix M-II-C-1-d.

Protective Clothing (BL3-N)

Appendix M-II-C-1-d-(1). Full protective clothing that protects the individual (e.g., scrub suits, coveralls,
uniforms) shall be worn in the animal area. Clothing shall not be worn outside the animal containment
area and shall be decontaminated before laundering or disposal. Personnel shall be required to shower
before exiting the BL3-N area and wearing of personal clothing.
Appendix M-II-C-1-d-(2). Special care shall be taken to avoid skin contamination with microorganisms
containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules. Impervious and/or protective gloves shall be
worn when handling experimental animals and when skin contact with an infectious agent is unavoidable.
Appendix M-II-C-1-d-(3). Appropriate respiratory protection shall be worn in rooms containing
experimental animals.
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Records (BL3-N)

Appendix M-II-C-1-e-(1). Documents regarding experimental animal use and disposal shall be
maintained in a permanent record book.
Appendix M-II-C-1-e-(2). Any incident involving spills and accidents that result in environmental release
or exposure of animals or laboratory workers to organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules shall be reported immediately to the Biological Safety Office, Animal Facility Director,
Institutional Biosafety Committee, NIH OSP, and other appropriate authorities (if applicable). Reports to
the NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by email to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional contact information is also available here and on the OSP
website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). Medical evaluation, surveillance, and treatment shall be provided as
appropriate and written records maintained. If necessary, the area shall be appropriately
decontaminated.
Appendix M-II-C-1-e-(3). When appropriate and giving consideration to the agent handled, baseline
serum samples shall be collected and stored for animal care and other at-risk personnel. Additional
serum specimens may be collected periodically depending on the agent handled or the function of the
facility.
Appendix M-II-C-1-f.

Transfer of Materials (BL3-N)

Appendix M-II-C-1-f-(1). Biological materials removed from the animal containment laboratory in a viable
or intact state shall be transferred to a non-breakable sealed primary container and then enclosed in a
non-breakable sealed secondary container. All containers, primary and secondary, shall be disinfected
before removal from the animal facility. Advance approval for transfer of material shall be obtained from
the Animal Facility Director. Packages containing viable agents may be opened only in a facility having
an equivalent or higher level of physical containment unless the agent is biologically inactivated or
incapable of reproduction.
Appendix M-II-C-1-f-(2). Special safety testing, decontamination procedures, and Institutional Biosafety
Committee approval shall be required to transfer agents or tissue/organ specimens from a BL3-N animal
facility to a facility with a lower containment classification.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g.

Other (BL3-N)

Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(1). All genetically engineered neonates shall be permanently marked within 72
hours after birth, if their size permits. If their size does not permit marking, their containers should be
marked. In addition, transgenic animals should contain distinct and biochemically assayable DNA
sequences that allow identification of transgenic animals from among non-transgenic animals.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(2). Appropriate steps should be taken to prevent horizontal transmission or
exposure of laboratory personnel. If the agent used as the vector is known to be transmitted by a
particular route (e.g., arthropods), special attention should be given to preventing spread by that route. In
the absence of specific knowledge of a particular route of transmission, all potential means of horizontal
transmission (e.g., arthropods, contaminated bedding, or animal waste) should be prevented.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(3). Eating, drinking, smoking, and applying cosmetics shall not be permitted in the
work area.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(4). Individuals who handle materials and animals containing recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be required to wash their hands before exiting the containment
area.
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Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(5). Experiments involving other organisms that require containment levels lower
than BL3-N may be conducted in the same area concurrently with experiments requiring BL3-N
containment provided that they are conducted in accordance with BL3-N practices.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(6). Animal holding areas shall be cleaned at least once a day and decontaminated
immediately following any spill of viable materials.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(7). All procedures shall be performed carefully to minimize the creation of
aerosols.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(8). A double barrier shall be provided to separate male and female animals unless
reproductive studies are part of the experiment or other measures are taken to avoid reproductive
transmission. Reproductive incapacitation may be used.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(9). The containment area shall be in accordance with state and Federal laws and
animal care requirements.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(10). All animals shall be euthanized at the end of their experimental usefulness
and the carcasses decontaminated before disposal in an approved manner.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(11). Personnel shall be required to shower before exiting the BL3-N area and
wearing personal clothing.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(12). Animals of the same or different species, which are not involved in the work
being performed, shall not be permitted in the animal area.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(13). Needles and syringes shall be used only for parenteral injection and
aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm bottles. Only needle-locking syringes or
disposable syringe-needle units (i.e., needle is integral to the syringe) shall be used for the injection or
aspiration of fluids containing organisms that contain recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules.
Extreme caution shall be used when handling needles and syringes to avoid autoinoculation and the
generation of aerosols during use and disposal. Following use, needles shall not be bent, sheared,
replaced in the needle sheath or guard or removed from the syringe. The needles and syringes shall be
promptly placed in a puncture-resistant container and decontaminated, preferably by autoclaving, before
discard or reuse.
Appendix M-II-C-1-g-(14). A biosafety manual shall be prepared or adopted. Personnel shall be advised
of special hazards and required to read and follow instructions on practices and procedures.
Appendix M-II-C-2.

Animal Facilities (BL3-N)

Appendix M-II-C-2-a. Animals shall be contained within an enclosed structure (animal room or
equivalent) to minimize the possibility of theft or unintentional release and avoid arthropod access. The
special provision to avoid the entry or escape of arthropods from the animal areas may be waived if the
agent in use is not known to be transmitted by arthropods.
Appendix M-II-C-2-b. The interior walls, floors, and ceilings shall be impervious to water and resistant to
acids, alkalis, organic solvents, and moderate heat, to facilitate cleaning. Penetrations in these structures
and surfaces (e.g., plumbing and utilities) shall be sealed.
Appendix M-II-C-2-c. Windows in the animal facility shall be closed, sealed, and breakage resistant
(e.g., double-pane tempered glass or equivalent). The need to maintain negative pressure should be
considered when constructing or renovating the animal facility.
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Appendix M-II-C-2-d. An autoclave, incinerator, or other effective means to decontaminate animals and
waste shall be available, preferably within the containment area. If feasible, a double-door autoclave is
preferred and should be positioned to allow removal of material from the containment area.
Appendix M-II-C-2-e. If arthropods are used in the experiment or the agent under study can be
transmitted by an arthropod, the interior work area shall be appropriately screened (52 mesh). All
perimeter joints and openings shall be sealed, and additional arthropod control mechanisms used to
minimize arthropod entry and propagation, including appropriate screening, or the equivalent of access
doors.
Appendix M-II-C-2-f. Access doors to the containment area shall be self-closing.
Appendix M-II-C-2-g. The animal area shall be separated from all other areas. Passage through two
sets of doors shall be the basic requirement for entry into the animal area from access corridors or other
contiguous areas. The animal containment area shall be physically separated from access corridors and
other laboratories or areas by a double-door clothes change room, equipped with integral showers and
airlock.
Appendix M-II-C-2-h. Liquid effluent from containment equipment, sinks, biological safety cabinets,
animal rooms, primary barriers, floor drains, and sterilizers shall be decontaminated by heat treatment
before being released into the sanitary system. The procedure used for heat decontamination of liquid
wastes shall be monitored with a recording thermometer. The effectiveness of the heat decontamination
process system shall be revalidated at minimum on a yearly basis with an indicator organism. More
frequent validation, based on the amount of use or other safety factors, shall be left to the discretion of
the IBC.
Appendix M-II-C-2-i. An exhaust air ventilation system shall be provided. This system shall create
directional airflow that draws air into the animal room through the entry area. The building exhaust, or the
exhaust from primary containment units, may be used for this purpose if the exhaust air is discharged to
the outside and shall be dispersed away from occupied areas and air intakes. Personnel shall verify that
the direction of the airflow (into the animal room) is proper.
Appendix M-II-C-2-j. If the agent is transmitted by aerosol, then the exhaust air shall pass through a high
efficiency particulate air/HEPA filter.
Appendix M-II-C-2-k. Vacuum lines shall be protected with high efficiency particulate air/HEPA filters
and liquid disinfectant traps.
Appendix M-II-C-2-l. In lieu of open housing in the special animal room, animals held in a BL3-N area
may be housed in partial-containment caging systems (e.g., Horsfall units or gnotobiotic systems, or other
special containment primary barriers). Prudent judgment must be exercised to implement this ventilation
system (e.g., animal species) and its discharge location.
Appendix M-II-C-2-m. Each animal area shall contain a foot, elbow, or automatically operated sink for
hand washing. The sink shall be located near the exit door.
Appendix M-II-C-2-n. Restraining devices for animals may be required to avoid damage to the integrity
of the animal containment facility.
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Appendix M-II-D.
Biosafety Level 4 - Animals (BL4-N) (See Appendix M-III-C, Footnotes and
References for Appendix M)
Appendix M-II-D-1.

Standard Practices (BL4-N)

Appendix M-II-D-1-a.

Animal Facility Access (BL4-N)

Appendix M-II-D-1-a-(1). Individuals under 16 years of age shall not be permitted to enter the animal
area.
Appendix M-II-D-1-a-(2). The containment area shall be locked.
Appendix M-II-D-1-a-(3). The containment area shall be patrolled or monitored at frequent intervals.
Appendix M-II-D-1-a-(4). The containment building shall be controlled and have a locking access.
Appendix M-II-D-1-a-(5). The Animal Facility Director shall establish policies and procedures whereby
only persons who have been advised of the potential hazard and who meet any specific entry
requirements (e.g., vaccination) may enter the laboratory or animal room.
Appendix M-II-D-1-a-(6). Individuals shall enter and exit the animal facility only through the clothing
change and shower rooms.
Appendix M-II-D-1-a-(7). Personnel shall use the airlocks to enter or exit the laboratory only in an
emergency.
Appendix M-II-D-1-a-(8). Animal room doors, gates, and other closures shall be kept closed when
experiments are in progress.
Appendix M-II-D-1-b.

Decontamination and Inactivation (BL4-N)

Appendix M-II-D-1-b-(1). All contaminated liquid or solid wastes shall be decontaminated before
disposal.
Appendix M-II-D-1-b-(2). The work surfaces and containment equipment shall be decontaminated when
work with organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules is finished. Where
feasible, plastic-backed paper toweling shall be used on nonporous work surfaces to facilitate clean-up.
Appendix M-II-D-1-b-(3). All wastes from animal rooms and laboratories shall be appropriately
decontaminated before disposal in an approved manner.
Appendix M-II-D-1-b-(4). No materials, except for biological materials that are to remain in a viable or
intact state, shall be removed from the maximum containment laboratory unless they have been
autoclaved or decontaminated. Equipment or material that might be damaged by high temperatures or
steam shall be decontaminated by gaseous or vapor methods in an airlock or chamber designed for this
purpose.
Appendix M-II-D-1-b-(5). When ventilated suits are required, the animal personnel shower entrance/exit
area shall be equipped with a chemical disinfectant shower to decontaminate the surface of the suit
before exiting the area. A neutralization or water dilution device shall be integral with the chemical
disinfectant discharge piping before entering the heat sterilization system. Entry to this area shall be
through an airlock fitted with airtight doors.
Appendix M-II-D-1-b-(6). Needles and syringes shall be promptly placed in a puncture-resistant
container and decontaminated, preferably by autoclaving, before discard or reuse.
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Appendix M-II-D-1-b-(7). Supplies and materials needed in the animal facility shall be brought in by way
of the double-door autoclave, fumigation chamber, or airlock that shall be appropriately decontaminated
between each use.
Appendix M-II-D-1-b-(8). An autoclave, incinerator, or other effective means to decontaminate animals
and wastes shall be available, preferably within the containment area. If feasible, a double-door
autoclave is preferred and should be positioned to allow removal of material from the containment area.
Appendix M-II-D-1-b-(9). Liquid effluent from containment equipment, sinks, biological safety cabinets,
animal rooms, primary barriers, floor drains, and sterilizers shall be decontaminated by heat treatment
before being released into the sanitary system. If required by design, regulation, local ordinance or
policy, liquid wastes from shower rooms and toilets shall be decontaminated with chemical disinfectants
or heat by methods demonstrated to be effective. The procedure used for heat decontamination of liquid
wastes shall be monitored with a recording thermometer. The effectiveness of the heat decontamination
process system shall be revalidated at minimum on a yearly basis with an indicator organism. More
frequent validation, based on the amount of use or other safety factors, shall be left to the discretion of
the IBC. If required by design, regulation, local ordinance or policy, liquid wastes from the shower shall
be chemically decontaminated using an Environmental Protection Agency-approved germicide. The
efficacy of the chemical treatment process shall be validated with an indicator organism. Chemical
disinfectants shall be neutralized or diluted before release into general effluent waste systems.
Appendix M-II-D-1-c.

Signs (BL4-N)

Appendix M-II-D-1-c-(1). When the animal research requires special provisions for entry (e.g.,
vaccination), a warning sign incorporating the universal biosafety symbol shall be posted on all access
doors to the animal work area. The sign shall indicate: (i) the agent, (ii) the animal species, (iii) the name
and telephone number of the Animal Facility Director, or other responsible individual, and (iv) any special
requirements for entering the laboratory.
Appendix M-II-D-1-d.

Protective Clothing (BL4-N)

Appendix M-II-D-1-d-(1). Individuals shall enter and exit the animal facility only through the clothing
change and shower rooms. Street clothing shall be removed and kept in the outer clothing change room.
Complete laboratory clothing (may be disposable), including undergarments, pants, shirts, jump suits, and
shoes shall be provided for all personnel entering the animal facility. When exiting the BL4-N area and
before proceeding into the shower area, personnel shall remove their laboratory clothing in the inner
change room. All laboratory clothing shall be autoclaved before laundering. Personnel shall shower each
time they exit the animal facility.
Appendix M-II-D-1-d-(2). A ventilated head-hood or a one-piece positive pressure suit, which is
ventilated by a life-support system, shall be worn by all personnel entering rooms that contain
experimental animals when appropriate. When ventilated suits are required, the animal personnel
shower entrance/exit area shall be equipped with a chemical disinfectant shower to decontaminate the
surface of the suit before exiting the area. A neutralization or water dilution device shall be integral with
the chemical disinfectant discharge piping before entering the heat sterilization system. Entry to this area
shall be through an airlock fitted with airtight doors.
Appendix M-II-D-1-d-(3). Appropriate respiratory protection shall be worn in rooms containing
experimental animals.
Appendix M-II-D-1-e.

Records (BL4-N)

Appendix M-II-D-1-e-(1). Documents regarding experimental animal use and disposal shall be
maintained in a permanent record book.
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Appendix M-II-D-1-e-(2). A system shall be established for: (i) reporting laboratory accidents and
exposures that are a result of overt exposures to organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic
acid molecules, (ii) employee absenteeism, and (iii) medical surveillance of potential laboratoryassociated illnesses. Permanent records shall be prepared and maintained. Any incident involving spills
and accidents that results in environmental release or exposures of animals or laboratory workers to
organisms containing recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be reported immediately to
the Biological Safety Officer, Animal Facility Director, Institutional Biosafety Committee, NIH OSP, and
other appropriate authorities (if applicable). Reports to the NIH OSP shall be sent to the Office of Science
Policy, National Institutes of Health, preferably by e-mail to: NIHGuidelines@od.nih.gov; additional
contact information is also available here and on the OSP website (www.osp.od.nih.gov). Medical
evaluation, surveillance, and treatment shall be provided as appropriate and written records maintained.
If necessary, the area shall be appropriately decontaminated.
Appendix M-II-D-1-e-(3). When appropriate and giving consideration to the agents handled, baseline
serum samples shall be collected and stored for animal care and other at-risk personnel. Additional
serum specimens may be collected periodically depending on the agents handled or the function of the
facility.
Appendix M-II-D-1-e-(4). A permanent record book indicating the date and time of each entry and exit
shall be signed by all personnel.
Appendix M-II-D-1-f.

Transfer of Materials (BL4-N)

Appendix M-II-D-1-f-(1). No materials, except for biological materials that are to remain in a viable or
intact state, shall be removed from the maximum containment laboratory unless they have been
autoclaved or decontaminated. Equipment or material that might be damaged by high temperatures or
steam shall be decontaminated by gaseous or vapor methods in an airlock or chamber designed for this
purpose.
Appendix M-II-D-1-f-(2). Biological materials removed from the animal maximum containment laboratory
in a viable or intact state shall be transferred to a non-breakable sealed primary container and then
enclosed in a non-breakable sealed secondary container that shall be removed from the animal facility
through a disinfectant dunk tank, fumigation chamber, or an airlock designed for this purpose. Advance
approval for transfer of material shall be obtained from the Animal Facility Director. Such packages
containing viable agents can only be opened in another BL4-N animal facility if the agent is biologically
inactivated or incapable of reproduction. Special safety testing, decontamination procedures, and
Institutional Biosafety Committee approval shall be required to transfer agents or tissue/organ specimens
from a BL4-N animal facility to one with a lower containment classification.
Appendix M-II-D-1-f-(3). Supplies and materials needed in the animal facility shall be brought in by way
of the double-door autoclave, fumigation chamber, or airlock that shall be appropriately decontaminated
between each use. After securing the outer doors, personnel within the animal facility retrieve the
materials by opening the interior doors of the autoclave, fumigation chamber, or airlock. These doors
shall be secured after materials are brought into the animal facility.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g.

Other (BL4-N)

Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(1). All genetically engineered neonates shall be permanently marked within 72
hours after birth, if their size permits. If their size does not permit marking, their containers should be
marked. In addition, transgenic animals should contain distinct and biochemically assayable DNA
sequences that allow identification of transgenic animals from among non-transgenic animals.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(2). Eating, drinking, smoking, and applying cosmetics shall not be permitted in the
work area.
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Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(3). Individuals who handle materials and animals containing recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecules shall be required to wash their hands before exiting the containment
area.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(4). Experiments involving other organisms that require containment levels lower
than BL4-N may be conducted in the same area concurrently with experiments requiring BL4-N
containment provided that they are conducted in accordance with BL4-N practices.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(5). Animal holding areas shall be cleaned at least once a day and decontaminated
immediately following any spill of viable materials.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(6). All procedures shall be performed carefully to minimize the creation of
aerosols.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(7). A double barrier shall be provided to separate male and female animals.
Animal isolation barriers shall be sturdy and accessible for cleaning. Reproductive incapacitation may be
used.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(8). The containment area shall be in accordance with state and Federal laws and
animal care requirements.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(9). The life support system for the ventilated suit or head hood is equipped with
alarms and emergency back-up air tanks. The exhaust air from the suit area shall be filtered by two sets
of high efficiency particulate air/HEPA filters installed in series or incinerated. A duplicate filtration unit,
exhaust fan, and an automatically starting emergency power source shall be provided. The air pressure
within the suit shall be greater than that of any adjacent area. Emergency lighting and communication
systems shall be provided. A double-door autoclave shall be provided for decontamination of waste
materials to be removed from the suit area.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(10). Needles and syringes shall be used only for parenteral injection and
aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm bottles. Only needle-locking syringes or
disposable syringe-needle units (i.e., needle is integral to the syringe) shall be used for the injection or
aspiration of fluids containing organisms that contain recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules.
Extreme caution shall be used when handling needles and syringes to avoid autoinoculation and the
generation of aerosols during use and disposal. Following use, needles shall not be bent, sheared,
replaced in the needle sheath or guard, or removed from the syringe. The needles and syringes shall be
promptly placed in a puncture-resistant container and decontaminated, preferably by autoclaving, before
discard or reuse.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(11). An essential adjunct to the reporting-surveillance system is the availability of
a facility for quarantine, isolation, and medical care of personnel with potential or known laboratoryassociated illnesses.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(12). A biosafety manual shall be prepared or adopted. Personnel shall be advised
of special hazards and required to read and follow instructions on practices and procedures.
Appendix M-II-D-1-g-(13). Vacuum lines shall be protected with high efficiency particulate air/HEPA
filters and liquid disinfectant traps.
Appendix M-II-D-2.

Animal Facilities (BL4-N)

Appendix M-II-D-2-a. Animals shall be contained within an enclosed structure (animal room or
equivalent) to minimize the possibility of theft or unintentional release and avoid arthropod access.
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Appendix M-II-D-2-b. The interior walls, floors, and ceilings shall be impervious to water and resistant to
acids, alkalis, organic solvents, and moderate heat, to facilitate cleaning. Penetrations in these structures
and surfaces (e.g., plumbing and utilities) shall be sealed.
Appendix M-II-D-2-c. Windows in the animal facility shall be closed, sealed, and breakage resistant
(e.g., double-pane tempered glass or equivalent).
Appendix M-II-D-2-d. An autoclave, incinerator, or other effective means to decontaminate animals and
wastes shall be available, preferably within the containment area. If feasible, a double-door autoclave is
preferred and should be positioned to allow removal of material from the containment area.
Appendix M-II-D-2-e. Access doors to the containment area shall be self-closing.
Appendix M-II-D-2-f. All perimeter joints and openings shall be sealed to form an arthropod-proof
structure.
Appendix M-II-D-2-g. The BL4-N laboratory provides a double barrier to prevent the release of
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule containing microorganisms into the environment. Design
of the animal facility shall be such that if the barrier of the inner facility is breached, the outer barrier will
prevent release into the environment. The animal area shall be separated from all other areas. Passage
through two sets of doors shall be the basic requirement for entry into the animal area from access
corridors or other contiguous areas. Physical separation of the animal containment area from access
corridors or other laboratories or activities shall be provided by a double-door clothes change room
equipped with integral showers and airlock.
Appendix M-II-D-2-h. A necropsy room shall be provided within the BL4-N containment area.
Appendix M-II-D-2-i. Liquid effluent from containment equipment, sinks, biological safety cabinets,
animal rooms, primary barriers, floor drains, and sterilizers shall be decontaminated by heat treatment
before being released into the sanitary system. If required by design, regulation, local ordinance or
policy, liquid wastes from shower rooms and toilets shall be decontaminated with chemical disinfectants
or heat by methods demonstrated to be effective. The procedure used for heat decontamination of liquid
wastes shall be monitored with a recording thermometer. The effectiveness of the heat decontamination
process system shall be revalidated at minimum on a yearly basis with an indicator organism. More
frequent validation, based on the amount of use or other safety factors, shall be left to the discretion of
the IBC. If required by design, regulation, local ordinance or policy, liquid wastes from the shower shall
be chemically decontaminated using an Environmental Protection Agency-approved germicide. The
efficacy of the chemical treatment process shall be validated with an indicator organism. Chemical
disinfectants shall be neutralized or diluted before release into general effluent waste systems.
Appendix M-II-D-2-j. A ducted exhaust air ventilation system shall be provided that creates directional
airflow that draws air into the laboratory through the entry area. The exhaust air, which is not recirculated
to any other area of the building, shall be discharged to the outside and dispersed away from the
occupied areas and air intakes. Personnel shall verify that the direction of the airflow (into the animal
room) is proper.
Appendix M-II-D-2-k. Exhaust air from BL4-N containment area shall be double high efficiency
particulate air/HEPA filtered or treated by passing through a certified HEPA filter and an air incinerator
before release to the atmosphere. Double HEPA filters shall be required for the supply air system in a
BL4-N containment area.
Appendix M-II-D-2-l. All high efficiency particulate air/HEPA filters' frames and housings shall be
certified to have no detectable smoke [dioctyl phthalate] leaks when the exit face (direction of flow) of the
filter is scanned above 0.01 percent when measured by a linear or logarithmic photometer. The
instrument must demonstrate a threshold sensitivity of at least 1x10-3 micrograms per liter for 0.3
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micrometer diameter dioctyl phthalate particles and a challenge concentration of 80-120 micrograms per
liter. The air sampling rate should be at least 1 cfm (28.3 liters per minute).
Appendix M-II-D-2-m. If an air incinerator is used in lieu of the second high efficiency particulate
air/HEPA filter, it shall be biologically challenged to prove all viable test agents are sterilized. The
biological challenge must be minimally 1x108 organisms per cubic foot of airflow through the incinerator.
It is universally accepted if bacterial spores are used to challenge and verify that the equipment is
capable of killing spores, then assurance is provided that all other known agents are inactivated by the
parameters established to operate the equipment. Test spores meeting this criterion are Bacillus subtilis
var. niger or Bacillus stearothermophilus. The operating temperature of the incinerator shall be
continuously monitored and recorded during use.
Appendix M-II-D-2-n. All equipment and floor drains shall be equipped with deep traps (minimally 5
inches). Floor drains shall be fitted with isolation plugs or fitted with automatic water fill devices.
Appendix M-II-D-2-o. Each animal area shall contain a foot, elbow, or automatically operated sink for
hand washing. The sink shall be located near the exit door.
Appendix M-II-D-2-p. Restraining devices for animals may be required to avoid damage to the integrity
of the containment animal facility.
Appendix M-II-D-2-q. The supply water distribution system shall be fitted with a back-flow preventer or
break tank.
Appendix M-II-D-2-r. All utilities, liquid and gas services, shall be protected with devices that avoid backflow.
Appendix M-II-D-2-s. Sewer and other atmospheric ventilation lines shall be equipped minimally with a
single high efficiency particulate/HEPA filter. Condensate drains from these type housings shall be
appropriately connected to a contaminated or sanitary drain system. The drain position in the housing
dictates the appropriate system to be used.
Appendix M-III. Footnotes and References for Appendix M
Appendix M-III-A. If a recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecule is derived from a Class 2 organism
requiring BL2 containment, personnel shall be required to have specific training in handling pathogenic
agents and directed by knowledgeable scientists.
Appendix M-III-B. Personnel who handle pathogenic and potentially lethal agents shall be required to
have specific training and be supervised by knowledgeable scientists who are experienced in working
with these agents. BL3-N containment also minimizes escape of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid
molecule-containing organisms from exhaust air or waste material from the containment area.
Appendix M-III-C. Risk Group 4 and restricted microorganisms (see Appendix B, Classification of
Human Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, and Sections V-G and V-L, Footnotes and References of
Sections I through IV) pose a high level of individual risk for acquiring life-threatening diseases to
personnel and/or animals. To import animal or plant pathogens, special approval must be obtained from
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services,
National Center for Import-Export, Products Program, 4700 River Road, Unit 40, Riverdale, MD 20737.
Phone: (301) 734-8499; Fax: (301) 734-8226.
Laboratory staff shall be required to have specific and thorough training in handling extremely hazardous
infectious agents, primary and secondary containment, standard and special practices, and laboratory
design characteristics. The laboratory staff shall be supervised by knowledgeable scientists who are
trained and experienced in working with these agents and in the special containment facilities.
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Within work areas of the animal facility, all activities shall be confined to the specially equipped animal
rooms or support areas. The maximum animal containment area and support areas shall have special
engineering and design features to prevent the dissemination of microorganisms into the environment via
exhaust air or waste disposal.
Appendix M-III-D. Other research with non-laboratory animals, which may not appropriately be
conducted under conditions described in Appendix M, may be conducted safely by applying practices
routinely used for controlled culture of these biota. In aquatic systems, for example, BL1 equivalent
conditions could be met by utilizing growth tanks that provide adequate physical means to avoid the
escape of the aquatic species, its gametes, and introduced exogenous genetic material. A mechanism
shall be provided to ensure that neither the organisms nor their gametes can escape into the supply or
discharge system of the rearing container (e.g., tank, aquarium, etc.) Acceptable barriers include
appropriate filtration, irradiation, heat treatment, chemical treatment, etc. Moreover, the top of the rearing
container shall be covered to avoid escape of the organism and its gametes. In the event of tank rupture,
leakage, or overflow, the construction of the room containing these tanks should prevent the organisms
and gametes from entering the building's drains before the organism and its gametes have been
inactivated.
Other types of non-laboratory animals (e.g., nematodes, arthropods, and certain forms of smaller animals)
may be accommodated by using the appropriate BL1 through BL4 or BL1-P through BL4-P containment
practices and procedures as specified in Appendices G and L.
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research.” Dual use research of concern is a subset of dual use research defined as: “life
sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to
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Section 1. Introduction
Life sciences research is essential to the scientific advances that underpin improvements in
public health and safety, agriculture (including crops and other plants and animals) the
environment, materiel 1, and national security. Despite its value and benefits, certain types of
research conducted for legitimate purposes can be utilized for both benevolent and harmful
purposes. Such research is called “dual use research.” For the purposes of this Policy, dual use
research of concern (DURC) is a subset of dual use research defined as life sciences research
that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge,
information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant
threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and
other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.
In general, there are risks associated with life sciences research, such as accidental exposure of
personnel or the environment to a pathogen or toxin. Many existing and complementary
statutes, regulations, and guidelines are in place to address risks associated with biosafety,
physical security, and personnel reliability. 2 Some risks relate directly to the characteristics of
DURC – the risk that knowledge, information, products, or technologies resulting from the
research could be used in a manner that results in harm or threatens society. DURC should be
evaluated for possible risks, as well as benefits, in all these domains, to ensure that risks are
appropriately managed and benefits realized. This Policy addresses dual use research risks
holistically, that is, the risk that knowledge, information, products, or technologies generated
from life sciences research could be used in a manner that results in harm.
Funders of life sciences research and the institutions and scientists who receive those funds
have a shared responsibility for oversight of DURC and for promoting the responsible conduct
and communication of such research. A comprehensive oversight system must include both
the U.S. Government (USG) and institutional oversight processes. The goal of oversight is to
preserve the benefits of life sciences research while minimizing the risk that knowledge,
information, products, or technologies generated by such research could be used in a manner
that results in harm. On March 29, 2012, the USG issued its “Policy for Oversight of Life
Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern” (March 2012 DURC Policy). 3 That policy formalized a
process of regular USG review of USG-funded or -conducted research with certain highconsequence pathogens and toxins to identify DURC and implement risk mitigation measures,
where applicable.

1

Materiel includes food, water, equipment, supplies, or material of any kind.
E.g., the select agent regulations (42 CFR Part 73, 9 CFR Part 121, and 7 CFR Part 331); NIH Guidelines on Research
Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules (NIH Guidelines, http://osp.od.nih.gov/officebiotechnology-activities/biosafety/nih-guidelines); Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories
(BMBL), 5th Edition (http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/BMBL.pdf).
3
The United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern, March 29, 2012,
http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/us-policy-durc-032812.pdf.
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This Policy, the “United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences
Dual Use Research of Concern,” addresses institutional oversight of DURC. Oversight includes
policies, practices, and procedures to ensure DURC is identified and risk mitigation measures
are implemented, where applicable. Institutional oversight of DURC is a critical component of a
comprehensive oversight system because institutions are most familiar with the life sciences
research conducted in their facilities and are in the best position to promote and strengthen
the responsible conduct and communication of DURC. This Policy and the March 2012 DURC
Policy are complementary and emphasize a culture of responsibility by reminding all involved
parties of the shared duty to uphold the integrity of science and prevent its misuse. 4
The components outlined in the March 2012 DURC Policy and in this Policy will be updated, as
needed, following domestic dialogue, international engagement, and input from interested
communities including scientists, national security officials, global health specialists, and the
general public.
The USG has limited the scope of this Policy (Section 6.2) as well as the March 2012 DURC Policy
to a well-defined subset of life sciences research that involves 15 agents and toxins and seven
categories of experiments. The USG will solicit feedback on the experience of institutions in
implementing the Policy; will evaluate the impact of DURC oversight on the life sciences
research enterprise; will assess the advantages and disadvantages of expanding the scope of
the Policy to encompass additional agents and toxins and/or categories of experiments; and will
update the Policy, as warranted. Research institutions are encouraged to be mindful that
research outside of the scope articulated in this Policy (Section 6.2) may also constitute DURC.
Institutions have the discretion to consider other categories of research for DURC potential and
may expand their internal oversight to other types of life sciences research as they deem
appropriate, but such expansion would not be subject to oversight as articulated in this Policy.
It is important to note that life sciences research that meets the definition of DURC often
increases our understanding of the biology of pathogens; makes critical contributions to the
development of new diagnostic, prevention, and treatment measures; improves public, animal,
and plant health surveillance; and enhances emergency preparedness and response efforts.
Thus, designating research as DURC should not be seen as a negative categorization, but simply
an indication that the research may warrant additional oversight in order to reduce the risks
that the knowledge, information, products, or technologies generated could be used in a
manner that results in harm. As a general matter, designation of research as DURC does not
mean that the research should not be conducted or communicated.
Nothing in this Policy should be read as superseding U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services or Department of Agriculture statutory authority to regulate the possession, use, or
4

The March 2012 DURC Policy and this Policy are complemented by extant laws and treaties (e.g. Title 18, U.S.
Code, Section 175 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) that prohibit the development, production,
acquisition, or stockpiling of biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes and that prohibit the use of biological agents and toxins as
weapons.

4

transfer of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe risk to public
health and safety, animal and plant health or animal and plant products; or provisions of the
select agent regulations found at 42 CFR Part 73, 9 CFR Part 121, and 7 CFR Part 331; nor the
export control regulations at 15 CFR Parts 730-774 (known as the “Export Administration
Regulations”[EAR]), and 22 CFR Parts 120-130 (known as the “International Traffic in Arms
Regulations”[ITAR]). Note that the term “dual use” should not be interpreted to indicate which
regulations govern the export of these items, and that some of the DURC agents/experiments
are controlled by the ITAR and not the EAR.
This Policy will take effect on September 24, 2015, which is 12 months after its release date. A
12-month time frame will allow institutions and USG funding agencies subject to this Policy to
establish the procedures necessary to comply with this Policy. Institutions to which this Policy
applies, as defined in Section 6.1 are required to certify at the time of seeking funding (e.g., by
signing the face page of a grant application), but no sooner than the effective date of this
Policy, that they are in compliance with all aspects of this Policy.
Section 2. Purpose
The purpose of this Policy is to strengthen ongoing institutional review and oversight of certain
life sciences research with high-consequence pathogens and toxins in order to identify potential
DURC and mitigate risks where appropriate. This Policy delineates the roles and responsibilities
of USG funding agencies, research institutions, and life scientists, and provides requirements
and performance standards for review of life sciences research, identification of potential
DURC, and development and implementation of risk mitigation measures for DURC, where
applicable. In so doing, the Policy seeks to preserve the benefits of life sciences DURC while
minimizing the risk that the knowledge, information, products, or technologies generated from
such research could be used in a manner that results in harm to public health and safety,
agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.
Section 3. Guiding Principles for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research
The following principles serve as a guide for oversight of life sciences dual use research
generally:
A. Life sciences research underpins advances in public health, agriculture, the
environment, and other pertinent areas, and significantly strengthens national security
and the economy.
B. Life sciences research has the potential to produce beneficial knowledge, information,
technology, or products that can also be used in a manner that results in harm to public
health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, or the environment.
Therefore, it is appropriate to have in place a framework and tools for the responsible
oversight, conduct, and communication of such research.
C. Life sciences research is by nature dynamic and can produce unanticipated results and
must be evaluated on an ongoing basis for dual use potential.
5

D. Oversight of DURC must recognize both the need for security and the need for research
progress; as such, the degree of oversight should be commensurate with the possible
consequences of misuse.
E. Effective oversight helps maintain public trust in the life sciences research enterprise by
demonstrating that the scientific community recognizes the implications of DURC and is
acting responsibly to protect public welfare and preserve security.
F. USG agencies that fund DURC, the recipients of those public funds, and individuals who
conduct this research share the oversight responsibility.
G. It is essential to have a consistent approach to the oversight of DURC.
H. Any oversight process for DURC should be periodically evaluated both for effectiveness
and impact on the research enterprise.
I. The free and open conduct and communication of life sciences research is vital to a
robust scientific enterprise and will continue to be the goal of the USG. It also should
continue to be the goal of institutions engaged in life sciences research.
J. Educating the scientific community about the dual use potential of life sciences research
and cultivating a sense of responsibility for dual use research among life scientists is
essential for promoting responsible research behavior.
K. No policy or set of guidelines can anticipate every possible situation. Motivation,
awareness of the dual use issue, and good judgment are key considerations in the
responsible evaluation of research for dual use potential. It is incumbent on those
engaged in life sciences research to adhere to the intent of this Policy as well as to the
performance standards described herein.
Section 4. Definitions
For the purpose of this Policy the following terms are defined:
A. “To certify” is to attest to the USG that an institution subject to this Policy will comply
with all aspects of this Policy.
B. “Dual use research” is research conducted for legitimate purposes that generates
knowledge, information, technologies, and/or products that could be utilized for both
benevolent and harmful purposes.
C. “Dual use research of concern” (DURC) is life sciences research that, based on current
understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information,
products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat
6

with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and
other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.
D. “Institution” is any government agency (Federal, State, tribal, or local), academic
institution, corporation, company, partnership, society, association, firm, sole
proprietorship, or other legal entity conducting research.
E. “Institutional Contact for Dual Use Research” (ICDUR) is an individual designated by the
institution to serve as an institutional point of contact for questions regarding
compliance with and implementation of the requirements for the oversight of DURC as
well as the liaison (as necessary) between the institution and the relevant USG funding
agency.
F. “Institutional Review Entity” (IRE) is a committee established by the institution as
described in Section 7.2.E and empowered to execute the requirements in Section
7.2.B.i- iii, v, and viii.
G. “Life sciences” pertains to living organisms (e.g., microbes, human beings, animals, and
plants) and their products, including all disciplines and methodologies of biology such as
aerobiology, agricultural science, plant science, animal science, bioinformatics,
genomics, proteomics, microbiology, synthetic biology, virology, molecular biology,
environmental science, public health, modeling, engineering of living systems, and all
applications of the biological sciences. The term is meant to encompass the diverse
approaches to understanding life at the level of ecosystems, populations, organisms,
organs, tissues, cells, and molecules.
H. “National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity” (NSABB) is a USG advisory committee
established to advise the USG on dual use research issues as requested.
I. “Principal Investigator” (PI) is an individual who is designated by the research institution
to direct a project or program and who is responsible to the funding agency or the
research institution for the scientific and technical direction of that project or program.
There may be more than one PI on a research grant or project within a single or multiple
institutions.
Section 5. Policy Statement
It is the policy of the USG that:
A. Life sciences research that meets the scope specified in Section 6.2 of this Policy is
subject to USG (through the March 2012 DURC Policy) as well as institutional oversight
(as described in this Policy). The purpose of this oversight is to preserve the benefits of
such research while minimizing the risk that the knowledge, information, products, or
technologies generated by DURC could be used in a manner that results in harm to
7

public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment,
materiel, or national security; and
B. Oversight includes the identification of life sciences research that raises dual use
concerns as well as the implementation of measures to mitigate the risk that DURC is
used in a manner that results in harm. Measures that mitigate the risks of DURC should
be applied in a manner that minimizes, to the extent possible, adverse impact on
legitimate research, is commensurate with the risk, includes flexible approaches that
leverage existing processes, and endeavors to preserve and foster the benefits of
research.
Section 6. Applicability of this Policy and Scope of Research Requiring Oversight
6.1. Applicability
This Policy applies to:
A. USG departments and agencies that fund or conduct life sciences research.
B. Institutions within the United States that both:
i. Receive USG funds to conduct or sponsor life sciences research; and
ii. Conduct or sponsor research that involves one or more of the 15 agents or toxins
listed in Section 6.2.1, even if the research is not supported by USG funds.
C. Institutions outside of the United States that receive USG funds to conduct or
sponsor research that involves one or more of the 15 agents or toxins listed in
Section 6.2.1.
Institutions that do not receive USG funds for life sciences research, but conduct life
sciences research that has the potential to generate knowledge, information, products, or
technologies that could be used in a manner that results in harm, are not subject to
oversight as articulated in this Policy; however, they are strongly encouraged to implement
internal oversight procedures consistent with the culture of shared responsibility
underpinning this Policy.
6.2. Scope of Research Requiring Oversight
Consistent with the March 2012 DURC Policy, under this Policy, research that uses one or
more of the agents or toxins listed in Section 6.2.1, and produces, aims to produce, or can
be reasonably anticipated to produce one or more of the effects listed in Section 6.2.2 will
be evaluated for DURC potential.
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6.2.1. Agents and toxins 5
a) Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic)
b) Bacillus anthracis
c) Botulinum neurotoxin 6
d) Burkholderia mallei
e) Burkholderia pseudomallei
f) Ebola virus
g) Foot-and-mouth disease virus
h) Francisella tularensis
i) Marburg virus
j) Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus
k) Rinderpest virus
l) Toxin-producing strains of Clostridium botulinum
m) Variola major virus
n) Variola minor virus
o) Yersinia pestis
6.2.2. Categories of experiments
a) Enhances the harmful consequences of the agent or toxin
b) Disrupts immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization against the agent or toxin
without clinical and/or agricultural justification
c) Confers to the agent or toxin resistance to clinically and/or agriculturally useful
prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitates
their ability to evade detection methodologies
d) Increases the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate the agent or
toxin
e) Alters the host range or tropism of the agent or toxin
f) Enhances the susceptibility of a host population to the agent or toxin
g) Generates or reconstitutes an eradicated or extinct agent or toxin listed in 6.2.1,
above
6.3. Compliance
Non-compliance with this Policy may result in suspension, limitation, or termination of
USG funding, or loss of future USG funding opportunities for the non-compliant USGfunded research project and of USG funds for other life sciences research at the
institution, consistent with existing regulations and policies governing USG funded
5

The 15 agents and toxins listed in this Policy are subject to the select agent regulations (42 CFR Part 73, 7 CFR Part
331, and 9 CFR Part 121), which set forth the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of select agents and
toxins, and have the potential to pose a severe threat to human, animal, or plant health, or to animal or plant
products. It is important to note, however, that the Federal Select Agent Program does not oversee the
implementation of this Policy or the March 2012 DURC Policy.
6
For the purposes of this Policy, there are no exempt quantities of botulinum neurotoxin. Research involving any
quantity of botulinum neurotoxin should be evaluated for DURC potential.
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research, and may subject the institution to other potential penalties under applicable
laws and regulations. While each USG funding agency is responsible, in accordance with
its relevant statutory and regulatory authorities, for determining how best to ensure
compliance with the oversight requirements set forth in this Policy for research it funds,
the USG will develop and promulgate consistent processes for this purpose.
Section 7. Organizational Framework for Oversight of DURC
This Section describes the organizational framework for review of research with dual use
potential and the oversight of DURC and articulates the roles and responsibilities of PIs,
institutions, USG funding agencies, and the USG under this Policy. Components of the review
and oversight system for DURC include:
A. Identification, by the PI, of life sciences research that involves one or more of the 15
agents or toxins listed in Section 6.2.1.
B. An institutional review process for assessing whether research that uses one or more of
the agents or toxins listed in Section 6.2.1 also produces, aims to produce, or is
reasonably anticipated to produce one or more of the effects listed in Section 6.2.2.
C. For research anticipated to produce at least one of the seven effects, determination of
whether the research meets the definition of DURC in Section 4.C. A risk assessment
should underpin the determination of DURC (see Section 8.A for resources for this
assessment).
D. Identification of the anticipated benefits of the research identified as DURC (see Section
8.A for resources for this assessment). The anticipated benefits should be considered in
conjunction with the previously identified risks (see Section 7.C) in order to develop a
draft risk mitigation plan to guide the conduct and communication of the DURC. The
risk mitigation plan must be approved by the USG funding agency. Plans should be
evaluated by the institution at least annually and modified as necessary for the duration
of the research. Institutions are responsible for ensuring that the DURC is conducted in
accordance with the risk mitigation plan. Research that has already been determined to
be DURC under the March 2012 DURC Policy, and for which a risk mitigation plan has
already been developed, does not need a new risk mitigation plan but the extant risk
mitigation plan will be subject to ongoing review and modification, as necessary, by the
institution.
E. Notification of the results of this review process to the relevant USG funding agency
and, in instances when the research is determined to be DURC, provision of the draft
risk mitigation plan by the institution to the USG funding agency. For non-USG funded
research, notification should be made to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 7 which
7

For non-USG funded research, notifications of the results of the review process should be submitted to the NIH
Program on Biosecurity and Biosafety Policy at DURC@od.nih.gov.
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will receive the notification for administrative purposes and will in turn refer the
notification to an appropriate agency based upon the nature of the research.
F. For institutions subject to this Policy, certify that the institution will comply with this
Policy.
G. Oversight by USG funding agencies and the USG as articulated in the March 2012 DURC
Policy with additional responsibilities with respect to this Policy described in Sections 7.3
and 7.4 below.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the process for institutional review of life sciences research
within the scope of the Policy.

7.1. Responsibilities of Principal Investigators
In accordance with this Policy, PIs are to:
A. Notify the Institutional Review Entity (IRE) as soon as:
i. The PI’s research involves one or more of the agents or toxins listed in
Section 6.2.1;
11

ii.
iii.

The PI’s research with one or more of the agents or toxins listed in Section
6.2.1 also produces, aims to produce, or can be reasonably anticipated to
produce one or more of the seven effects listed in Section 6.2.2; or
The PI’s research that is within the scope of Section 6.2 may meet the
definition of DURC.

The notification must include the PI’s assessment of whether any research involving
these agents or toxins produces, aims to produce, or is reasonably anticipated to
produce one or more of the effects listed in Section 6.2.2.
B. Work with the IRE to assess the dual use risks and benefits of the DURC and to
develop risk mitigation measures.
C. Conduct DURC in accordance with the provisions in the risk mitigation plan.
D. Be knowledgeable about and comply with all institutional and USG policies and
requirements for oversight of DURC.
E. Ensure that laboratory personnel (i.e., those under the supervision of laboratory
leadership, including graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, research technicians,
laboratory staff, and visiting scientists) conducting life sciences research with one or
more of the agents listed in Section 6.2.1 of this Policy have received education and
training on DURC.
F. Communicate DURC in a responsible manner. Communication of research and
research findings is an essential activity for all researchers, and occurs throughout
the research process, not only at the point of publication. Researchers planning to
communicate DURC should do so in compliance with the approved risk mitigation
plan (per Section 7.2.B.vii)
7.2. Responsibilities of USG-Funded Research Institutions
In accordance with this Policy, research institutions (Federal and non-Federal) that receive
USG funds for life sciences research and conduct or sponsor research with any of the 15
agents or toxins listed in Section 6.2.1 are to:
A. Establish and implement internal policies and practices that provide for the
identification and effective oversight of DURC.
B. When research is identified by a PI (per Section 7.1.A) as utilizing one of the agents
or toxins listed in Section 6.2.1, initiate an institutional review and oversight process
(Figure 1) that includes the steps below (Section 7.2.B.i-ix), as applicable. Research
that has already been determined to be DURC under the March 2012 DURC Policy,
and for which a risk mitigation plan has already been developed, is not required to
12

undergo steps 7.2.B.i-vi, but will be subject to ongoing review and notification per
Section 7.2.B.viii-ix.
i. Verification, by an IRE, that the research identified by the PI utilizes one or
more of the agents or toxins listed in Section 6.2.1.
ii. Review, by an IRE, of the PI’s assessment of whether the research produces,
aims to produce, or is reasonably anticipated to produce one or more of the
effects listed in Section 6.2.2 and final determination of their applicability. If
the IRE determines that the research in question does not involve one or more
of the categories of experiments detailed in Section 6.2.2, the research is not
subject to additional review or oversight (i.e., the steps detailed in 7.2.B.iii-ix,
below), but shall continue to be assessed by the PI per Section 7.1.A.
iii. If the research has been assessed per Section 7.2.B.ii to meet the scope of the
Policy (Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2), determination, by an IRE, of whether the
research meets the DURC definition (Section 4.C). Note that a risk assessment
(see Section 8.A for resources for this assessment) should underpin both the
determination of DURC and the subsequent development of a draft risk
mitigation plan (step 7.2.B.v, below). The PI should be included in these
activities, as appropriate. If the IRE determines that the research in question
does not meet the definition of DURC, the research is not subject to additional
DURC oversight (i.e., the steps detailed in 7.2.B.v-ix, below), but the institution
shall notify the appropriate USG funding agency of the institutional review
findings (step 7.2.B.iv, below). If the IRE determines that the research in
question meets the definition of DURC, all additional review and DURC
oversight steps shall be followed. Research that has been determined to be
DURC should not be conducted until an approved risk mitigation plan is in
place.
iv. Within 30 calendar days of the institutional review of the research for DURC
potential, notification to the USG funding agency of any research that involves
one or more of the 15 listed agents and one or more of the seven listed
experimental effects (Section 6.2), including whether it meets or does not
meet the definition of DURC. For non-USG funded research, notification
should be made to NIH, 8 which will in turn refer the notification to an
appropriate USG funding agency, based upon the nature of the research (per
Section 7.E). This initial notification should include: the grant or contract
number related to the research (if the research is funded by the USG); the
name(s) of PI(s); the name(s) of the agent(s) listed in Section 6.2.1 of the
Policy; and a description of why the research is deemed to produce one or
more of the experimental effects listed in Section 6.2.2 of the Policy. For
research that is determined by the IRE to meet the definition of DURC, the
notification should also include: the name of the investigator (if different from
8

For non-USG funded research, notifications of the results of the review process should be submitted to the NIH
Program on Biosecurity and Biosafety Policy at DURC@od.nih.gov.
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v.

vi.

vii.

viii.
ix.

the PI) responsible for the performance of the DURC; and a description of the
IRE’s basis for its determination.
Identification by the IRE of the anticipated benefits of the research identified
as DURC (see Section 8.A for resources for this assessment). The anticipated
benefits should be considered in conjunction with the previously identified
risks (see Section 7.2.B.iii) in order to develop a draft risk mitigation plan to
guide the conduct and communication of the DURC. Institutions should work
with both the PI and USG funding agency, or for non-Federally funded DURC,
the NIH-designated USG agency (per Section 7.E) to develop a risk mitigation
plan. Research that has already been determined to be DURC under the March
2012 DURC Policy, and for which a risk mitigation plan has already been
developed, does not need a new risk mitigation plan but the extant risk
mitigation plan will be subject to ongoing review and modification, as
necessary, by the IRE (per Section 7.2.B.viii).
Within 90 calendar days of an IRE’s determination that the research is DURC,
provision of the draft risk mitigation plan (developed per Section 7.2.B.v) to the
USG funding agency for final review and approval. In the case of non-USG
funded research, draft risk mitigation plans should be provided to the USG
agency designated by NIH (per Section 7.E). Per Section 7.3.D, USG agencies
must provide an initial response within 30 calendar days and should finalize
the plan within 60 calendar days of receipt of the draft plan.
Implementation of the risk mitigation plan. After a risk mitigation plan is
developed (per this Policy or the March 2012 DURC Policy) and is approved by
the USG funding agency, the DURC must be conducted in accordance with that
plan.
IRE review, at least annually, of all active risk mitigation plans. If the research in
question still constitutes DURC, the IRE should modify the plan as needed.
Notification, within 30 calendar days, of: 1) any change in the status of a DURC
project at the institution (including whether the research is determined by the
IRE to no longer meet the definition of DURC), and 2) details of any changes to
risk mitigation plans (such changes need to be approved by the funding
agency). Such notification should be made to the USG funding agency or, in the
case of non-USG funded research, to the USG agency designated by NIH (per
Section 7.E).

C. Ensure that internal policies establish a mechanism for the PI to immediately refer a
project to the IRE as soon as:
i. The PI’s research involves one or more of the agents or toxins listed in Section
6.2.1;
ii. The PI’s research with one or more of the agents or toxins listed in Section 6.2.1
also produces, aims to produce, or can be reasonably anticipated to produce one
or more of the seven effects listed in Section 6.2.2; or
iii. The PI’s research that falls within the scope of Section 6.2 may meet the
definition of DURC.
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D. Designate an Institutional Contact for Dual Use Research (ICDUR) to serve as an
institutional point of contact for questions regarding compliance with and
implementation of the requirements for the oversight of research that falls within
the scope of Section 6.2 and/or meets the definition of DURC. If questions arise
regarding compliance, implementation of this Policy, or the March 2012 DURC
Policy, or when guidance is needed about identifying DURC or developing risk
mitigation plans, the ICDUR serves as the liaison (as necessary) between the
institution and the relevant program officers at the USG funding agencies, or for
non-USG funded research, between the institution and NIH (or the USG agency to
which NIH refers the institution).
E. Establish an IRE to execute the requirements in Section 7.2.B.i-iii, v, and viii, above.
A range of mechanisms for fulfilling the role of an IRE are acceptable as long as the
review entity is appropriately constituted and authorized by the institution to
conduct the dual use review. Options include: (1) a committee established for dual
use review; (2) an extant committee (such as an Institutional Biosafety Committee
[IBC]) whose constitution meets or could meet, with the addition of new or ad hoc
members, the requirements and attributes outlined below; or (3) an externally
administered committee (e.g., an IBC or review entity at a neighboring or regional
institution or a commercial entity).
Regardless of the mechanism selected to fulfill the institutional responsibility of
reviewing research that falls within the scope of Section 6.2.1, the IRE must be
composed of at least five members and:
i. Be sufficiently empowered by the institution to ensure it can execute the
requirements of Section 7.2.B.i-iii, v, and viii;
ii. Include persons with sufficient breadth of expertise to assess the dual use
potential of the range of relevant life sciences research conducted at a given
research facility;
iii. Include persons with knowledge of relevant USG policies and understanding of
risk assessment and risk management considerations, including biosafety and
biosecurity. The review entity may also include, or have available as
consultants, at least one person knowledgeable in the institution’s
commitments, policies, and standard operating procedures;
iv. On a case by case basis, recuse any member of an IRE who is involved in the
research project in question or has a direct financial interest, except to provide
specific information requested by the review entity; and
v. Engage in an ongoing dialogue with the PI of the research in question when
conducting a risk assessment and developing a risk mitigation plan.
F. Maintain records of institutional DURC reviews and completed risk mitigation plans
for the term of the research grant or contract plus three years after its completion,
but no less than eight years, unless a shorter period is required by law or regulation.
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G. Provide education and training on DURC for individuals conducting life sciences
research with one or more of the agents listed in Section 6.2.1 of this Policy, and
maintain records of such education and training for the term of the research grant
or contract plus three years after its completion. Institutions may also wish to
address dual use topics in existing courses on research ethics or the responsible
conduct of research. Institutions may require additional record keeping and should
designate an individual responsible for maintaining documentation.
H. Ensure compliance with this Policy and with approved risk mitigation plans. Report
instances of noncompliance with this Policy, as well as mitigation measures
undertaken by the institution to prevent recurrences of similar noncompliance,
within 30 calendar days to the USG funding agency. In the case of non-USG funded
research, reports should be made to the USG agency designated by NIH (per Section
7.E of this Policy).
I. As necessary, assist the PIs conducting life sciences research when questions arise
about whether their research may require further review or oversight.
J. Establish an internal mechanism for PIs to appeal institutional decisions regarding
research that is determined by the IRE to meet the definition of DURC.
K. Make information about the process for review of research subject to the Policy
available upon request, as consistent with applicable law.
L. When applying for or accepting USG funds for life sciences research, as applicable,
certify that the institution will be or is in compliance with all aspects of this Policy.
Notes: There may be cases in which a Federal department or agency simply passes through
funding from another Federal department or agency to support life sciences research at an
institution that conducts or sponsors research involving any of the agents listed in Section
6.2.1. In this instance, the agency originally providing the funding shall be considered the
USG funding agency, and the ultimate recipient of the funds shall be considered the
institution, and respectively shall fulfill the requirements expected of each under this Policy.
The USG also recognizes that there will be situations where elements of a potential DURC
project are being carried out at multiple institutions through a subaward with a primary
institution which directly receives the grant or contract from the USG funding agency. In
cases of such collaborations involving multiple institutions via a subaward, the primary
institution is responsible for notifying the funding agency of research that falls within the
scope of Section 6.2 and, if that research is determined to be DURC, providing copies of
each institution's risk mitigation plan. Furthermore, the primary institution should ensure
that DURC oversight is consistently applied by all entities participating in the collaboration.
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7.3. Responsibilities of USG Funding Agencies
The oversight process and the roles and responsibilities of the USG departments and
agencies that fund life sciences research are delineated in the complementary March 2012
DURC Policy. In conjunction with the requirements delineated in the March 2012 DURC
Policy, USG funding agencies are to:
A. Require all institutions they fund that meet the applicability criteria in Section 6.1 to
implement this Policy.
B. Respond to questions from institutions regarding the oversight of DURC and provide
guidance to institutions regarding compliance with this Policy.
C. For USG agency-funded and proposed life sciences research that meets the criteria
listed in Section 6.2.1, assess the applicability of the criteria listed in Section 6.2.2,
and for such research that also meets the definition of DURC, complete a risk
assessment prior to the funding decision and when progress reports are submitted
by PIs. USG funding agencies will review projects on an ongoing basis for DURC and
are to:
i. For research that meets the criteria in Section 6.2.1, notify an institution
when the USG funding agency determines that the research meets the
criteria listed in Section 6.2.2 and meets the definition of DURC;
ii. Notify an institution when the USG funding agency does not agree with an
institution’s assessment of the applicability of the criteria listed in Section
6.2.2 or with an institution’s determination of the DURC status of such
research;
iii. Review institutional risk mitigation plans (and any subsequent changes) and
notify an institution of concerns or disagreements with a risk mitigation plan;
iv. Prior to reaching its final determination, consult with institutions to address
disagreements identified in accordance with 7.3.C.i, ii, and iii above.
D. Provide an initial response to the institution within 30 calendar days from receipt of
material or inquiry. In cases of DURC, finalize risk mitigation plans in a timely
fashion, but no later than 60 calendar days after initial submission of the draft plan
by the institution.
E. Respond to reports of non-compliance with this Policy and work with institutions to
address such non-compliance.
F. For research institutions in low-resource environments outside of the United States
that receive USG funds, consider serving as the implementing IRE if appropriate.
7.4. Responsibilities of the USG
In accordance with this Policy, the USG is to:
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A. Develop training tools and materials for use by the USG agencies and by institutions
implementing this Policy.
B. Provide education and outreach to stakeholders about dual use policies and issues.
C. Provide guidance to institutions on the sharing of DURC research products and on
the communication of DURC.
D. Convene advisory bodies such as NSABB, as necessary, to develop recommendations
on particularly complex cases of DURC.
E. Periodically assess the impact of this Policy on life sciences research programs and
institutions, and update this Policy and the March 2012 DURC Policy, as appropriate.
This should be informed by national and international dialogue with interested
communities, including scientists, research administrators, security experts, and
public health officials.
Section 8. Resources for Institutional Oversight of DURC
It is the expectation of the USG that PIs and institutions will be able to identify, assess, and
appropriately manage DURC. To assist in these processes, the following resources are available
for optional use:
A. Guidance documents for DURC oversight. The USG has developed a compendium of
tools to assist investigators and research institutions in the implementation of DURC
oversight outlined in this Policy and the March 2012 DURC Policy 9. These tools will aid
in the understanding and identification of DURC, the risk assessment and development
of risk mitigation plans and risk management processes, the responsible communication
of DURC, and training and education on DURC.
B. Consultation with the USG funding agency. Institutions may consult with the USG
department or agency that is funding the research in question for advice on matters
related to DURC. Such consultations should involve the ICDUR. The funding agency
program officers can provide guidance on DURC issues. Questions regarding non-USG
funded research should be directed to NIH or to the USG funding agency to which NIH
refers the institution based on the nature of the research in question. Consultation with
the funding agency is not mandatory or intended as a substitute for institutional dual
use review or the reporting requirements (see Section 7.2.B above). Such consultations
may be appropriate when:

9

These tools can be accessed at the U.S. Government Science, Safety, Security (S3) website at
http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse.
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i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

The IRE requires guidance on developing an adequate risk mitigation plan in cases
where the potential risks are perceived as particularly high;
The IRE considers the only viable risk mitigation measure to be not conducting or
not communicating the research in question;
The PI does not agree with the finding of the IRE and so the institution would like
to request outside advice;
The research in question represents a particularly complex case or appears to fall
outside the scope of this Policy, but still seems to present significant concerns; or
Guidance is required to ensure a clear understanding of how the USG interprets
the definition of DURC and related terms.
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